Mon, Dec 20, 1999 page9

• Good news, bad news: Korean Peninsula at year's end

  • By Ralph Cossa
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  After many years of bad news outweighing the good regarding the Korean Peninsula, this year the good news finally seems to outweigh the bad. But there's still enough bad news to make even an optimist cautious, says Washington observer Ralph Cossa

  The bad news

  Current euphoria regarding North Korea's seemingly cooperative attitude notwithstanding, Pyongyang has still shown little inclination to respond positively to South Korea's Sunshine Policy overtures; time and again, attempts by Seoul to engage Pyongyang in direct dialogue have fallen on unreceptive ears.

  

  Illustration: Mountain People

  In addition, North Korea has yet to officially respond to the US engagement initiative delivered personally to Pyongyang by former US Defense Secretary William Perry last May and, after six rounds, there has been little real progress at the Four-Party Talks involving the two Koreas, the US, and China. Pyongyang's anti-US and anti-ROK rhetoric continues unabated.

  Meanwhile, the US-North Korea crisis over the suspected underground facility at Kumchangri earlier this year demonstrated that, even when Pyongyang finally agrees to cooperate, getting there is a painful (if not costly) process.

  The inspection agreement has failed to convince skeptics that the North is really serious about halting its nuclear weapons program and honoring its commitments to work toward a peaceful, stable, nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula.

  In addition, the US Congress has literally declared open season on North Korea, demanding greater Administration accountability and tying future funding for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to "significant progress" in stemming North Korea's missile development and export programs.

  North Korea's agreement to temporarily suspend further missile tests (while retaining the right to develop and export such systems) as long as constructive missile talks between Pyongyang and Washington were taking place was a positive step,although the negotiations once again give the appearance of US attempts to bribe the North from refraining from bad behavior.

  If that were not enough, continued hostile rhetoric, threats, and accusations by the North, along with the discovery of North Korean submarines in South Korean waters and other blatant acts of espionage, continue to call into question the value of US and South Korean attempts to offer olive branches to the North, while the June 1999 North-South naval confrontation -- in which a North Korean ship was sunk -- underscores the continued volatility of the situation.

  Meanwhile, North Korea remains one of the most heavily-armed nations on earth, with the majority of its military forces forward-deployed in a manner that makes them immediately threatening to Seoul.

  The good news

  Nonetheless, there are some positive signs on the horizon and some ongoing initiatives which, while limited, do provide a framework upon which to build toward reconciliation and ultimate reunification.

  1. Agreed Framework

  The US-DPRK Agreed Framework traded a freeze in North Korea's nuclear program for interim fuel oil deliveries and the eventual construction of two light-water nuclear reactors (LWRs). Despite increased criticism as a result of the Kumchangri crisis and other instances or real or suspected North Korean misbehavior, it remains clear to this observer that the United States and its allies remain better off with the Agreed Framework than without it.

  The DPRK's suspected nuclear weapons program at Yongbyon remains frozen. Equally important, Pyongyang has allowed for the canning and continued safeguarding of the existing DPRK reactor's spent fuel. This, in and of itself, is a major contribution to US non-proliferation goals.

  The Agreed Framework also provides a vehicle for dialogue and a standard by which to measure DPRK sincerity and willingness to cooperate.

  In the end, it should be noted, the North was willing to submit Kumchangri to US inspection rather than let the Agreed Framework die, even if it could not resist using brinkmanship techniques to gain additional benefits from compliance. The inspection provided no evidence of North Korean non-compliance.

  2. KEDO

  The success of the Agreed Framework is closely linked to the success of its implementing mechanism, KEDO. The establishment of KEDO has provided a creative way for the ROK to be directly involved in the Agreed Framework process in a meaningful way.

  From its inception, the ROK has been a member of KEDO's Executive Board and has had a direct role in KEDO's decision-making process. ROK officials have been involved in all KEDO meetings with the DPRK. As a result, KEDO has become an important vehicle for direct North-South contact.

  In short, KEDO has transformed the bilateral US-DPRK Agreed Framework process into a multilateral effort in which the Republic of Korea now plays a leading role. This has also helped restore South Korean confidence in the US; confidence that was shaken during the negotiating process leading up to the Agreed Framework.

  3. Four-Party Talks

  While the Four-Party Talks have not made much substantive progress, merely conducting the Talks achieves several important purposes.

  First, it underscores the commitment of the other three parties to the armistice until such time as a treaty is achieved.

  Secondly, it reiterates to North Korea that a separate peace treaty with the US, excluding the ROK, remains out of the question.

  Third, it keeps Pyongyang engaged and provides an opportunity for direct discussions between North and South.

  Fourth, it provides China an opportunity to be actively involved in the process -- Chinese strong backing for the establishment of the two subcommittees reportedly was instrumental in persuading North Korea to accept this ROK proposal.

  4. Sunshine Policy

  Another cause for optimism is the fact that the Kim Dae-jung Administration in South Korea, in marked contrast to its predecessor, has laid out a long-term, comprehensive strategy for dealing with the North.

  The South's Constructive Engagement or Sunshine Policy embraces both cooperation and deterrence. It calls for a gradual opening up of the North and confidence building measures today that will hopefully pave the way for eventual reunification.

  The main difference between this policy and earlier approaches is that it is more accepting of allowing the North to die of natural causes over time rather than trying to hasten this outcome by prematurely turning off life support systems today. It recognizes that a great deal of "stage setting" must occur before the two sides can even seriously think of merging.

  The less the North Korean regime feels imminently threatened, the more likely it is to cooperate -- and the less likely it is to lash out in irrational ways. Predicting the North's behavior remains a risky endeavor, however. This is why continued deterrence -- in the form of a solid ROK-US alliance and a continued US military presence -- is essential until complete reunification is achieved.

  5. The Perry Report

  Cooperation and deterrence are also the key phrases in describing Perry's policy initiative. Perry lays out two paths for future US-DPRK interaction: enhanced cooperation or enhanced deterrence.

  The decision as to which path to take rests on North Korean behavior. In other words, North Korea will be rewarded for good behavior and confronted if its behavior remains confrontational; a welcome shift from a policy that seemed to dole out benefits not for positive actions but merely for the North's willingness to refrain from negative ones.

  Perry has also managed to facilitate greater three way cooperation among Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington. Thanks to the efforts of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) that he helped to establish, the three countries have successfully managed their respective, somewhat differing views on the potentially contentious issue of how best to deal with North Korea.

  This firm, unified carrot-and-stick approach contributed greatly to North Korea's willingness to agree to refrain from destabilizing actions (ie, no missile tests) in return for a long overdue partial lifting of US economic sanctions. North Korea had previously argued, not without some justification, that the American refusal to lift sanctions put the US in violation of the Agreed Framework. Pyongyang's decision to cooperate on the missile front makes further progress in its relations with Washington and Tokyo possible.

  It also removes a potential irritant in US-ROK and US-Japan relations, while keeping South Korea's "Sunshine Policy" of increased engagement with the North alive.

  The path ahead

  Many obstacles and moments of truth still lie ahead in the quest for a peaceful, prosperous, nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. While a positive outcome cannot be guaranteed, there are steps that can be taken to help improve the prospects of getting there from here.

  First and foremost is the need for continued deterrence, given the level of uncertainty about what the North really desires or is willing to concede in the interests of greater peace and stability. Flowing from this is the need for continued close cooperation and coordination among Seoul, Washington and Tokyo.

  One thing appears certain: North Korea will continue to seek the daylight between various US, ROK, and Japanese approaches and views in order to gain negotiating advantage.

  Keeping these policy gaps as narrow as possible is in everyone's national security interest and will make dealing with the DPRK (always a grueling task) perhaps a little less difficult.

  The US and Japan must also ensure that their respective bilateral initiatives with North Korea do not give Pyongyang false hopes that it can isolate Seoul from the broader Korean Peninsula peace process.

  The US message, as initially spelled out in the Four-Party Talks proposal, must remain crystal clear: South Korea cannot and will not be excluded from any peace agreement or from any negotiations directly related to the Peninsula's future security structure.

  All involved, and especially the US Congress, must also give Perry's initiative time to work.

  The stakes involved in dealing with North Korea are too high to continually subject the process to partisan politics and power plays between the administration and Congress.

  Regrettably, as the year 2000 elections approach, it will become increasingly more easy to recommend good policy than it will be to implement it.

  As recommended both by President Kim and Dr. Perry, a comprehensive "package deal" approach is needed, one that ties together individual programs like the Agreed Framework/KEDO, the Four-Party Talks, the US-DPRK missile talks, and other such initiatives, with clearly defined linkages and milestones. The US and ROK also have to more clearly specify what constitutes sufficient progress in South-North dialogue. Clearly identified criteria and milestones, along with a willingness to honor quid pro quo agreements, is a prerequisite to success of any package deal.

  As part of this process, the US must continue to demonstrate its good faith adherence to the Agreed Framework.

  In the final analysis, it appears inevitable that the Korean Peninsula will one day be reunited under the political and economic system that prevails today in Seoul. Getting there from here is the challenge; one that requires careful management of US-DPRK and US alliance relationships.

  Skillfully coordinated US-ROK-Japanese policies can help ensure that this desired condition is brought about peacefully. Such trilateral cooperation -- which entails the strengthening of the respective US security relationships with Tokyo and Seoul and a significant improvement in ROK-Japan relations -- can help create a virtual alliance?among the US, Japan and an eventually reunified Korea; one that would serve the national security interests of all three nations as well as the broader cause of peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

  Ralph Cossa is executive director

  of the Pacific Forum at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
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