The Middle East has long been a source of misery for Washington. It could be a land of opportunity for US president-elect Donald Trump.
In his first term as president, Trump brokered diplomatic detentes between Israel and several Arab states.
In his second, he would encounter a region in which Israeli military successes have dramatically reset the balance of power. That creates the possibility for a bold play to roll back Iran’s influence and curb its nuclear program — if Trump can avoid stumbling into another Middle Eastern mess.
Illustration: Yusha
The regional situation has improved markedly from a year ago, when Israel looked shockingly vulnerable and Iran and its proxies seemed ascendant. Today, Israel has not eliminated Hamas in Gaza, but it has wrecked most of its military capability. In Lebanon, Hezbollah can still fire rockets and conduct ambushes, but its leadership and long-range capabilities have been ravaged by Israeli assaults.
With US help, Israel blunted Iranian missile and drone attacks in April and last month, and delivered a damaging, targeted retaliation after the latter assault. With its proxies battered, its air defenses shredded and its missile arsenal devalued, Iran is more strategically naked than at any time in decades.
US President Joe Biden deserves some credit here. Yes, Biden has often urged caution on Israel and his relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is toxic. Still, Biden has given Israel the arms, the diplomatic assistance and the time necessary to take the offensive. The idea that Israel defends itself by itself is a myth: Several times, US forces have even fought directly on its behalf (by shooting down drones and missiles). Since Hamas’ invasion on Oct. 7 last year, US-Israel relations have been both deeply dysfunctional and devastatingly effective. What would Trump make of this inheritance?
He appears to have forgiven Netanyahu for acknowledging Biden’s victory in 2020; he surely admires Israel’s recent shows of strength. That provides an opening — and reports that Iran allegedly tried to assassinate Trump this fall provides extra motive — to further reset the region by squeezing its most malevolent regime.
Trump would likely renew his “maximum pressure” campaign to starve Iran of resources. The US might simultaneously take sharper military action against Yemen’s Houthis, still wreaking havoc on Red Sea shipping.
The US could also make clear that, along with Israel, it would hold Iran directly responsible for proxy attacks — a precedent Trump set by killing General Qassem Soleimani in 2020 — rather than giving Tehran strategic immunity by responding only against the proxies themselves. The US might also give Israel additional arms and intelligence for an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities — perhaps even joining that attack itself — unless Tehran accepts a tougher nuclear deal than the one Trump exited in 2018.
Finally, expect Trump to pick up Biden’s push for a regional grand bargain — diplomatic normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, coupled with enhanced US defense and technological ties to the Saudis — that would consolidate the anti-Iran coalition.
The temptation to make these moves would be strong, because success — reversing the two-decade expansion of Iranian influence and keeping Tehran from acquiring the world’s most dangerous weapons — would be so rewarding. Given that Iran, China, Russia and North Korea are cooperating more closely, weakening Tehran would also weaken this larger autocratic coalition.
However, as ever in the Middle East, do not downplay the complications.
First, Trump must determine what he wants. In his first term, he never decided whether the goal was to change Iranian policy or change the Iranian regime. Given Tehran’s weakness, the former objective might now be feasible. The latter, probably, is not.
Second, Trump must bring ambivalent Gulf states onboard. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates loathe Iran, but fear conflict in their backyard. Trump would have to prove that the US would not simply abandon them when tensions spiral, as he did when Iran attacked Saudi Arabian oil facilities in 2019.
Third, Washington must mind the oil markets. Pressing Iran means removing from global markets most of the 1.7 million barrels per day it exports. Unless Trump relaxes sanctions against the likes of Russia and Venezuela, he would have to expand domestic production while bringing the Saudis and their spare capacity along.
Fourth, Trump cannot avoid grappling with Gaza. Saudi Arabia would not normalize ties with Israel until the war there ends (and, perhaps, Israel at least gestures at the creation of a Palestinian state).
Trump might hope that stronger US backing would end the war through Israeli victory. If that fails, Trump’s support for Israel and his desire to close a Saudi deal could be at odds, and if the Israeli government goes ahead with a far-right plan to formally annex the West Bank, the regional diplomatic climate would change for the worse.
Finally, the risk of escalation is real. Iran is weak, but not impotent. It would not sit passively as Washington crushes its economy and Israel bludgeons its allies.
Iran could respond by lobbing more missiles at Israel, targeting US allies or military bases in the Persian Gulf, or perhaps even making a break for the nuclear bomb. Any of these moves could trigger the big, ugly war Trump aims to avoid.
The Middle East has changed, but it is still the Middle East — where the most ambitious plans so easily go awry.
Hal Brands is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist and the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
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