China’s nuclear arsenal has increased from about 200 warheads in 2020 to more than 500 last year and is expected to exceed 1,000 by 2030. Beijing already possesses adequate nuclear capability to create an asymmetric threat in the Indo-Pacific region. To add to the threat, Beijing is making preparations to test-fire its Dong Feng-31AG intercontinental ballistic missiles, which can travel more than 11,000km and reach multiple targets across the contiguous US.
This is a clear demonstration that China is increasingly growing its long-range nuclear capability as well as ability to precisely hit targets in the US, as it gradually narrows the technological gap between the two nations. To Beijing, the expansion of its nuclear arsenal is not about timely military strategy, but about bolstering its global power.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace senior research fellow Tong Zhao (趙通) in May published an article in the Foreign Affairs magazine titled “The Real Motives for China’s Nuclear Expansion: Beijing Seeks Geopolitical Leverage More Than Military Advantage.” Zhao wrote that China does not yet view nuclear weapons as a tool to achieve specific military goals, but that its arsenal plays a role in expanding political influence on its periphery. This strategy also echoes China’s long-term ambitions for the global order, namely to gradually cut away at the US’ regional influence, in particular the cohesion of the US’ alliance system, without throwing itself into a large-scale war.
The US’ alliances in the Indo-Pacific have long had a foundation of constraining Chinese territorial and power expansion, yet Beijing now has adequate nuclear threat capabilities to exert asymmetric pressure on the region. This kind of capability allows China to possess a limited nuclear threat to coerce the US’ allies and even to shake up these countries’ faith in US security guarantees. Should China start a conflict with Taiwan, it could use this as an excuse to elevate its nuclear posture, blocking the US from directly entering on Taiwan’s side and further isolating Taiwan to realize Beijing’s peripheral goals.
Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) is not only attempting to use military means to realize the refashioning of the world order, but is also using propaganda and information warfare to bolster his international narrative, chipping away at US culture and ideological influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Simultaneously, Xi is using domestic control and extreme measures to maintain China’s stability, guaranteeing that his nuclear weapons policy promotion does not get rebuffed by domestic turmoil headwinds.
However, there is a degree of silent concern swirling around this act. Internally, China’s high-pressure restrictions on space for domestic policy discussion have left researchers and specialist groups wondering whether they should provide constructive criticism about the nation’s nuclear policy. Beijing’s top-down policymaking model could lead to an increase in strategy risk miscalculations.
Faced with China’s nuclear arms expansion, the US not only needs to bolster military deployment, but also to respond to peripheral politics. Primarily, Washington needs to put more efforts into solidifying its allies’ trust in it, and revamp its regional nuclear capability, for example, by reviving its submarine-launched cruise missiles, to counter China’s nuclear posturing. At the same time, it could take advantage of weaknesses in China’s political system, circumventing its Great Firewall and censorship to spread information about its political corruption and its economic failures. If Xi’s attention could be shifted to internal strife, it could chip away at China’s investment and influence in global affairs.
Liao Ming-hui is a Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research assistant researcher.
Translated by Tim Smith
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