In the late 19th century, as China, Japan and Korea faced growing pressure from Western powers, they grappled with a question: Should “unequal treaties” be accepted as a temporary cost of survival, or resisted at all costs to defend national sovereignty? Behind that laid a deeper question — can a nation accommodate an external power while strengthening itself from within?
The anxiety surrounding Taiwan’s relationship with the US carries a familiar resonance. Taiwan must navigate new tariffs, semiconductor diplomacy and the realpolitik of a shifting world order — all through the lens of Taiwan-US relations. At its heart lies a familiar dilemma: Can we engage with a powerful partner such as the US while safeguarding our political coherence, economic resilience and national dignity?”
Taiwan’s role in the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy is not a partisan matter. Republican and Democratic administrations see Taiwan not just as a flashpoint, but as a partner. That brings opportunities such as deeper defense cooperation, friend-shored supply chains and the potential for long-term capital alignment. However, the return of US President Donald Trump brings a different tone and tempo to Taiwan-US relations.
On one hand, there is a renewed emphasis on hardline economic measures — such as the 32 percent tariff on Taiwanese imports, a move that is likely to send shockwaves across multiple industries. On the other, Taiwan has demonstrated its willingness to engage with the US.
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) — arguably the nation’s most strategically important enterprise — has pledged more than US$100 billion to expand its operations in the US and has already begun production in Arizona. The company has also tentatively agreed to form a joint venture with Intel, with TSMC acquiring a 20 percent stake in Intel’s chipmaking operations — an unprecedented collaboration blending Taiwanese efficiency with US industrial scale.
Those developments position Taiwan as a pivotal contributor to US manufacturing renewal. However, it has also sparked concerns at home, with many asking why the nation is investing so heavily abroad. Why are Taiwanese companies creating jobs in Phoenix or Ohio, while issues such as double taxation remain unresolved and bilateral investment agreements continue to stall?
To a certain extent, those questions should be addressed by the administration in good faith, under a democratic society engaging in necessary debate. However, left unaddressed, they risk fueling populist backlash and anti-government sentiment.
If President William Lai (賴清德) and his administration fail to clearly communicate the strategic vision behind those international moves, public skepticism might harden into suspicion — and suspicion into opposition.
We must be honest about the asymmetries in that relationship. The US is a superpower with global obligations and domestic political dynamics we do not control. However, Taiwan is not without agency. Our economic vitality, democratic strength and strategic location are not favors — they are leverage. To wield that effectively, the nation needs to be clear that its engagement with the US is not about placating it for short-term gains and it must advocate for its own interest. At the same time, Taiwan needs to avoid performative defiance — as if disengagement were the only way to preserve autonomy.
There is a middle path: showing up in Washington not as a guest, but as a counterpart. That would mean pushing for the swift passage of the Taiwan Double Taxation Elimination Act and negotiating a Taiwan-US bilateral investment agreement. It must also be transparent with the Taiwanese public. Trade-offs are inevitable and some overseas investments are strategically necessary. However, they are also key to boosting real benefits at home — investment in our research-and-development ecosystem, higher wages for engineers and technicians, and the overall long-term resilience of the economy.
The question that haunted the Asian nations of 150 years ago seems relevant again: Can we navigate great power competition without being consumed by it?
The answer lies not just in diplomacy, but in the strength of domestic leadership. If Taiwan is to preserve its sovereignty, it must be realistic and proactive in advocating for a genuine partnership with the US, while delivering transparency at home. That means aligning foreign policy with national strategy, not election cycles, having the courage to level with the public about difficult choices, and the wisdom to know when to let our interests be known.
Taiwan has a place at the table — but we must bring more than gratitude. We must bring a clear voice and a clear vision.
Yeh Chieh-ting is a venture investor in Silicon Valley, the editor-in-chief of Ketagalan Media and a director of US Taiwan Watch, an international think tank focusing on Taiwan-US relations.
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