One question that this year might begin to answer is whether the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) is becoming the new center of power in world politics. Now that the group has added new members (Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates) and come to represent 45 percent of the world population, some believe that it is consolidating the (misleadingly named) “Global South” and posing a serious challenge to US and Western power. However, I remain skeptical of such claims.
When Jim O’Neill (then the chief economist at Goldman Sachs) coined the “BRIC” acronym in 2001, his aim was simply to identify the four emerging economies that were most likely to dominate global economic growth by 2050. However, the label soon acquired a political valence. It became an informal diplomatic grouping at the 2006 UN General Assembly, and then a formal organization with the first BRIC Summit in 2009. Hosted in Russia, the focus then — as it is now — was on advancing a multipolar world order. At the end of the following year, the group got its “S” when South Africa joined.
A Wall Street asset class evolved into an international organization partly because it aligned with Russia’s and China’s own aspirations to lead the developing world. The BRICS 16th summit in Russia in October last year was the first to include its new members (Saudi Arabia has not yet decided whether to accept the group’s invitation to join, and Argentina’s new government declined). Some 36 national leaders attended, as did representatives from many international organizations, including UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, and Turkey used the occasion to present its own application for membership.
Last year’s summit focused on fostering ties across the Global South and building a multipolar world, with Russian President Vladimir Putin using the occasion to demonstrate his global diplomatic relevance, despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
With more countries showing an interest in joining, it looks like the BRICS could indeed present itself as a leader of the resistance to the US-dominated international order. Some even see it as the successor to the Cold War-era Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), whose members refused to choose between the US and the Soviet Union. However, while NAM had a shared interest in resisting the US, it did not have Russia and China as founding members.
In any case, the BRICS is unlikely to succeed in formally organizing the “Global South.” Not only do its largest and most important members — China, India and Russia — all lie north of the equator, but the three are competing for leadership.
Russia and China do have a common interest in countering what they see as an US threat, and they have declared an “alliance without limits.” However, such slogans mask major differences in their strategic perspectives. While Russia took vast swaths of territory from China in the 19th century, when the Qing Dynasty was weak, China’s economy is now ten times the size of Russia’s. Both countries are vying for influence in Central Asia, and China is uneasy about Russia’s recruitment of its neighbor North Korea to fight in Ukraine.
An even more important limit on the BRICS as an organization is the rivalry between China and India, which is now the world’s most populous country. Although China is much wealthier than India, it is experiencing demographic decline (like Russia), while India’s population and workforce continue to grow.
Moreover, China and India share a disputed boundary in the Himalayas — where their forces have clashed repeatedly — and the situation is further complicated by China’s traditional friendship with Pakistan. In fact, an abiding concern about China is one reason why India participates in the BRICS in the first place. While it avoids formal alliances, it has also stepped up its participation in “the Quad” (which includes the US, Japan and Australia) for the same reason.
Rather than making the BRICS stronger, the admission of new members merely imports more rivalries. Egypt and Ethiopia are locked in a dispute over a dam that Ethiopia is building on the Nile River, and Iran has long-standing disputes with the UAE and prospective member Saudi Arabia. Far from making the BRICS more effective, these new intra-organizational rivalries would hamper its efforts. The Group of 77 developing countries has even more members, and it is chronically limited by internal divisions.
At last year’s summit, BRICS+ discussed matters such as economic and security cooperation, promotion of cultural exchanges and joint development projects focused on infrastructure and sustainability. However, such talk usually does not yield significant results. In 2014, the group established the New Development Bank, which is headquartered in Shanghai, but the institution has had only modest results to date.
Likewise, the group’s stated intention of avoiding the US dollar and clearing more of its members’ bilateral trade in their own currencies has made only limited headway. Any serious attempt to replace the US dollar as a global reserve currency would require China to back the renminbi with deep, flexible capital markets and the rule of law — and those conditions are nowhere close to being met.
So, what is the BRICS good for? As a means of escaping diplomatic isolation, it is certainly useful to Russia. As a diplomatic device for projecting leadership of the developing world, it also has been useful to China. As a channel through which to counterbalance China, it has its uses for India. As a modest stage for touting national development, it has sometimes been useful to Brazil and South Africa. However, do these functions make it a new fulcrum of world politics? I think not.
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., professor emeritus at Harvard University, is a former US assistant secretary of defense and author of the memoir A Life in the American Century (Polity Press, 2024).
Copyright: Project Syndicate
It is almost three years since Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) and Russian President Vladimir Putin declared a friendship with “no limits” — weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Since then, they have retreated from such rhetorical enthusiasm. The “no limits” language was quickly dumped, probably at Beijing’s behest. When Putin visited China in May last year, he said that he and his counterpart were “as close as brothers.” Xi more coolly called the Russian president “a good friend and a good neighbor.” China has conspicuously not reciprocated Putin’s description of it as an ally. Yet the partnership
The ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu (孫子) said “know yourself and know your enemy and you will win a hundred battles.” Applied in our times, Taiwanese should know themselves and know the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) so that Taiwan will win a hundred battles and hopefully, deter the CCP. Taiwanese receive information daily about the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) threat from the Ministry of National Defense and news sources. One area that needs better understanding is which forces would the People’s Republic of China (PRC) use to impose martial law and what would be the consequences for living under PRC
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) said that he expects this year to be a year of “peace.” However, this is ironic given the actions of some KMT legislators and politicians. To push forward several amendments, they went against the principles of legislation such as substantive deliberation, and even tried to remove obstacles with violence during the third readings of the bills. Chu says that the KMT represents the public interest, accusing President William Lai (賴清德) and the Democratic Progressive Party of fighting against the opposition. After pushing through the amendments, the KMT caucus demanded that Legislative Speaker
Beijing’s approval of a controversial mega-dam in the lower reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo River — which flows from Tibet — has ignited widespread debate over its strategic and environmental implications. The project exacerbates the complexities of India-China relations, and underscores Beijing’s push for hydropower dominance and potential weaponization of water against India. India and China are caught in a protracted territorial dispute along the Line of Actual Control. The approval of a dam on a transboundary river adds another layer to an already strained bilateral relationship, making dialogue and trust-building even more challenging, especially given that the two Asian