Beijing’s approval of a controversial mega-dam in the lower reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo River — which flows from Tibet — has ignited widespread debate over its strategic and environmental implications.
The project exacerbates the complexities of India-China relations, and underscores Beijing’s push for hydropower dominance and potential weaponization of water against India. India and China are caught in a protracted territorial dispute along the Line of Actual Control. The approval of a dam on a transboundary river adds another layer to an already strained bilateral relationship, making dialogue and trust-building even more challenging, especially given that the two Asian giants have yet to fully normalize their relations since the Galwan standoff.
Hydropower has long been a cornerstone of China’s energy strategy, and this project — approved in 2020 as part of China’s 14th Five-Year Plan — manifests this.
Speculated to be three times larger than the Three Gorges Dam — the world’s largest dam in terms of energy production — this trillion-yuan project is seemingly part of China’s ambitious hydropower expansion strategy, and demonstrates its technological prowess and national pride, with potential ramifications for regional geopolitics, water resource management and environmental conservation. China’s pursuit of energy security and national prestige also raises questions about the trade-offs between progress and sustainability.
The Yarlung Tsangpo — named the Brahmaputra in India — is vital for the livelihoods of millions in India’s northeastern region, and any perceived threat to its flow could heighten mistrust between the two countries.
Often referred to as the “Third Pole” due to its extensive ice reserves, the Tibetan plateau is a fragile ecosystem already highly vulnerable to climate change, with glaciers depleting at an alarming rate.
With its decision to unilaterally approve the dam’s construction without first taking downstream stakeholders like India into consideration, China has seemingly contravened transboundary water cooperation norms. By constructing a dam on a transboundary river, China would acquire the ability to manipulate water flows and potentially weaponize the resource in its relations with India. During periods of heightened tensions, China could restrict the water flow to India, exacerbating drought conditions, or release excess water to cause floods in downstream regions.
New Delhi’s worries have been strengthened by this lack of cooperation and transparency, especially in view of other geopolitical hotspots, such as the Ladakh border dispute, predatory Belt and Road Initiative investments in the Indian subcontinent and expanding military footprints in the Indian Ocean.
It is also a tell-tale sign of the lack of a robust water-sharing agreement between India and China, which — in contrast to India’s treaties with other neighbors, like Bangladesh and Pakistan — leaves doubts about the future of a peaceful and equitable river water sharing mechanism in Asia.
Decisions made upstream in China have downstream effects. By asserting control over water resources originating in Tibet, China reinforces its position as an upper riparian hegemon, complicating India’s efforts to ensure water security for its northeastern states and potentially fueling domestic upheavals.
In Tibet, construction of the mega-dam is likely to displace local communities, many of whom are indigenous Tibetans with strong cultural and spiritual ties to the land. Forced relocations and the loss of ancestral lands could lead to social unrest, exacerbating existing tensions between the Chinese government and Tibetan communities. Additionally, the influx of workers and infrastructure development could disrupt traditional ways of life and place pressure on local resources.
The potential for altered water flow also raises concerns about India’s own ability to harness the river for hydropower projects. India is also building a hydropower dam on the river. If China’s dam reduces water levels downstream, India might struggle to meet its energy targets, particularly in states like Arunachal Pradesh that have significant untapped hydropower potential.
The prospect of using water as a coercive tool underscores India’s need to enhance its hydrological monitoring and forecasting systems to mitigate potential risks. From India’s perspective, the dam could be part of a broader strategy to consolidate China’s control over Tibet and its surrounding areas. This could prompt India to bolster its military infrastructure in the region, leading to an arms race that further destabilizes the Himalayan frontier.
To mitigate the negative impacts, it is crucial that Beijing adopt a more inclusive and transparent approach by engaging with downstream countries to address shared concerns and build trust. International frameworks, such as the UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, could provide a platform for negotiating equitable water-sharing agreements.
Ultimately, the future of India-China ties depends on their ability to navigate this contentious issue while balancing the normative commitments of being neighbors with regional stability and mutual interests. Europe’s past cannot become the guide for Asia’s future, where giants put others in peril for their selfish interests.
Rahul Mishra is a senior research fellow at the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance at Thammasat University in Thailand, and an associate professor at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. He uses the handle @rahulmishr_ on X.
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