Just weeks into his second term, US President Donald Trump has already shaken the post-World War II liberal international order with his destabilizing foreign policy initiatives. Trump has held Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy responsible for the Russian invasion of Ukraine and suspended US aid programs.
Trump has upset the US’ European allies by saying that “Europe has sadly spent more money buying Russian oil and gas than they have spent on defending Ukraine.”
President Trump has also questioned the US’ commitment to NATO, withdrawn the US from key UN institutions and doubled down his global tariff war.
In an unprecedented development, Trump’s quest to expand the US’ control over Greenland, Canada, Panama and Gaza in the name of national and international security has undermined the territorial sovereignty of a state, leaving the world community in a fix.
Undoubtedly, every nation has the right to reinvent its foreign policy to achieve national interests. This is the same with the US and Trump. However, the idea of the US national interests has never been so narrow. To promote peace, security and development, protection of democracy, freedom and individual rights in the world have remained some core principles of US foreign policy, which have come under great strain due to Trump’s transactional and aggressive foreign and security policies.
More to the point, Trump 2.0’s foreign policy outlook has significantly contributed to the highly volatile international order. This, in turn, has led countries, including the US’ allies, strategic partners and friends, to reassess their dependence upon Washington for security and other purposes, and accordingly explore means and ways to protect their national interests in case of the Trump administration’s uncooperative policy toward them.
One country that has all the more reason to observe Trump’s foreign and security policies closely is Taiwan.
First, the US has remained the most valuable security provider for Taiwan. Trump took several steps to deepen ties with Taiwan, and the relationship between the two sides reached a new height under the administration of former US president Joe Biden with visits from US political delegations and others.
However, during campaigning ahead of the US presidential election in November last year, a section of Taiwanese experts viewed Trump’s comment that Taiwan “stole” the chip business from the US as an indicator of a possible shift in the US approach toward Taiwan under Trump 2.0.
Second, the Trump administration’s policies toward the war in Ukraine have jolted Taiwan. Trump’s decision to hold talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin for a ceasefire has given Russia an edge against Ukraine, while Trump’s policies on the war have justified the aggressor’s action against the aggrieved state.
Hence, whatever the reasons for the Trump administration to take such a policy orientation, this shift in US foreign policy might cause China to intensify its aggressive efforts against Taiwan.
Third, Trump’s attempt to isolate the US from global institutions, including the WHO, the Paris climate agreement and others, would eventually pave the way for China to expand its international influence. Consequently, with the absence of the US from these global institutions, Taiwan would find it challenging to push for its presence on the world stage, and the world community would greatly suffer from losing Taiwan’s expertise in several critical areas.
Fourth, uncertainty about the US’ commitment to protect Taiwan from Chinese aggression and Trump’s transactional approach to European countries would squeeze Taiwan’s strategic space. China could feel at ease pressuring other nations to end their diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
Fifth, one question that haunts Taiwanese the most is what the future of Taiwan would be if the Trump administration succeeds in getting a favorable trade deal with China.
Although it appears highly unlikely that the regime of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) would bow to the pressure of the Trump administration, delegations from Taipei have visited Washington, promising to increase defense spending and reduce the trade surplus with the US.
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co announced it would invest an additional US$100 billion to expand its advanced semiconductor manufacturing operations in the US to ensure that the Trump administration does not impose high tariffs on Taiwanese chips.
Taiwan’s accommodative gestures have impressed the US administration to the extent that the fact sheet on Taiwan-US relations released by the US Department of State on its Web site has removed a statement that it does not support Taiwan’s independence.
It also says: “We oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side.”
During his visit to the US from Feb. 6 to 8, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba and Trump opposed China’s “unlawful maritime claims” and called for peace in the Taiwan Strait. A delegation led by Arizona Governor Katie Hobbs met with President William Lai (賴清德) on Tuesday, with the two sides having expressed the desire to foster cooperation between Taiwan and the US in high-technology and other areas.
Although these developments are reassuring for Taiwan’s security, it must be realized that the semiconductor industry works as a “silicon shield” to keep it protected from a Chinese attack.
Moreover, the Trump administration should also understand that the Taiwan factor has remained one of the central pillars of US policy in dealing with China.
Hence, Taiwan, as a democracy and economy, is essential for the US to protect and promote the liberal international order. Only time will tell whether instincts or practical and principled considerations dominate the Trump administration’s policy toward Taiwan and other countries.
Sumit Kumar is an assistant professor in the University of Delhi’s Department of Political Science and a former Ministry of Foreign Affairs visiting fellow at National Chengchi University.
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