In the weeks following the 2024 US presidential election, I have received one question more than any other from friends in Taiwan — how will Donald J. Trump’s return to the White House affect Taiwan and cross-Strait relations?
Some Taiwan counterparts have argued that Trump hates China, so therefore he will support Taiwan, according to the logic that the enemy of one’s enemy is a friend. Others have expressed anxiety that Trump will put pressure on Taiwan to dramatically increase defense spending, or to compensate the United States for allegedly “stealing” America’s semiconductor sector.
While I understand these hopes and concerns, I think they miss the bigger story. Trump does not “hate” China. Anyone expecting Trump to pursue a vengeful policy toward Xi Jinping (習近平) will be disappointed. Trump wants to be perceived as a strong leader and a great dealmaker. He wants to burnish this image through leader-to-leader negotiations with Xi.
Trump will not focus day-to-day on US-Taiwan relations. Trump has vowed that Taiwan will be safe from Chinese military assault during his time in office. This is the main criteria he will use to evaluate American policy on Taiwan. Trump believes he is uniquely capable of delivering peace by demonstrating strength and by nurturing closer personal relations with Xi.
Whether Trump’s instincts will deliver their intended results is a reasonable topic for debate. For example, Trump’s record of prioritizing personal relations with Xi risks creating opportunities for Xi to manipulate Trump into believing that Taiwan is the troublemaker that is destabilizing cross-Strait relations. Xi surely also will lobby Trump to endorse eventual peaceful unification and to oppose Taiwan independence. Trump will be more ambiguous than President Joe Biden has been about whether the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense if attacked. There are a host of other issues that could be highlighted here as well. The point of this piece is not to spot potential problems, though, it is to consider strategies for strengthening US-Taiwan relations in the next four years.
Trump’s main critique of Biden is that Biden was too weak and predictable in his conduct of American foreign policy. According to Trump and his advisors, America’s weakness under Biden contributed to Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine, Iran’s use of its proxies to destabilize the Middle East, and China’s intensifying military pressure on Taiwan. Trump wants to reverse these trends by projecting strength and maintaining unpredictability. For all his rhetorical bluster, Trump is averse to war and alarmed by the specter of nuclear conflict.
Viewed holistically, this suggests Trump holds status quo ambitions for Taiwan. He will not risk conflict for symbols of Taiwan sovereignty. At the same time, given his critique that the Biden administration’s overall weakness invited aggression, Trump will be more likely to overreact than underreact in the face of perceived challenges to America’s security posture in Asia.
During his first term, Trump was supportive of arms sales to Taiwan, in part because he viewed such sales as supporting American businesses. He likely will remain supportive of arms sales to Taiwan in his second term, both for financial reasons and because he likes America’s partners to show they are doing more to invest in their own defense.
On US-Taiwan trade issues, the first Trump administration was supremely cautious. Trump prioritized negotiating a trade deal with China and did not want any efforts with Taipei to undermine his broader ambitions with Beijing.
Trump secured a Phase-1 trade deal with China in January 2020. Even though the deal dramatically underperformed on expectations, Trump still appears to crave the notion of negotiating a new trade deal with Beijing during his next term. As such, it would be unsurprising if US officials lean forward on Taiwan security issues and pull back on economic initiatives with Taiwan.
Of course, the US-Taiwan relationship is not a one-player game. Leaders in Taipei also get a vote in how the US-Taiwan relationship develops and how cross-Strait relations unfold. During President Lai Ching-te’s (賴清德) term, Taiwan will be in the strongest position to protect its interests in the face of China’s unrelenting pressure if it can demonstrate that it is growing its relationship with the United States.
To do so effectively, Taiwan may want to consider finding ways to position itself as a contributor to “peace through strength.” Trump and his advisors have latched on to this Reagan-era bumper sticker slogan as a unifying strategy for American foreign policy in a turbulent era. They see the international landscape as being more unstable and dangerous than at any point since the end of World War II. In the face of this uncertainty, they believe the United States must exercise strength and resolve to stabilize and re-order a dangerous world.
Part of the Trump team’s strategy for reordering the world is reducing trade dependencies on China. The Trump team also is focused on restoring American and allied manufacturing might, particularly its defense industrial base. America is not capable in the near-term of significantly ramping up defense industrial production. To expand output, Washington will need to involve close partners such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Taiwan thus has an opportunity to position itself as an indispensable partner for high-technology industrialization in America and as a trusted supplier of defense equipment, such as advanced drones.
Trump’s return to the White House presents an opportunity for leaders in Taipei to demonstrate Taiwan is a partner and an enabler for America’s strategy of “peace through strength.” The more both sides lean into this framing, the greater the potential for progress in advancing US-Taiwan relations in the years to come.
Ryan Hass is a senior fellow, the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies, and the Director of the China Center at the Brookings Institution.
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