Taiwan’s undersea cables connecting it to the world were allegedly severed several times by a Chinese ship registered under a flag of convenience. As the vessel sailed, it used several different automatic identification systems (AIS) to create fake routes. That type of “shadow fleet” and “gray zone” tactics could create a security crisis in Taiwan and warrants response measures.
The concept of a shadow fleet originates from the research of Elisabeth Braw, senior fellow at the Washington-based Atlantic Council. The phenomenon was initiated by authoritarian countries such as Iran, North Korea and Russia, which have been hit by international economic sanctions over the past few years. They responded to the sanctions by using several retired postal service vessels or unofficial ships to secretly transport oil or other special materials to raise money for war chests. Because of the unknown routes of these shadow fleets — as their crew disable their vessel’s AIS transponders — they are able to skirt sanctions under international maritime law. Thus, they create a serious threat for the environments around island nations.
NATO on Jan. 14 for the first time invited its Baltic state members to convene and discuss the more than 10 incidents of undersea cables severed by Russia’s shadow fleets since 2023. Such incidents have an enormous impact on European and global energy supplies and network communications.
NATO has decided to launch its “Baltic Sentry” activities. It could deploy naval vessels, surveillance aircraft and uncrewed aerial drones to conduct patrols, bolstering and guaranteeing the security of key territory and underwater infrastructure. These developments show that shadow fleets are a pressing and significant threat to global security.
Following the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine, China has steadily reviewed, amended and evolved its military strategies against Taiwan to incorporate such warfare uses of shadow fleets. Over the past two years, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has conducted four large-scale “Taiwan blockade” drills — given the codename “Joint Sword” — which involve the joint operations training of the PLA navy and air force.
Apart from its conventional military forces, China is implementing a “shadow fleet” as a war strategy, encroaching on Taiwan’s undersea fiber-optic communications cables in its domestic waters and in international waters. China’s actions are meant to terrify Taiwanese and create social instability, and to influence the government toward being unable to contact the international community at a moment’s notice. This is why China’s possible invasion plan of Taiwan could incorporate mixed warfare modalities such as shadow fleets.
In early February 2023, two Taiwanese undersea communications cables linking Taiwan proper to Lienchiang County (Matsu) on the other side of the Taiwan Strait were twice severed by a Chinese fishing boat and an unidentified ship, impacting phone calls, communications and broadband networks with services cut off for more than two months in the county.
The greater trend is that over the past five years, Chinese shipping vessels and fishing boats have cut local undersea power cables no fewer than 30 times, media reports showed.
This developmental trend is serious.
China frequently destroys Taiwan’s undersea cables. A few weeks ago, a bold and deliberate incident occurred near Taiwan’s northern coast in the waters off Yehliu Geopark (野柳地質公園) — it has already been chalked up as a shadow fleet attack.
In response to this new style of maritime activities, the legislature on Jan. 16 requested that the National Security Council (NSC), the Ministry of National Defense, the Mainland Affairs Council, the National Communications Commission, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Digital Affairs and the Coast Guard Administration conduct a special report. However, the proposed eight-part report has been criticized by the legislature’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee, saying that each ministry, department, agency, commission and body has yet to come together to provide a cohesive joint report or a platform for pooling resources and information, but are instead acting alone. When that news came out, the government bodies handling the “gray zone” tactic incidents were still confined within the narrow limitations of their respective departments.
Taiwan is an island nation. It must rely on its undersea cables to communicate with the outside world. China’s use of “gray zone” tactics via its deliberate attempts to seal off Taiwan’s communications networks and sever its power cables is a test of the communications resilience of Taiwan’s national defense operations.
The NSC should convene cross-agency dialogues and meetings, conduct studies, collect suggestions and expert opinions, and establish an effective defense zone and response systems to fend off China’s shadow fleet and avoid attacks on its undersea cables.
Yao Chung-yuan is an adjunct professor and former deputy director of the Ministry of National Defense’s Department of Strategic Planning.
Translated by Tim Smith
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