It has been nearly a month since Donald Trump’s decisive victory of in the US presidential election, but the result is still sending shockwaves around the world.
States and industries are bracing for Trump’s promised redoubling of protectionist policies.
Cryptocurrency markets were invigorated by the prospect of deregulation. Taiwan, much like other nations facing security threats, is scrambling to grapple with the uncertainty and volatility a Trump administration is known for.
Observers argue over whether Trump’s transactional and “realist” approach is conducive to making Taiwan safer. The general consensus by experts in the field is that Trump would undoubtedly be tough on China, while the support for Taiwan from the US Congress and the Oval Office is firm.
While the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has sought to reassure the public of the stability of US security support, the discourse in Taiwan remains centered on cross-strait security.
A recent poll conducted by the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation showed that about 51 percent of respondents were averse to the notion of “paying protection money for US defense,” revealing a slightly ambivalent sentiment.
A mixed sense of cautious skepticism and sometimes cheery optimism has permeated the conversation.
What seems to be missing among this cacophony of national interest dialogue is a broader conversation about democratic values and challenges.
I want to make an argument against Trump beyond the analysis of Taiwan’s national security and trade policies.
At the core of Taiwan’s political debate is the issue of national identity — be it a localized identity of purely pro-independent Taiwanese, pro-”status quo” Republic of China (ROC), or both — which makes it distinct from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) based on Taiwan’s liberalized and democratic system.
The DPP government has stressed its “democratic identity” on the international stage for many years. Concepts such as “like-minded countries” and “value-based diplomacy” were at the core of former president Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) policies, as is the case with President William Lai (賴清德).
Stressing the importance of building a “democratic alliance or relations” is never far from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ agenda.
With China’s incessant pressure to push Taiwan out of any international space, Taiwan’s competitiveness and power come not from its size or military strength, but from its specialized industry, like semiconductors, and the soft power garnered through its democratic affinity. For years, the democratic legacy of Taiwan not only informed a national identity that gravitated away from authoritarianism, but also molded an approach to foreign policy that aligned with the liberal international order.
Recently, Taiwan has faced numerous challenges to its democracy in the form of an overreaching legislative majority. From amendments to expand the legislature’s power in May this year to attempts to boycott crucial political nominations, such as to the Examination Yuan, by refusing to proceed with confirmation hearings, the opposition parties have sought to obstruct the ability of the ruling party to govern effectively.
Civil movements against these blatant legislative overreaches have had tremendous momentum. The “Blue Bird” movement reportedly drew 100,000 people outside the legislature in Taipei in a robust protest against new legislation that would later be ruled mostly unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court.
This month, Taiwan’s lawyers organized and spoke out against a legislative proposal that would essentially cripple the Constitutional Court’s ability to function should the legislative majority simply refuse to consider any nominees.
The many troubles that Taiwan’s democracy faces do not strictly contravene any laws or regulations. The legislative majority is acting well within its legal prerogatives to legislate and set legislative agendas.
However, liberal democratic principles demand more than mere adherence to the law from politicians. There are normative practices, such as the willingness to negotiate with the opposition, and respect for the system of checks and balances.
There are two main forms of this particular type of stealth democratic backsliding, which erodes democracy in spirit if not substantively. One is seeking to change the rules of the game, like how the legislative majority is trying to modify electoral and procedural rules that would empower itself above the other branches of government. The other is bending the norms of democracy, like forgoing party negotiations and substantive deliberation completely in pursuit of legislative goals.
Trump, however hawkish his administration might be on China, is a political figure who is more than willing to engage in this type of political maneuvering. Under his directives, the Republican Party’s US Senate majority in 2017 dismantled the filibuster for US Supreme Court nominees to push through Trump’s nominee, Neil Gorsuch. The filibuster, whatever its implications are for popular democracy, is a long-standing procedural mechanism that induces bipartisanship within the US Senate. By ridding the system of its check on majority power, the Senate majority now holds the power to confirm nominees without bipartisan support.
As for bending the norms, Trump is known to be a serial norm breaker. He appointed and is poised to appoint personal lawyers to key positions in the US Department of Justice. Disregarding the common practice of avoiding conflicts of interest, he interfered with FBI investigations by dismissing its director, James Comey, and threatened to fire then-US special counsel Robert Mueller who was investigating potential Russian interference in the 2016 election, an infringement on independent agencies.
Finally, he purposefully excluded media outlets he deemed unfavorable to him from attending numerous White House news conferences, undermining the expected professional transparency a democratic executive ought to have.
With Trump set to retake office, he is already pressuring Republican senators to approve his Cabinet nominees during the Senate recess so they do not have to go through the usual confirmation process. Even when his party holds the majority to confirm their preferred nominees, Trump is trying to bend norms to further reduce any potential check on his power.
The Lai administration’s prudence in dealing with its most important security partner is commendable and reasonable. Nevertheless, the parallel between Trump and the democratic erosions Taiwan now faces domestically is a cogent one. Outside the cordiality that state-level relations demand, those who prize Taiwan’s democratic values and principles ought to caution against a US president who tramples on democratic institutions repeatedly.
Those who take pride in Taiwan’s hard-earned democratization must keep in mind that the reason Taiwan has aligned itself with the broader Western world is precisely because it hopes to work with other states that share its democratic vision.
Lee Chi-en is pursuing a master’s degree in international studies at National Chengchi University. His research focuses on democratic backsliding and legislative politics. He was also a Ministry of Foreign Affairs youth ambassador in 2019.
US president-elect Donald Trump on Tuesday named US Representative Mike Waltz, a vocal supporter of arms sales to Taiwan who has called China an “existential threat,” as his national security advisor, and on Thursday named US Senator Marco Rubio, founding member of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China — a global, cross-party alliance to address the challenges that China poses to the rules-based order — as his secretary of state. Trump’s appointments, including US Representative Elise Stefanik as US ambassador to the UN, who has been a strong supporter of Taiwan in the US Congress, and Robert Lighthizer as US trade
A nation has several pillars of national defense, among them are military strength, energy and food security, and national unity. Military strength is very much on the forefront of the debate, while several recent editorials have dealt with energy security. National unity and a sense of shared purpose — especially while a powerful, hostile state is becoming increasingly menacing — are problematic, and would continue to be until the nation’s schizophrenia is properly managed. The controversy over the past few days over former navy lieutenant commander Lu Li-shih’s (呂禮詩) usage of the term “our China” during an interview about his attendance
Following the BRICS summit held in Kazan, Russia, last month, media outlets circulated familiar narratives about Russia and China’s plans to dethrone the US dollar and build a BRICS-led global order. Each summit brings renewed buzz about a BRICS cross-border payment system designed to replace the SWIFT payment system, allowing members to trade without using US dollars. Articles often highlight the appeal of this concept to BRICS members — bypassing sanctions, reducing US dollar dependence and escaping US influence. They say that, if widely adopted, the US dollar could lose its global currency status. However, none of these articles provide
Bo Guagua (薄瓜瓜), the son of former Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee Politburo member and former Chongqing Municipal Communist Party secretary Bo Xilai (薄熙來), used his British passport to make a low-key entry into Taiwan on a flight originating in Canada. He is set to marry the granddaughter of former political heavyweight Hsu Wen-cheng (許文政), the founder of Luodong Poh-Ai Hospital in Yilan County’s Luodong Township (羅東). Bo Xilai is a former high-ranking CCP official who was once a challenger to Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) for the chairmanship of the CCP. That makes Bo Guagua a bona fide “third-generation red”
RSS