As Taiwan’s domestic political crisis deepens, the opposition Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) have proposed gutting the country’s national spending, with steep cuts to the critical foreign and defense ministries. While the blue-white coalition alleges that it is merely responding to voters’ concerns about corruption and mismanagement, of which there certainly has been plenty under Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and KMT-led governments, the rationales for their proposed spending cuts lay bare the incoherent foreign policy of the KMT-led coalition.
Introduced on the eve of US President Donald Trump’s inauguration, the KMT’s proposed budget is a terrible opening missive to its most crucial ally.
It proposes cutting NT$2.3 billion (US$70.2 million) from the Public Television Service (PTS) as part of a larger attempt to roll back the government’s ability to communicate to international and domestic audiences. The ostensible rationale is an incident in November last year when a foreign anchor for TaiwanPlus, the English-language broadcaster operated by PTS, referred to Trump as a felon on a broadcast on the night of the US election. The KMT argues that the incident seriously damaged Taiwan-US relations and threatens Taiwan’s ability to forge a strong partnership with the Trump administration.
The ensuing fallout over the TaiwanPlus incident has given rise to many fair criticisms of the service. Despite an annual budget of NT$800 million, the platform, intended to be Taiwan’s voice to the world, has attracted only a few thousand viewers globally, with most videos reaching mere dozens of views on YouTube. Instead of conveying Taiwan’s story to the world, its broadcasts cover random international news and hyperlocal stories without a foreign audience in mind. Serious questions remain about PTS, and the Ministry of Culture’s oversight and mismanagement of the platform.
Perhaps this is a good opportunity for the Legislative Yuan to exercise the new oversight and investigative powers it granted itself last year. Although largely struck down by the Constitutional Court, investigative committees can still be set up for matters within the Legislative Yuan’s purview, such as budgetary spending, with the voluntary cooperation of witnesses.
I myself, as a former adviser to TaiwanPlus, would commit to voluntarily cooperating with such a committee on matters of TaiwanPlus’ failures to address feedback and execute its mission of “bringing Taiwan to the world.”
Responsible legislative oversight could lead to an improved and more effective international broadcasting service, rather than throwing the baby out with the bathwater.
Setting aside that no one in Washington has even heard of this controversy — the Trump campaign even denied press credentials to TaiwanPlus reporters prior to the incident, likely due to obscurity — the KMT’s sudden concern over Taiwan’s relationship with the Trump administration belies its proposed cuts to the national defense budget. Trump and his advisers have made one thing clear: They expect Taiwan to spend more on national defense. Trump has stated this on numerous occasions and key Asia advisers such as Elbridge Colby, the incoming US undersecretary of defense for policy, have called for Taiwan to dramatically increase defense spending.
Given that the KMT has made opposing Trump’s main policy concern about Taiwan a focal point of its proposed budget, how can anyone take seriously its proposition that zeroing out PTS is due to very real concerns over alienating the new US president? Both cannot be true. This leaves as the only possibility that the KMT prioritizes cutting the defense budget far more than preserving relations with the US.
Are there any legitimate reasons to slash the defense budget while China continues to relentlessly erode the “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait? According to a recent report from the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, only 10 percent of Taiwanese favor cutting the defense budget, while among KMT supporters, a mere 19 percent favor reducing the budget.
Some have long argued that Taiwan simply cannot outspend or outclass China on the military front given its massive population and economic advantage. They argue that as Taiwan’s defense is ultimately dependent on the US coming to its aid, Taiwan’s own defense spending has diminishing returns compared with a foreign policy oriented toward either accommodating China or instead ensuring ironclad commitments from Washington. While these foreign policy considerations are certainly important, if Taiwan’s own defenses are not sufficient, the US might not come to its aid.
If the nation is unable to hold its own against China in the initial stages of an amphibious attack, the US might lose confidence in Taiwan. No matter the level of the US’ commitment to defending Taiwan, it might simply be unable to give aid if the defenses are so hollowed out that the battle becomes no longer a question of defending Taiwan, but reconquering it from Chinese occupation.
Sasha B. Chhabra is a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research in Taipei.
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