The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) National Congress tomorrow will potentially be one of the most consequential in the party’s history.
Since the founding of the DPP until the late 2000s or early 2010s, the party was riven with factional infighting, at times getting very ugly and very public. For readers curious to know more about the context of the factions and who they are, two previous columns explore them in depth: “The powerful political force that vanished from the English press,” April 23, 2024 and “Introducing the powerful DPP factions,” April 27, 2024.
In 2008, a relatively unknown mid-level former bureaucrat named Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) made a bold bid to become party chair in the devastating aftermath of the disarray and corruption of the Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) presidency and the subsequent landslide election defeat inflicted on the party as punishment by the voters. To bring order to the party, Tsai — who was not affiliated with any faction at the time, though one later formed that to her considerable annoyance named itself after her — laid out a power-sharing formula for national party and government appointments that was fixed at certain percentages to each faction and thereby removing much of the incentive to battle it out with each other.
Photo: Taipei Times file photo
In an edition of this column published on June 22 titled “The risks inherent in New Tide and Lai clique domination” we examined my analysis on the factional or personal ties to President William Lai (賴清德), who is also party chair, and found that Tsai’s formula had been completely abandoned in favor of Lai’s New Tide faction and personal loyalists. In that column, I warned of the risk of the factions going back to war with each other and noted “we may have a chance to see which way the wind is blowing at the DPP National Congress.”
SHIFTING ALLIANCES
Since that column was published it has become clear that the factions are indeed back to struggling with each other, and the National Congress is going to reveal the winners and losers. Specifically, all eyes will be on how many votes out of the 617 delegates each faction gets for their candidates for the 30-member Executive Committee and the even more powerful 10-member Central Standing Committee.
Photo: Taipei Times file photo
The outgoing Central Standing Committee had three members from New Tide (新潮流系統, usually abbreviated to 新系), two members from the Taiwan Normal Country Promotion Association (TNCPA, 正常國家促進會, usually abbreviated to 正國會), two from the Ing Faction (英系, named after Tsai Ing-wen) and one each from the Su Faction (蘇系, named after former premier Su Tseng-chang), Taiwan Forward (湧言會, often commonly referred to as Ocean Faction, 海派) and the Green Fellowship Association (綠色友誼連線, sometimes written as 綠色友誼系統 but also commonly referred to as the Sunny Bank Gang, 陽信幫).
Previously there was a New-Su-Association (新蘇連) alliance, referring to New Tide, Su and the Sunny Bank factions, which gave them half of the committee. Apparently, this alliance has lost the Su Faction, which is reportedly now cooperating with the Ing Faction for purposes of this election.
The TNCPA has joined a “trust in Lai” (referring to William Lai) coalition with New Tide and promised to only run two candidates for the Central Standing Committee. The same coalition also has the newest faction, which I have translated as “Vital Spring of Democracy” (民主活水連線), which is unsurprising as the faction was explicitly formed to back William Lai (or perhaps ride on his coattails).
DOUBLE TROUBLE
After the boring years under Tsai Ing-wen, for the first time in awhile there is blood in the water due to two potentially seismic events. Not only is Tsai not around to direct the votes of the non-factionally aligned delegates, this time around there have been efforts to break off pieces of two factions.
Historically, the DPP has gone through chaotic periods when the factions realign, new factions arise and swallow up chunks of old factions, old factions morph into new ones and alliances between factions shift. New Tide, which was one of the original factions at the founding of the DPP and the only one whose current name predates this century.
Already we have seen some shifting alliances but it is unclear how big of a shift the factions are undergoing or will be undergoing. The results on Sunday may give us some idea as to how things stand and maybe some clues as to where they are going.
The first big event was Tainan Legislator Chen Ting-fei (陳亭妃) registering herself as a candidate for the Central Standing Committee in defiance of the orders of her TNCPA faction, which as part of its “trust in Lai” alliance had promised to only run the two candidates they had designated, which did not include her. Chen is very familiar with Lai going back to his days as Tainan mayor and when both of them served in the legislature representing different Tainan districts.
Chen apparently does not “trust in Lai” and openly stated her reason for running for the committee is to have a vote against any proposals to change the rules covering the Tainan mayoral primary. She has coveted the job since at least 2018, and it is widely assumed that it was Lai who blocked her path.
Chen had been a leader of the TNCPA in the south since the days when the faction was still named after former premier You Si-Kun. However, the TNCPA apparently feared Lai and New Tide more than losing her, and kicked her and two of her supporters out. Almost certainly related, the other two top leaders in the TNCPA are Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) and Lin You-chang (林右昌). Lai recently appointed them to the plum positions of foreign minister and second in command at the DPP respectively.
The second bombshell event was the arrest of former deputy premier Cheng Wen-tsan (鄭文燦) on charges of bribery. He has not been convicted of the allegations and remains innocent until proven guilty, but he is being held incommunicado after a judge agreed with prosecutors that he had been tampering with evidence by deleting LINE messages to alleged co-conspirators, so was a risk for evidence tampering, witness collusion or fleeing the country.
That this was a fourth judge and two judges had previously let him out on bail is curious. Regardless, Cheng is now out of action politically and will spend at least two months in jail according to local media reports. Though not convicted of any crime, local commentators have widely pronounced him to have “fallen off the horse” (落馬), prejudging him guilty and his career over. It did not help that he had recently been caught up in a thesis plagiarism scandal.
BLOOD IN THE WATER
The local press is reporting that Chen Ting-fei has been canvassing people in the south for support for her Central Standing Committee member bid. It is known she was the faction’s leader in the south, and very likely many of the faction’s members in the south were recruited by and reported to her.
Will those delegates be loyal to her or to the faction when it comes voting time tomorrow? Because the factions are officially banned and operate partially in the shadows, we can not even be sure exactly how many delegates are TNCPA, never mind trying to determine their individual loyalties. Usually, local news outlets find some insiders to explain what is going on, but it appears no one knows in this case.
In my column last month, I wrote in regards to the congress “it will be interesting to see if anyone has the audacity to challenge Lai.” Now that Chen has, how will other delegates respond?
That is a huge question. Are the delegates that are up for grabs more afraid of Lai, or Lai’s power grab on behalf of New Tide and its allies?
Her run is bold and brave, and the results will say a lot about the state of the party. If she loses, or wins big, either way it would be a big deal.
There is also considerable speculation regarding Cheng Wen-tsan’s subfaction of New Tide, and not a few conspiracy theories and speculation related to his arrest and internal power dynamics. That will be a subject of an upcoming column.
There are three main subfactions within New Tide. One is devoted to the head of the Control Yuan, Chen Chu (陳菊), and largely centered around Kaohsiung, where she used to be mayor. However, since the Control Yuan is the branch of government devoted to investigating and impeaching government officials, she has to remain neutral in politics, which limits her ability to lead the faction.
The most powerful subfaction is unsurprisingly President Lai’s, which is weighted towards Tainan, where he was once mayor, though he has a fair number in other areas. Cheng’s subfaction is centered on Taoyuan from the days he was mayor there.
It has been widely reported that Lai and Cheng have never gotten along well, but Cheng was a powerful figure in the party and they had to work together. Now with Cheng out of action to represent their interests in New Tide, and Lai openly favoring his Tainan loyalists, there is considerable speculation on what comes next for this subfaction.
Will they stay in New Tide? Join another faction? Start a new faction? Disperse in the wind? No one has any idea, though I suspect starting a new faction is not likely as they are not big enough and do not have any truly powerful members.
There are reports that figures from both the Ing Faction and “Vital Spring” faction have been meeting with figures from the Cheng subfaction, implying that they are trying to win them over. Others have suggested that the subfaction might back Chen’s committee bid. Though it seems a long shot, it would be interesting if Chen’s southern Taiwan backers joined up with the north Taiwan Cheng subfaction. The big questions are there enough of these people combined to form a new faction, would their internal cultures clash and other than Chen is there anyone who would vie for leadership.
Donovan’s Deep Dives is a regular column by Courtney Donovan Smith (石東文) who writes in-depth analysis on everything about Taiwan’s political scene and geopolitics. Donovan is also the central Taiwan correspondent at ICRT FM100 Radio News, co-publisher of Compass Magazine, co-founder Taiwan Report (report.tw) and former chair of the Taichung American Chamber of Commerce. Follow him on X: @donovan_smith.
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