Lithuanian Prime Minister Gintautas Paluckas and 14 ministers of his Cabinet were sworn in on Thursday last week. The new government of Lithuania is formed by three parties: the center-left Social Democratic Party of Lithuania, the conservative Union of Democrats for Lithuania and the populist Dawn of Nemunas.
Paluckas, the Social Democratic Party’s deputy leader, expressed several concerns regarding Lithuania’s expanding relationship with Taiwan during the previous government.
He referred to the opening of a representative office with the “Taiwanese name” in Vilnius, as a “grave diplomatic mistake.” One of the goals that he laid out before the elections was to “restore diplomatic relations with China” by bringing the Lithuanian and Chinese ambassadors back to their posts.
At the same time, Paluckas stressed the need to normalize relations “without humiliation, collapse or the need to kneel to or beg anyone.”
“We are a sovereign country. We really do not have any dependence on China, and nobody tries to create one, but diplomatic relations are a value. There is still a need for it,” he said.
Paluckas’ government would then try to balance a more pragmatic stance toward Beijing with its Euro-Atlantic orientation. Particularly with regard to China-Russia “no limits relations,” in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Lithuania is well aware of the need to adopt a cautious approach to the People’s Republic of China.
Within this context, the new government of Lithuania could follow the example of the previous Lithuanian administration by taking a firm stance with regards to the tensions in the Taiwan Strait.
Former Lithuanian minister of foreign affairs Gabrielius Landsbergis, a defender of democracy in the face of rising authoritarian threats from Europe and beyond, is a true ally of Taiwan.
Before leaving office, Landsbergis affirmed the importance of “maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait” and praised the “government’s chosen direction of strategic diversification and deepening cooperation with the Indo-Pacific region.”
Taipei-Vilnius relations have flourished since the latter’s government became aware of the need to look at Taiwan through the lens of Taiwan.
This meant that the previous Lithuanian government decided to adopt an innovative strategy (if compared with that of other European countries) focused on approaching Taiwan without the fear of repercussions from Beijing.
The economic sanctions imposed by Beijing, coupled with the deterioration of diplomatic relations, made Lithuania even more persuaded to listen to Taiwan’s voice, while understanding why it mattered and the benefits it brings to its allies.
On Nov. 7, the Lithuanian high-tech company Teltonika reached an agreement with Taiwan’s Industrial Technology Research Institute on the development of the semiconductor sector in Lithuania.
Moreover, Lithuanian fish, milk and egg products are to be authorized for export to Taiwan in the near future.
“A decision that will significantly boost exports to Taiwan,” Landsbergis said.
The new Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Kestutis Budrys should follow in his predecessor’s footsteps by advancing Lithuania’s interests and defending his country’s values in the international arena.
From a general point of view, the appointment of Dovile Sakaliene as the new minister of national defense is an auspicious start and a decision that bodes well for the future of Lithuania-Taiwan relations.
She is a member of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China who has been blacklisted by China in retaliation for her condemnation of “mass detentions of Muslim Uighurs and human rights abuses in Xinjiang” and her multiple visits to Taiwan.
What the Lithuanian lawmaker Ruslanas Baranovas said during his first interview with TVBS as the new chairperson of the Lithuania-Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group is an auspicious start, too.
In particular, he pointed out that “we really don’t have any discussions about changing the name or closing down the Taiwanese Representative Office. It really isn’t an issue, I can assure that.”
By taking into account Paluckas’ comments on his country’s relationship with China on the one hand, and Sakaliene’s appointment and Baranovas’ clarification through his latest interview on the other, we should carefully navigate the complexities of the situation.
The idea that Lithuania is keen on dealing with China is not what bothers Taiwan and its allies. The uniqueness of Vilnius-Taipei relations is seen in the former’s decision to engage with Taiwan not through the lens of a possible retaliation by China.
The Paluckas administration’s main challenge would be to prove itself capable of setting out a foreign policy agenda consistent with that strategy.
In that sense, it is of the utmost importance, practically and symbolically, that the new Paluckas administration does not amend Lithuania’s historical decision to establish a Taiwanese representative office on its soil.
Failing to meet these expectations would result in a missed opportunity to strengthen a flourishing relationship that has proved resistant to authoritarian threats and blackmail.
Michele Maresca is an analyst at the online international law journal Il Caffe Geopolitico and the think tank Geopol 21.
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