India and China have taken a significant step toward disengagement of their military troops after reaching an agreement on the long-standing disputes in the Galwan Valley. For government officials and policy experts, this move is welcome, signaling the potential resolution of the enduring border issues between the two countries. However, it is crucial to consider the potential impact of this disengagement on India’s relationship with Taiwan.
Over the past few years, there have been important developments in India-Taiwan relations, including exchanges between heads of state soon after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s third electoral victory. This raises the pressing question: Would India prioritize its relationship with China and sideline Taiwan?
A high level of mistrust exists between India and China, stemming from incidents such as the Doklam and Galwan crises. India has already undergone a rapid transformation of its infrastructure in Galwan valley to facilitate quick mobilization of forces. Militarily, once these deployments are made, reversing them is challenging. It is believed that field exercises would take place in summer next year, signaling India’s continued distrust of China.
As noted by Jadeva Rande at the International Forum on the Changing Indo-Pacific Geopolitical Landscape held at National Tsing Hua University on Wednesday last week, this disengagement could be viewed as a “tactical move” by China which can be “temporary.”
India must balance two key objectives: First, it must maintain its deterrence capabilities against China.
Second, India aims to avoid military confrontation with China, which could adversely affect its developing economy. India’s ability to balance these priorities would, without doubt, shape the future of its relationship with Taiwan.
India sees significant potential in Taiwan for two primary reasons: Taiwan’s strategic geopolitical location, which connects the Pacific and Indian oceans, and the island nation’s growing importance as an emerging economic hub. This offers substantial opportunities to India, particularly in sectors such as semiconductors and shipbuilding.
The critical question is how India can engage with Taiwan beyond economic, cultural and academic exchanges, while still adhering to its “one China” policy. Although India has not publicly emphasized its “one China” policy since 2010, it has not yet made a formal decision to revise this stance.
Beyond various memoranda of understanding and people-to-people contacts, India’s “defense diplomacy” could provide an avenue for greater naval cooperation between the two countries. This “defense diplomacy” encompasses more than just military exercises or strategic discussions on common adversaries. It can also include academic exchange programs between defense personnel from India and Taiwan, in which discussions could focus on advanced technologies.
Taiwan could also become a key player in India’s naval strategy aimed at combating piracy in the Indo-Pacific region, countering potential terrorist threats and facilitating rapid humanitarian responses during natural disasters. India is carrying out such academic endeavors with other countries of South Asia, as well as with African nations. It would provide India with an opportunity to engage Taiwan’s middle and senior-level defense personnel who would be pursuing staff-level courses in India.
These activities are permissible under India’s official policies, particularly those outlined by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, without requiring a revision of India’s position on the “one China” policy. Such academic cooperation among serving defense personnel would enhance mutual understanding of the Indo-Pacific region and improve coordination during crises.
India should also bear in mind that China has not only openly funded Pakistan’s nuclear program, but has supported Pakistan in various international forums, fully aware of India’s reservations.
Furthermore, China is attempting to extend its influence in South Asia through initiatives such as establishing ports in Sri Lanka and interfering in the internal affairs of the Maldives.
Strengthening India’s relationship with Taiwan could yield significant economic and diplomatic benefits, while also serving as a strategic counterbalance to China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific region.
Neha Kumar is an assistant professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Sri Balaji University in Pune, India, and a visiting fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research in Taipei.
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