In a move that has stirred excitement and skepticism, Indonesia officially joined the BRICS international forum this year. Proponents hailed it as a bold step forward, one that could amplify Indonesia’s voice in global affairs. However, as the dust settles, questions remain: What does Indonesia hope to gain from BRICS? Can this group of emerging economies truly deliver on its lofty promises?
A closer look suggests Indonesia’s decision might be less about economic benefits and more about a desire to assert its status on the global stage.
At first glance, BRICS — a bloc comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates — seems like a promising platform. Its members represent more than half of the world’s population and GDP, and its rhetoric centers on fostering a fairer and more inclusive global order. However, the reality of BRICS’ achievements tells a different story.
The New Development Bank (NDB), often touted as BRICS’ answer to the World Bank and the IMF, has failed to live up to expectations. While its establishment signaled an intent to reduce dependence on Western financial institutions, its contributions to economic growth among member states have been minimal. Instead, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) continues to dominate the landscape of infrastructure development in the Global South, dwarfing the NDB’s impact. From 2015 to 2021, the NDB approved cumulative loans exceeding US$30 billion, whereas China’s cumulative engagement in BRI projects from 2013 to 2023 surpassed US$1 trillion. For Indonesia, a country already benefiting from BRI projects, the tangible economic gains from BRICS membership appear limited at best.
Adding to this, Russia’s push to dedollarize BRICS economies has created more challenges than solutions. Far from breaking free of US dollar dominance, the bloc has seen increased currency volatility, weakening member states’ exchange rates against the US dollar. For an economy like Indonesia’s — heavily reliant on dollar-denominated trade and investment — such instability could pose significant risks.
So why did Indonesia join BRICS? The answer lies in what the move symbolizes rather than what it delivers. Three key motivations stand out, each reflecting a broader narrative of status-seeking and global positioning.
First, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s foreign policy vision plays a pivotal role. Prabowo, who has long aspired to elevate Indonesia’s standing in global affairs, sees BRICS membership as a cornerstone of his legacy. Unlike his predecessor, former Indonesian president Joko Widodo, whose focus was largely domestic, Prabowo is keen to project Indonesia as a global power. Joining BRICS allows him to signal a shift in Indonesia’s trajectory, one that aligns with the emerging multipolar world order.
Second, the geopolitical winds are shifting southward. With the relative decline of the US and the EU, the Global South is gaining momentum, and China is leading the charge. By joining BRICS, Indonesia positions itself alongside countries advocating for a more equitable global system, echoing its historic role in championing the Bandung Conference’s principles in 1955. It is a statement of solidarity with nations seeking to challenge Western dominance and reimagine the global order.
Finally, BRICS membership does not conflict with Indonesia’s “free and active” foreign policy doctrine. Unlike NATO or AUKUS, BRICS is not a military alliance. It allows Indonesia to engage with rising powers without alienating traditional partners like the US and the EU. This strategic flexibility ensures Indonesia maintains its middle-power status, capable of balancing relationships across geopolitical divides.
However, as Indonesia embraces its new role in BRICS, it faces significant challenges. The bloc has long struggled to move beyond rhetoric and deliver concrete results. Intra-BRICS trade remains modest compared with trade between BRICS nations and Western economies. Moreover, the bloc’s internal dynamics are dominated by the larger economies of China and India, leaving smaller members like Indonesia at risk of being overshadowed.
For Indonesia, the real question is whether BRICS can become more than a stage for status-seeking. Can the bloc evolve into a platform that delivers tangible economic and strategic benefits? Or would it remain a symbol of unfulfilled potential?
Indonesia’s decision to join BRICS reflects a calculated effort to enhance its international stature. However, in a world where symbolism often outweighs substance, the risks of relying too heavily on status-driven initiatives are clear. If BRICS cannot overcome its internal challenges and deliver on its promises, Indonesia might find that the prestige of membership comes with little payoff.
As Prabowo charts this new course, the task ahead is clear: leverage BRICS membership to secure real gains that align with Indonesia’s national interests. Otherwise, the move risks becoming yet another chapter in Indonesia’s long history of status-seeking in global politics — one that leaves more questions than answers.
Dion Maulana Prasetya is an assistant professor in the Department of International Relations at the University of Muhammadiyah Malang in Indonesia.
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