China’s illegal, coercive, aggressive and deceptive activities represent an escalating threat to global democracies. Among these, subsea cable sabotage stands out as a critical challenge, endangering international communication, economic stability and democratic values.
Subsea fiber-optic cables, which carry more than 99 percent of global Internet traffic, are indispensable to modern information and telecommunications technology infrastructure, International Telecommunication Union (ITU) secretary-general Doreen Bogdan-Martin said.
Any disruption to those cables risks impairing economic activity, compromising the free flow of information and jeopardizing the operational security of democratic nations.
The Taiwan Strait has become a focal point for China’s “gray zone” tactics, which includes deliberate interference with subsea cables. Early this year, the Xingshun-39, a Tanzania-flagged ship controlled by a Chinese entity, severed critical cables near the northeastern coast of Keelung, hampering vital communication links between Taiwan and the global network. Even more egregiously, that vessel is also registered under the name Shunxing-39 in Cameroon — a calculated ploy to obscure its identity during interactions with the Coast Guard Administration. That deliberate act of sabotage not only exposed Taiwan’s infrastructural vulnerabilities, but also intensified global concerns over China’s increasingly aggressive maneuvers.
That incident is not isolated, but part of a larger pattern of systematic disruption. In 2023 alone, subsea cables connecting Taiwan and Matsu — Taiwanese territories near China — were severed 12 times, Chunghwa Telecom said. Repair costs reached a staggering NT$100 million (US$3.04 million), illustrating the significant economic burden such actions impose. Those recurring disruptions align with Beijing’s broader strategy to undermine Taiwan’s connectivity, test its resilience and assess the international community’s responses without resorting to open conflict.
China’s operations extend well beyond the Taiwan Strait. In November last year, two critical subsea cables — one connecting Finland and Germany, and another linking Sweden and Lithuania — were damaged one after the other. The Yi Peng 3, a Chinese bulk carrier, was found anchored near the damaged sites in international waters. Inspections conducted by naval and coast guard authorities from Denmark, Germany and Sweden found evidence of Beijing engaging in covert activities targeting vital European infrastructure.
The Baltic Sea, a critical hub for transatlantic communication cables, represents a strategic vulnerability for NATO and European democracies. By targeting those essential lifelines, China disrupts regional stability, hinders communication networks and weakens the cohesion of international alliances such as NATO.
China’s actions test the resilience of democratic nations, disrupt critical communication channels and exert covert political and economic pressure. Such operations exemplify Beijing’s “gray zone” tactics — non-military methods designed to achieve geopolitical goals without provoking direct confrontation. That strategic ambiguity makes countering those threats complex and urgent.
To counter that growing threat, democracies must take coordinated and proactive measures to safeguard subsea infrastructure. The following actions are critical:
Implementing submarine cable automatic warning systems: Governments should collaborate with and subsidize telecom operators to install warning systems on international subsea cables. Those systems can detect vessels approaching cable routes and send automated warnings, significantly reducing the risk of accidental or intentional damage.
Enhancing inspections of high-risk vessels: Countries must strengthen inspection protocols and enforcement measures against vessels registered under the flags of problematic states, such as Tanzania or Cameroon, which are often linked to suspicious activities. Rigorous oversight can help mitigate the risks posed by illegal operations near critical subsea infrastructure.
Promoting international cooperation through International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) membership: The government should support Chunghwa Telecom’s efforts to join the ICPC. The ICPC collaborates with the ITU under the International Advisory Body for Submarine Cable Resilience and includes members beyond sovereign states. Joining that platform would enable Taiwan to share expertise, promote international cooperation and bolster subsea cable security.
To address the persistent threat of subsea cable sabotage, democracies must act collectively. Joint initiatives to monitor cable routes, share intelligence and invest in advanced protection technologies are crucial.
The protection of subsea cables is a fight to preserve democratic values, safeguard global connectivity and ensure the free flow of information. By prioritizing resilience, intelligence-sharing and international cooperation, democracies can safeguard critical lifelines, and defend the principles of a free and open international order.
Gahon Chiang is a congressional staff member in the office of Democratic Progressive Party Legislator Chen Kuan-ting, focusing on Taiwan’s national security. He holds a master’s degree in international relations from National Taiwan University and serves as the youth representative to the Taichung City Government.
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