US$18.278 billion is a simple dollar figure; one that’s illustrative of the first Trump administration’s defense commitment to Taiwan. But what does Donald Trump care for money?
During President Trump’s first term, the US defense department approved gross sales of “defense articles and services” to Taiwan of over US$18 billion. In September, the US-Taiwan Business Council compared Trump’s figure to the other four presidential administrations since 1993:
President Clinton approved a total of US$8.702 billion from 1993 through 2000.
President George W. Bush approved US$15.614 billion in eight years. This total would have been significantly greater had Taiwan’s Kuomintang-controlled Legislative Yuan been cooperative.
During President Obama’s eight years, US$13.962 billion in arms sales were approved (despite a virtual freeze on arms sales to Taiwan from September 21, 2011 through December 16, 2015, 4 years and 3 months!)
The current Biden Administration approved US$5.71 billion, an average of about US$1.43 billion a year.
Compare all this to “Trump-45”. During its four years, US defense sales to totaled US$18.278 billion; higher in four years than any other administration in eight. And Trump’s sales included significant new weapons systems, including F-16V jet fighters, M1A2 Abrams tanks, SLAM-ER land attack missiles, HIMARS missiles (so effective against Russian targets in Ukraine), and land-based Harpoon missiles.
So, as far as Taiwan’s defenses are concerned, the next Trump administration is likely to be more friendly to Taiwan than any previous non-Trump administration, at least back to Ronald Reagan’s.
“Past performance is not a guarantee of future results” is a prudent disclaimer. Likewise, one may not take the first-term Taiwan-policy record of America’s “once-and-future” President as an infallible indicator of his second-term disposition, particularly given the disruption of the Biden years. But, with a month still to go before the President-elect’s inauguration, it is a good bet that the 47th President’s policies toward China and Taiwan will be marked by continuity.
Eight years ago this month, December 2, 2016, Mr. Trump experienced his first official encounter with “China Policy.” The president-elect graciously accepted a phone call from Taiwan’s then-president Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), who congratulated him on his remarkable election. Ah, how clearly I remember! The professional foreign policy class had a meltdown over the incoming President’s temerity. The Washington Post’s sage of world affairs David Ignatius asked, “is this a cool, calculating strategy from the dealmaker? It looks to me more like a hot mess.”
But Ignatius had not considered Mr. Trump’s eminently reasonable Twitter-post on Taiwan: “Interesting how the US sells Taiwan billions of dollars of military equipment but I should not accept a congratulatory call.” It wasn’t as if the president-elect knew nothing about Taiwan arms sales prior to that date. As far back as November 18, 2011, Trump took to Twitter with this complaint: “Why is @BarackObama delaying the sale of F-16 aircraft to Taiwan? Wrong message to send to China. #TimeToGetTough.” Two months prior, the Obama administration had approved F-16 retrofitting for Taiwan’s existing jets — for a total of US$5.3 billion — but resolutely ignored Taiwan’s need for additional new F-16s. And the Obama administration froze arms sales to Taiwan shortly thereafter. The Trump 2011 tweet about Taiwan’s F-16s is proof he was engaged with the issue.
To be sure, President Trump’s aides tip-toed around Taiwan arms sales whenever a decision had to be made. For example, his national security advisor, John Bolton, recalls that he and then-secretary of state Michael Pompeo fretted over just the right timing to get the President’s signature on the US$8.0 billion sale of 66 new F-16V [Block 70] fighter jets. The President had been engaged in frustrating trade talks with Chinese Vice Premier Liu He (劉鶴) for six weeks, and at the beginning of August 2019 announced that 25 per cent across the board tariffs on Chinese imports would be in order. On August 13, Bolton and Pompeo briefed him on the F-16s, to which Trump asked “did you ever give any thought to not making the sale?” Pompeo said “no” and Trump (no doubt with Chinese tariffs in mind) said, “ok, but do it quietly.”
The F-16 sale to Taiwan went through smoothly, albeit with ample newspaper coverage and with the usual suspects in existential angst. So, “quietly” wasn’t exactly possible. Evan S. Medeiros, a China expert on Obama’s National Security Council, intoned in solemn hyperbole, “there is never a good time to sell arms to Taiwan, but this timing is probably the worst possible choice.” “Trade talks will stall, China will try to hit American companies hard.” But in the end, China chose not to make a federal case out of it. Indeed, Beijing was more intimidated by Trump’s tariff threats than Trump ever was by Beijing’s displeasure. And Vice Premier Liu He reached a trade agreement with President Trump on October 11.
Let me give you a sense of how the President-elect’s mind works. Two weeks before the November 5, 2024, election, Mr. Trump had a free-wheeling session with the editors of The Wall Street Journal. Editorial page editor Paul Gigot asked Trump “how he would persuade Xi Jinping (習近平) to stand down from a blockade of Taiwan.”
“Oh, very easy,” the former president replied. “I had a very strong relationship with him…” Trump then embarked on a curious anecdote. During Xi’s informal visit to the US in April 2017, the Chinese president stayed at Mar-a-Lago as the US president’s guest. Before dinner, President Trump had a classified briefing on a US bombing operation in Syria. It was an awkward moment. Apparently, there was intelligence that Chinese military aircraft maintenance personnel were present at the target. During dessert, Mr. Trump confided to his Chinese counterpart: “I said, ‘President, we’ve just shot 58 missiles into Syria to an airport that’s housing a lot of new planes. Your people are not at risk, but they’re on their way right now.’”
In the former president’s recollection, Mr. Xi did not quite understand and asked his host to “repeat.” Trump repeated his information and at “first, it looked like he was furious, right?” But Xi Jinping immediately collected himself. Trump described Xi as “pretty cool, but he’s a fierce guy.”
What this had to do with Taiwan was still a mystery to Mr. Gigot, but President Trump explained: “I would say: If you go into Taiwan, I’m sorry to do this, I’m going to tax you at 150% to 200% and might even shut down trade altogether.” Mr. Gigot pressed, “Would you use military force against a blockade on Taiwan?” to which Mr. Trump responded, “I wouldn’t have to, because he respects me and he knows I’m f— crazy.”
By contrast, Trump’s way of endearing himself to Russia’s Vladimir Putin on Ukraine was diametrically opposite and he must be quoted verbatim.
“I said to Putin, ‘Vladimir, we have a great relationship.’ I got along with him great. He’s a different kind of a character, I will tell you, much different than anybody under — I knew him very well. I said, ‘Vladimir, if you go after Ukraine, I am going to hit you so hard, you’re not even going to believe it. I’m going to hit you right in the middle of fricking Moscow.’ I said, ‘We’re friends. I don’t want to do it, but I have no choice.’ He goes, ‘No way!’ I said [quoting a memorable meme from the 1992 film Wayne’s World], ‘Way!’ I said, ‘You’re going to be hit so hard, and I’m going to take those f— domes [of the Kremlin] right off your head.’ Because, you know, he lives under the domes.”
With Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), Trump talks money. Not so much with Vladimir Putin. But what of Taiwan?
During the campaign, President-elect Trump voiced a few complaints about Taiwan. All have either already been resolved or are immediately solvable. He complained that Taiwan “stole our jobs and our technology,” a charge he has levelled at Taiwan for decades. And so, Taiwan Semiconductor now plans a third gigafactory in Arizona using its state-of-the-art 3-nanometer process, boosting its total investment in Arizona to more than US$65 billion. Last summer, Mr. Trump complained that Taiwan “should pay us for defense. You know, we’re no different than an insurance company. Taiwan doesn’t give us anything.” He complained floridly that Taiwan “took our chip business!” Mr. Trump observed, “Taiwan is 9,500 miles away” but “68 miles away from China.” Solution simple! With a new President in Washington willing to sell advanced arms to Taiwan (unlike any previous administration since 1992), President William Lai’s (賴清德) government wants to show the president-elect it’s serious: Aegis destroyers, more Patriot missiles and F-35 fighter jets are on the wish list.
As Trump said once to John Bolton, “Other presidents just didn’t think it was appropriate to talk about money. That’s all I know how to talk about.”
John J. Tkacik Jr is a retired US foreign service officer who served at US embassies in both Taipei and Beijing. He now directs the Future Asia Project at the International Assessment and Strategy Center and is on the advisory board of the Global Taiwan Institute.
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