Taiwan-South Korea relations face a critical test, as a deadline forces both sides to confront a long-simmering issue.
Taipei has requested that Seoul correct its classification of Taiwan in South Korea’s e-arrival system, where it has been labeled as “China (Taiwan)” since Feb. 24 last year. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs set today as a clear deadline for revision, warning that failure to act would trigger reciprocal measures beginning tomorrow.
Taipei has already signaled its willingness to respond. Beginning on March 1, the government changed the designation of South Koreans on the alien resident certificates from the “Republic of Korea” to “South Korea,” explicitly framing the move as a matter of reciprocity.
For years, South Korea’s immigration system has labeled Taiwan as “China (Taiwan).” The designation has appeared on identification documents for long-term Taiwanese residents in South Korea since 2004 and has long been known within the community. However, it only recently became visible to a broader public.
The e-arrival card system, which must be completed by temporary foreign visitors to South Korea, fully replaced paper forms in December last year. Once the paper arrival card was eliminated, short-term foreign visitors entering South Korea were required to use the digital system, effectively extending the “China (Taiwan)” designation to Taiwanese travelers.
Previously, the issue drew little attention, as visitors could simply write “Taiwan” on paper arrival forms. Under the digital system, they are required to select “China (Taiwan)” from a predefined list.
However, the way South Korea’s immigration classification system is set up deserves closer examination. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is listed as “China P.R.,” while Hong Kong and Macau appear as “China P.R. (Hong Kong)” and “China P.R. (Macau).” Taiwan alone is labeled “China (Taiwan),” without the “P.R.” designation.
This inconsistency points to a special treatment of Taiwan in accordance with South Korea’s “one China” policy, rather than explicitly supporting Beijing’s claim; Taiwan is clearly different from the Chinese territories of Hong Kong and Macao.
That approach contrasts with a recent case in Denmark, where Taiwanese nationals were reportedly labeled only as “China” or “CHN,” with no mention of Taiwan.
It is also important to understand South Korean society’s broader perception of Taiwan and those who are considered to be Taiwanese within the country. Many people in South Korea who have been categorized as “China (Taiwan)” and who have generally been lenient toward the label belong to long-established overseas Chinese communities. Such community members hold Taiwanese nationality without a household registration in Taiwan and have resided in South Korea for generations.
Their significance reflects deep ties between Taiwan and South Korea. South Korea only ended diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1992. It was the last country in Asia to do so. As a result, with greater exposure to Taiwan and the Taiwanese government, there was more space for overseas Chinese in South Korea to fixate on the national identity of Taiwan, as the Republic of China (ROC), rather than the PRC, unlike in many other countries.
Taiwanese flags are prominently displayed during Double Ten National Day celebrations in places such as Incheon Chinatown. Overseas Chinese schools across South Korea hang Taiwanese flags and portraits of Sun Yat-sen (孫逸仙) in their classrooms, much like schools in Taiwan. The Taipei Mission in Korea, Taiwan’s de facto embassy, works closely with these groups, which identify with Taiwan and support Taiwan’s public diplomacy efforts.
The “China” label applied to Taiwan, without the “P.R.” designation, was not necessarily a case of South Korea showing disrespect toward Taiwan; rather, it reflects an entrenched South Korean understanding shaped by the ROC identity of Taiwan, influenced by the significant presence of overseas Chinese communities in South Korea who prefer to identify with Taiwan over the PRC.
Most residents in South Korea categorized under “China (Taiwan)” on their residence cards belong to long-established overseas Chinese communities.
It is notable that South Korea appears to have made an adjustment. The e-Arrival card system now lists Taiwan simply as “Taiwan” [editor’s note: the change was only on the e-Arrival card system, not on arrival cards] despite the potential backlash from Beijing. That suggests that Seoul has understood the sensitivity of the issue from Taiwan’s standpoint today and responded accordingly.
Unfortunately, the issue goes beyond the label itself, but what the episode reveals. The set deadline and the public pressure surrounding it have laid bare the limits of today’s Taiwan-South Korea relations.
Tensions have also spilled beyond formal diplomacy. Events such as the World Baseball Classic have stirred strong national sentiment, with an unhealthy Taiwan-South Korea rivalry quickly playing out in the media and online. That South Korea advanced to the knockout stage in Miami despite its loss to Taiwan drew understandable negative reactions from Taiwan.
Today, economic ties are robust, and exchanges are frequent, but institutional links have remained weak since 1992. A deeper Taiwan-South Korea partnership would be better able to handle disputes like this before they escalate, strengthening cooperation between the two democracies in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific region.
Alan Jeong is a Georgetown University graduate who previously served at the Korean Immigration Service.
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