The Ministry of National Defense on Tuesday delivered its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to the Legislative Yuan, the first such report since 2021. The QDR serves as a roadmap for military planning over the subsequent four years, and is designed to assess security threats, outline defense strategies and guide military development to safeguard national security.
This year’s QDR reflects continuity and evolution. While deterrence and asymmetric warfare remain at the core, this year’s review places greater emphasis on multilayered deterrence, Taiwan-US military cooperation and countering “gray zone” threats, signaling a more proactive approach to defense. It also emphasizes the need to learn from global conflicts, and adopt an adaptive approach to tactical and technological change, while leveraging Taiwan’s unique territorial advantages.
The emphasis on deepening military exchanges with the US is one of the most significant shifts in this year’s report. While previous reviews acknowledged the importance of US support, this year’s goes further, calling for high-level strategic dialogues and exchanges between the two nations. Key initiatives it lists include expanding intelligence sharing, greater participation in joint tabletop exercises and increased observation of US military drills. This reflects China’s growing military assertiveness and the US’ increasing openness to deeper Taiwan-US defense force collaboration.
Like its 2021 predecessor, the latest edition reaffirms Taiwan’s commitment to asymmetric warfare, with “resolute defense and multi-domain deterrence” remaining a central principle.
It also emphasizes the need to deepen asymmetric capabilities that would make any potential invasion costly for Beijing. It also calls for leveraging Taiwan’s rugged terrain and developing the nation’s indigenous defense industry to enhance “adaptability, agility, lethality, cost-effectiveness and stealth.”
With its focus on innovation and reform, this year’s QDR shows the nation’s military is heeding lessons from recent global conflicts, such as Russia’s war in Ukraine, where decentralized warfighting and drones have played pivotal roles.
A key evolution in this year’s QDR is the heightened focus on countering “gray zone” threats. In the 2021 version, the tactics were discussed in a dedicated section, but this year’s version integrates “gray zone” threats into the broader strategic environment analysis and expands the military’s strategy to address them. This shows that the military is thinking about China’s sub-threshold operations, aware that its psychological operations, disinformation campaigns, and air and sea incursions are part of an integrated strategy.
Another area of continuity is the approach to civil defense and national mobilization. The 2021 QDR underscored the importance of preparing the civilian population for potential conflict. This year’s review expands on that, emphasizing the need for improved training for reservists and whole-of-society defense resilience. The review calls for a more comprehensive approach to national defense, encouraging public preparedness and the need for seamless collaboration between civilian sectors and the military.
This year’s QDR shows that military leadership intends to continue to push through command and control, and training reforms, while prioritizing innovation and asymmetric warfare. However, greater attention is also brought to deepening the nation’s capabilities across various domains, reflecting Beijing’s growing full-spectrum pressure on Taiwan, such as air and sea incursions and psychological warfare.
However, the QDR is a strategic military document and not a policy blueprint. With many Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers and pan-blue media figures hostile to deepening military reform, those interested in ensuring Taiwan’s strength and unity must put the KMT’s feet to the fire so it does not obstruct defense reforms.
President William Lai (賴清德) and wider civil society must ensure the QDR is properly implemented and the trend of reform continues.
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