On Jan. 6, Indonesia was officially accepted as a full member of the BRICS group. While this development might not have a direct or immediate impact on Taiwan, it could shift the geopolitical dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region.
First, BRICS, as an economic bloc, harbors diverse geopolitical interests among its member states. China considers Taiwan an “inseparable part of its territory,” and Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa generally support the “one China” policy, although not all actively endorse China’s stance on Taiwan.
Indonesia’s membership in BRICS brings Jakarta closer to China’s economic diplomacy, which might influence Indonesia’s approach to sensitive issues, including Taiwan.
Second, Indonesia’s accession to BRICS presents an opportunity for China, a key player in the bloc, to strengthen its regional influence, particularly in Southeast Asia. If China uses the BRICS platform to reinforce its diplomatic narrative on Taiwan, this could complicate the position of countries in the region, including Indonesia, in remaining neutral on Taiwan.
Despite Indonesia’s non-aligned diplomatic tradition, joining BRICS could create indirect pressure from China to align more closely with its agenda. Taiwan has sought to foster informal and economic ties with Southeast Asian countries through the New Southbound Policy. However, Indonesia’s membership in BRICS might diminish Taiwan’s opportunities to strengthen bilateral relations with Indonesia and other Southeast Asian nations, especially if Indonesia’s economic cooperation with China deepens.
Third, Indonesia in BRICS brings the bloc closer to Southeast Asia, especially with countries such as Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam serving as BRICS partners. With an increased BRICS presence in Southeast Asia, Taiwan might face challenges in maintaining its relevance and diplomatic space in the region, particularly if Indonesia chooses to support more pro-China policies.
Fourth, Taiwan is a major player in the global semiconductor industry. At the same time, BRICS, particularly China and India, are striving to enhance their technological independence, including in the semiconductor sector.
Indonesia in BRICS could open up opportunities for technological cooperation with China and India. This could lead to more competition with Taiwan.
These concerns might be overstated when considering Indonesia’s “free-active” diplomacy principle, which enables the country to maintain good relations with all parties, including Taiwan.
Indonesia has never had official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, but it has consistently maintained strong economic ties.
As a relatively neutral member of BRICS, Indonesia has an opportunity to play a mediating role in sensitive regional issues, including tensions between China and Taiwan.
Taiwan must ensure that its relationship with Indonesia remains strong, particularly in the economic and trade sectors. Taiwan could enhance its investments in strategic sectors such as renewable energy and technology, which align with Indonesia’s development priorities.
Taiwan needs to adopt a flexible diplomatic approach to maintain its relevance in the region, perhaps by focusing on non-political cooperation in areas such as education, technology and healthcare. Taiwan’s economic ties with Indonesia still hold significant potential, if the two sides could separate geopolitical issues from their bilateral cooperation.
Najamuddin Khairur Rijal is an associate professor in the International Relations Department of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Muhammadiyah Malang, Indonesia.
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