As India confidently moves toward next year, its foreign policy is poised to embody a pragmatic and forward-looking approach. One of its salient features would be its ability to build on multiple strategies, free from an excessive preoccupation with its relationship with China. Instead, India seeks to explore a realistic, multipolar world order. It firmly rejects the notion of a bipolar global dynamic, opting instead to foster multipolarity as a pathway to securing its rightful and anticipated place in the international arena.
India’s steady economic rise remains a cornerstone of its global outreach. With a projected growth rate of 7 percent over the coming years, India is positioning itself as a robust economy capable of supporting its neighborhood and beyond. That growth is complemented by India’s willingness to contribute to global solutions, be it in managing shared global challenges or providing assistance during crises.
Its track record as a developing nation that has remained steadfastly committed to pluralism and democracy resonates deeply with many countries in the Global South, serving as an inspiring example worth emulating.
In the Indo-Pacific region, India has demonstrated a nuanced response to China’s assertiveness. While many countries in the region grapple with the challenge of resisting Chinese hegemony, India has charted a unique path. It has engaged China without succumbing to pressure and simultaneously developed alternative partnerships that are neither explicitly anti-China nor wholly influenced by Beijing.
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) — consisting of India, Australia, Japan and the US — is one such platform where India’s strategic approach is evident. While uncertainty looms over how the incoming administration of US president-elect Donald Trump might influence the Indo-Pacific region, India remains clear about the importance of US involvement in the Quad.
However, India’s Indo-Pacific strategy has also cultivated strong bilateral ties with Japan and Australia, creating robust pillars of support independent of Washington. That enhances India’s value as a partner in the grouping and underscores its growing influence in the region.
India’s 18 million-strong diaspora plays a pivotal role in its foreign policy narrative. Across the globe, Indian professionals and entrepreneurs are recognized for their contributions, and mobility opportunities for Indian talent have become a key component of bilateral discussions. While countries in Europe have sought Indian talent to address labor shortages and demographic challenges, that trend could expand to Taiwan, Japan and South Korea.
In Southeast Asia, Indian entrepreneurs and investors are contributing to the economic growth of countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines. India’s outreach to ASEAN in the past few years demonstrates how private and governmental engagements are working synergistically to foster deeper ties. Such initiatives are not driven by competition with China, but by India’s broader strategic and economic interests.
Supply chain connectivity has emerged as a vital element of India’s foreign policy. The country is working toward achieving strategic autonomy from Chinese-dominated supply lines, while positioning itself as a reliable alternative. That effort is not framed as opposition to China, but as a proactive measure to safeguard Indian interests.
India’s approach to building resilient supply chains involves country-specific collaborations rather than region-wide agreements. Each nation’s economic priorities are addressed individually, ensuring mutual benefits.
For example, while reviewing the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement, India is engaging directly with ASEAN economies to establish robust supply chains in areas such as pharmaceuticals, food security, green energy and disaster resilience.
That pragmatic approach has already yielded results. This year, India lifted its rice export ban for specific ASEAN countries whose traditional suppliers, such as Vietnam and Thailand, were unable to meet demand. Similarly, India’s role as a supplier of refined petroleum products, bolstered by its large refining capacity and ability to procure Russian oil at controlled prices, has strengthened its partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region.
India acknowledges that its decade-old Act East Policy requires renewed attention. To that end, it is engaging ASEAN members individually and collectively without forcing them to choose between India and China. That balanced approach provides strategic comfort to ASEAN countries, some of which, such as Indonesia, possess vast natural resources that align with India’s growth trajectory.
Prominent bilateral relationships, such as those with Indonesia and Australia, illustrate how India is deepening its partnerships in the region. India’s policies do not seek to challenge China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific region, but aim to address regional needs and expectations. That nuanced strategy underscores India’s unique role in the region, separate from China’s.
India’s support of the inclusion of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam as BRICS partners and the several summit meetings with Japan. Australia and ASEAN member leaders this year showed the enthusiasm that India has in engaging the region.
While India does not have the financial resources to match China’s Belt and Road Initiative, it offers an alternative model based on public-private partnerships and foreign direct investment rather than government-led loans. The limits of China’s initiative are becoming increasingly evident, and nations in the region are beginning to explore India’s more sustainable and inclusive model of engagement. Those who seize the opportunity are likely to foster stronger, mutually beneficial relationships with India.
India’s foreign policy is not limited to the Indo-Pacific. Initiatives such as the I2U2 grouping (India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the US) and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) highlight India’s ability to navigate complex geostrategic challenges.
Similarly, India’s engagement with Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean regional body CARICOM reflects its expanding global reach. In these regions, India is focusing on emerging sectors rather than traditional industries, leveraging its strengths in technology and innovation.
In the Indo-Pacific region, there is potential for replicating frameworks such as the IMEC. Such initiatives could involve Taiwan, Japan, Australia and South Korea, extending across the South China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin.
The proposed Indian Trilateral Highway, which is set to connect Myanmar and Thailand and potentially extend to Vietnam, exemplifies India’s commitment to infrastructure development. However, the time has come for like-minded countries in the region to collaborate more actively, building resilient supply chains and infrastructure aligned with regional priorities.
Gurjit Singh is a former Indian ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, ASEAN, Ethiopia and the African Union.
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