After the coup in Burma in 2021, the country’s decades-long armed conflict escalated into a full-scale war. On one side was the Burmese army; large, well-equipped, and funded by China, supported with weapons, including airplanes and helicopters from China and Russia. On the other side were the pro-democracy forces, composed of countless small ethnic resistance armies. The military junta cut off electricity, phone and cell service, and the Internet in most of the country, leaving resistance forces isolated from the outside world and making it difficult for the various armies to coordinate with one another.
Despite being severely outnumbered and outgunned, the resistance has managed to retake about 80 percent of the country’s territory. While they have not been able to reclaim the largest cities, their resolve in the face of overwhelming odds holds valuable lessons for Taiwan in the event of a war with China.
Among the lessons Taiwan could potentially adopt from Burma are the use of civil disobedience, guerrilla tactics, psychological warfare, Starlink and solar power, adaptation to supply chain disruptions and drone warfare.
When the coup first took place in Burma, government workers went on a general strike, paralyzing the cities and hindering the government’s ability to function. By refusing to work, especially in critical sectors like chip factories, the civilian population could disrupt the occupying force. From the outset of the conflict, Myanmar’s resistance creatively used social media and digital tools to spread awareness and gain global support.
Taiwan could implement similar strategies by enhancing information warfare, leveraging the technological expertise of its civilian population to hack Chinese military infrastructure or spread counter-propaganda, thereby weakening China’s resolve and influencing international opinion.
Burma’s resistance forces operate with a highly decentralized structure, with numerous ethnic armed groups, each with their own languages, cultures and customs. Initially, it was difficult to convince these groups to cooperate, but over time, they have successfully united against a common enemy — the military junta.
This decentralized approach has made it harder for the Burmese military to defeat them. Taiwan could adopt a similar strategy by organizing its defense network into smaller, highly mobile units that could operate autonomously or in coordination with others, complicating direct confrontation with China.
One of Burma’s key advantages is local support, including sanctuary, food and resources. This support has allowed the resistance to endure, despite being underfunded and outgunned. Taiwan could leverage a similar approach by engaging local populations and creating a strong network of civilian and military resistance, making the cost of occupation unbearable for China.
Taiwan could foster national unity and a resistance narrative that resonates both domestically and internationally, emphasizing the unique Taiwanese identity, especially in contrast to China’s narrative of unity between China and Taiwan.
As Burma’s resistance has shown, the ability to disrupt logistics and supply chains is crucial. In Myanmar, military convoys are often attacked on land, forcing the government to rely on air supply drops. Taiwan could develop similar capabilities, such as small, nimble drone swarms, to create confusion, disrupt logistics and cause panic among Chinese forces, further complicating their occupation efforts.
After the Burmese military cut off electricity and communication networks, resistance areas in the country adapted by using solar power and generators to charge power banks. Soldiers and civilians rely on rechargeable batteries for everything from lighting their homes to cutting hair. Solar power and generators also fuel Starlink, which provides Internet service in jungle camps across the country. The resistance forces use Starlink not only for communication, but also for targeting and coordination. They spend considerable time watching YouTube videos and tutorials, as well as using tools like ChatGPT, to learn essential skills such as bomb-making, weapon crafting, 3D printing and drone technology.
Due to near-total manufacturing shutdowns, especially in resistance-held areas, almost all products and replacement parts must be imported from Thailand or China, often passing through conflict zones. This makes components extremely expensive, with wait times sometimes stretching to months for a single spare part. As a result, Myanmar’s resistance forces have become adept at operating with minimal supplies, relying on local resources, improvised weaponry and homegrown technologies.
Taiwan could follow a similar strategy by creating stockpiles of essential supplies and building self-sufficiency in key areas such as food, medical supplies and alternative energy. In the event of a Chinese blockade, Taiwan could also develop alternative supply routes or underground networks to circumvent restrictions.
Despite significant challenges such as a lack of electricity, money and parts, resistance groups like the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force have successfully used drones. Operating from remote jungle compounds, the resistance modifies civilian drones or creates and repairs them using 3D printing, Internet tutorials and limited resources. They have learned to adapt drones to carry bombs or perform surveillance. Drones have become a game-changer, providing essential air power in the absence of fighter jets or helicopters.
At the start of the conflict, the resistance had an advantage with its innovative use of drones, studying their use in Ukraine and by the Islamic State to learn the best strategies for fighting a superior and better-equipped force. However, as the war has progressed, the Burmese army has acquired drones and jammers, diminishing the resistance’s edge. Despite these setbacks, drones remain a critical tool for the resistance, as they are still their only form of air power.
For Taiwan, the more drones and drone jammers could be stockpiled, the better. With a highly educated, tech-savvy population, Taiwan could replicate and potentially surpass the success of the resistance in Myanmar. In the event of limited communication infrastructure due to Chinese interference, drones could help maintain tactical advantages by providing real-time intelligence, enhancing situational awareness while keeping personnel out of harm’s way.
While Taiwan and Burma have notable differences in terms of resources, geography and international context, many of the core lessons from Burma’s resistance could still be applied to Taiwan’s defense strategy. By learning from Burma’s use of technology, guerrilla tactics and the importance of national unity, Taiwan could better prepare for a potential conflict with China.
The key would be adapting these lessons to Taiwan’s unique circumstances and leveraging its strengths in technology, global alliances, and economic power to craft a defense strategy that is resilient and effective.
Antonio Graceffo, a China economic analyst who holds a China MBA from Shanghai Jiao Tong University, studies national defense at the American Military University.
Why is Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) not a “happy camper” these days regarding Taiwan? Taiwanese have not become more “CCP friendly” in response to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) use of spies and graft by the United Front Work Department, intimidation conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Armed Police/Coast Guard, and endless subversive political warfare measures, including cyber-attacks, economic coercion, and diplomatic isolation. The percentage of Taiwanese that prefer the status quo or prefer moving towards independence continues to rise — 76 percent as of December last year. According to National Chengchi University (NCCU) polling, the Taiwanese
US President Donald Trump is systematically dismantling the network of multilateral institutions, organizations and agreements that have helped prevent a third world war for more than 70 years. Yet many governments are twisting themselves into knots trying to downplay his actions, insisting that things are not as they seem and that even if they are, confronting the menace in the White House simply is not an option. Disagreement must be carefully disguised to avoid provoking his wrath. For the British political establishment, the convenient excuse is the need to preserve the UK’s “special relationship” with the US. Following their White House
It would be absurd to claim to see a silver lining behind every US President Donald Trump cloud. Those clouds are too many, too dark and too dangerous. All the same, viewed from a domestic political perspective, there is a clear emerging UK upside to Trump’s efforts at crashing the post-Cold War order. It might even get a boost from Thursday’s Washington visit by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer. In July last year, when Starmer became prime minister, the Labour Party was rigidly on the defensive about Europe. Brexit was seen as an electorally unstable issue for a party whose priority
US President Donald Trump’s return to the White House has brought renewed scrutiny to the Taiwan-US semiconductor relationship with his claim that Taiwan “stole” the US chip business and threats of 100 percent tariffs on foreign-made processors. For Taiwanese and industry leaders, understanding those developments in their full context is crucial while maintaining a clear vision of Taiwan’s role in the global technology ecosystem. The assertion that Taiwan “stole” the US’ semiconductor industry fundamentally misunderstands the evolution of global technology manufacturing. Over the past four decades, Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, led by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC), has grown through legitimate means
RSS