The Indo-Pacific region has emerged as the epicenter of geopolitical contestation, where great and middle powers test their strategies. Among these, Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy (NSP) and South Korea’s New Southern Policy-plus are key frameworks that illustrate how smaller and middle powers adapt to a region shaped by China’s rise.
From a southern perspective, particularly that of Indonesia and the rest of ASEAN, the policies can be conceptualized as two strands of a southern helix: Taiwan’s bottom-up and resilient approach, intertwined with South Korea’s visible and institutional engagement. Together, they expand Southeast Asia’s policy space and reaffirm its agency in navigating the South China Sea.
Taiwan’s NSP, launched in 2016 under the leadership of then-president Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), was designed to offset diplomatic isolation by deepening ties with South and Southeast Asia, as well as Australia and New Zealand. It emphasizes six corridors: technology, health, resilience, think tanks, non-governmental organizations (NGO) and young people. For Indonesia, Taiwan’s role as a top 10 source of foreign direct investment is crucial, particularly in the electronics, petrochemicals and manufacturing sectors.
Beyond investment, the NSP’s real value lies in scholarships, linkages with small and medium-sized enterprises (SME), and vocational training. Cooperation flows through academia and NGOs rather than formal diplomacy, thereby avoiding Beijing’s retaliation and preserving an informal yet resilient channel of engagement.
This mode of engagement might appear quiet, but it is precisely its low profile that makes it sustainable. The impact of Taiwan’s NSP is subtle, but significant, nurturing social capital, diversifying investment and reducing dependence on China. It is the hidden strand of the helix: quiet, informal and resilient.
The approach highlights how soft power and grassroots engagement can foster long-term resilience, even under political constraints, thereby providing ASEAN with continuity even when high-level diplomacy falters.
South Korea’s NSP, introduced in 2017 by then-South Korean president Moon Jae-in, aimed to diversify Seoul’s foreign policy after the crisis over US involvement in a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense anti-missile installation and reduce reliance on China. Structured around the pillars of people, prosperity and peace, the policy was upgraded to New Southbound Policy Plus (NSP+) with a greater emphasis on health, digital economy and the environment during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Unlike Taiwan’s informal approach, South Korea’s policy operates through structured state-to-state cooperation. Indonesia has benefited from South Korea’s prominent projects. A Hyundai electric vehicle plant in Bekasi symbolizes industrial modernization, while defense cooperation on the KF-21 warplane project reflects deeper strategic ties.
South Korea has also invested in smart city development for Ibu Kota Nusantara. These initiatives generate jobs, enhance technology transfer and embed Indonesia within regional supply chains. For ASEAN, South Korea’s policy institutionalizes engagement through summits, free-trade agreements — including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership — reinforcing ASEAN’s role in the Indo-Pacific order.
South Korea’s policy represents the outward spiral of the helix: visible, formal and structural. It situates ASEAN not only as an economic partner, but as a strategic player, signaling Seoul’s commitment to ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific region.
Indonesia and the rest of ASEAN face the dilemma of managing economic dependence on China while protecting sovereignty in the South China Sea. Chinese incursions near the Natuna Sea highlight the stakes.
Taiwan’s NSP indirectly supports resilience by offering maritime domain awareness training, fisheries management cooperation and technology transfer under civilian cover.
South Korea’s policy can deliver patrol vessels, digital surveillance and port resilience projects shaped as economic or environmental initiatives.
ASEAN’s cautious consensus limits collective action, so external engagement must strengthen unity rather than fragment it. Taiwan’s informal, bottom-up approach and South Korea’s structured, top-down engagement can be complementary if balanced carefully. Together, they provide ASEAN with the tools to reinforce resilience without escalating confrontation.
The contrast between Taiwan’s and South Korea’s policies creates a dual track for Indonesia. Taiwan strengthens the foundations of societal resilience, while South Korea offers industrial and strategic visibility. The duality gives Indonesia policy flexibility: It can engage both strands of the helix without being bound to one great-power orbit. Taiwan operates as the inner spiral, quiet and enduring, while South Korea functions as the outer spiral, visible and transformative.
The metaphor of the helix is especially apt, as both strands are distinct, yet inseparable, generating a combined force that enhances Indonesia’s government as it manages external pressures.
For ASEAN, the southern helix metaphor captures the interplay of these two approaches. Taiwan contributes bottom-up resilience through education, SMEs and civil society, while South Korea institutionalizes ASEAN’s strategic role in formal frameworks. Together, they reinforce ASEAN’s capacity to act as more than a passive arena of great-power rivalry.
Taiwan ensures that ASEAN can document and monitor maritime activities, while South Korea gives members the state-level platforms to amplify their concerns. In combination, the approaches transform ASEAN into an active site of middle-power experimentation, where alternative strategies to manage China’s rise can be tested without undermining ASEAN unity.
The southern helix is not without risks. Chinese pushback remains a serious concern, ranging from economic retaliation to diplomatic isolation. ASEAN cohesion could fracture if member states prioritize bilateral deals with China over collective resilience. Taiwan’s informal channels limit scalability, while South Korea’s formal frameworks risk reducing ASEAN’s flexibility. Yet, these risks can be mitigated by framing cooperation in non-military terms, such as disaster relief or environmental protection, and anchoring initiatives in ASEAN-centered mechanisms. By doing so, Indonesia and ASEAN can extract maximum benefit while minimizing escalation.
Framing cooperation as inclusive and developmental helps preserve ASEAN centrality while strengthening its negotiating leverage in the South China Sea.
Taiwan’s and South Korea’s policies reflect two complementary strands of a southern helix. Taiwan’s approach prioritizes human capital and civil society through subtle, bottom-up engagement. South Korea’s approach delivers industrial modernization and strategic partnerships through visible, institutional channels. For Indonesia, the duality provides resilience and transformation, and for ASEAN, it demonstrates that the region is not merely a passive recipient, but an active laboratory of middle-power strategies.
In navigating the South China Sea and broader shifts in the Indo-Pacific region, the helix metaphor underlines how Southeast Asia can weave together the strengths of Taiwan and South Korea. By doing so, ASEAN affirms its agency and secures a more balanced and autonomous future, proving that the region can shape its own trajectory in an era of great-power competition.
Darynaufal Mulyaman is an international relations lecturer at the Christian University of Indonesia, focusing on international political economy and area studies.
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