Chinese Ministry of National Defense spokesman Wu Qian (吳謙) announced at a news conference that General Miao Hua (苗華) — director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission — has been suspended from his duties pending an investigation of serious disciplinary breaches.
Miao’s role within the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) affects not only its loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), but also ideological control. This reflects the PLA’s complex internal power struggles, as well as its long-existing structural problems.
Since its establishment, the PLA has emphasized that “the party commands the gun,” and that the military is a tool of the party. However, as China’s economic strength grows, the flow of funds within the military has become larger, providing a hotbed for corruption. Particularly in areas such as weapons research and development, logistical support and military construction, corruption is almost unavoidable due to a lack of transparency and the centralization of power.
Corruption scandals have often erupted in units such as the PLA Rocket Force and the Equipment Development Department, which have also shown the systemic problems in military governance. Miao was responsible for all personnel appointments and ideological maintenance in the military. His fall is believed to have involved a large-scale network of corruption — especially a large number of navy generals that he promoted, the level of warship readiness, and collusion between state-run enterprizes and the PLA’s procurement system.
Since Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) took office, he has adopted a heavy-handed anti-corruption policy to reform the military. However, Miao’s fall proves that corruption inside the PLA has not yet been eradicatede. This reflects the contradiction between the anti-corruption goal and the military’s systemic problems: Xi wants to consolidate his control over the military through his anti-corruption drive, but the internal power mechanism of the PLA makes it difficult to eradicate corruption. Originally, Miao’s department was responsible for maintaining military discipline and political loyalty, so his involvement in corruption is ironic.
Although Xi’s “reign of terror” over the military has now effectively secured its political loyalty, it has to a degree contributed to the general insecurity of military officers and low morale. This sense of insecurity might cause a culture of “complying in public, opposing in private” and “formalism,” jeopardizing China’s military power.
The investigation into Miao might lead to a bigger corruption issue that might even affect the subordinates that he promoted. Chinese Minister of National Defense Dong Jun (董軍) is also allegedly being investigated for corruption just a year after taking the post. This highlights that corruption has spread into the PLA leadership. Meanwhile, Xi’s review mechanism for official recommendations fails to identify potential risks. Although the military has denied that Dong is under investigation, the outside world remains pessimistic about his future.
As events unfold, the international community is watching not only Dong’s fate, but also whether the CCP could stabilize its power while simultaneously resolving the PLA’s systemic corruption problems. What is needed is not just a personnel change or policy adjustments, but a change to the way the CCP operates.
In the absence of proper civil monitoring and an independent judicial system, it is very difficult for the CCP to monitor itself. Therefore corruption is certain to persist in the PLA, affecting the level of its overall combat readiness and military power.
Liao Ming-hui is a Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research assistant researcher.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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