Taiwan’s climate initiatives are a core pillar of its official diplomatic relations with the Marshall Islands, Palau and Tuvalu, as well as its broader diplomatic outreach in the Asia-Pacific region. For Taiwan’s three allies in the Pacific, the US is a key diplomatic partner, and its actions in the Pacific are consequential to Taiwan’s ability to retain its Pacific allies.
There are only a limited number of actions Taiwan can take to counter China’s increasing influence over the Pacific region if the US proves itself to be an unreliable ally.
Therefore, US president-elect Donald Trump’s positions on climate change, one of the top concerns of Pacific Island nations, might usher in uncertainty over the future of Taiwan’s diplomatic relations in the Pacific.
Taiwan has played a consistent role in financing climate change mitigation, adaptation and prevention initiatives for its Pacific allies.
Last year, it contributed US$1 million to jointly establish the Taiwan-Marshall Islands Adaptation and Contingency Fund for Climate Change. Of the US$1 million, US$800,000 has been allocated to the development of a seawall in Jenrok, one of the most populated areas in the Marshall Islands.
Taiwan’s International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF) has also provided loans to the Marshall Islands Development Bank and the Marshalls Energy Company to implement the Enhancing Home Energy Efficiency and Promoting Renewable Energy Project.
The objective of the project is to curb carbon dioxide emissions by helping homeowners transition to using energy-saving appliances and installing solar panels for residents who have applied and met the energy efficiency threshold.
Taiwan has also assisted Palau and Tuvalu in developing similar capacities.
In September, Taiwan announced that it had installed solar photovoltaic power systems in three sites in Palau, demonstrating Taiwan-Paulau cooperation on clean energy initiatives.
Taiwan also provided a US$1 million grant to Palau to pursue a Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction Project — a project that would aid Palau in meeting important targets outlined in its climate change policy.
Taiwan has worked closely with Tuvalu on the country’s Coastal Adaptation Project, which aims to equip it with infrastructure that could mitigate damage to property and life from rising sea levels and extreme water-related weather events.
Despite its considerable contributions to climate-related initiatives in the Pacific, major limitations stand in the way of Taiwan’s ability to engage at a deeper level.
Taiwan’s inability to participate in international organizations such as the UN and sign international treaties reduces the amount of ways it can signal its commitment to meeting global climate change goals.
While wealthier than China on a per capita basis, Taiwan cannot compete with it in absolute spending on climate change initiatives.
These constraints point to the outsized importance of countries such as Australia, Japan and the US in providing climate financing to the region to help maintain the “status quo,” especially as China’s regional presence intensifies.
Although previous climate conferences have fallen short of addressing the challenges Pacific Island nations face due to climate change, especially the issue of financing loss and damage, they still provide Pacific Island nations with an occasion to voice their case to the international community.
However, if Trump repeats his previous decision to pull the US out of the Paris Agreement, the US risks signaling to vulnerable states that it is not only unwilling to finance their climate-related needs, but also disinterested in listening to what these needs are.
In addition to the US’ potential second withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, Trump’s fondness for downplaying the effects of climate change manifests in some of the measures outlined in Project 2025 — a policy blueprint for the Trump administration published by the Trump-affiliated Heritage Foundation think tank — where every mention of climate change in the 900-page document demonstrated skepticism about of the issue’s importance.
Page 257 proposes that “the next conservative Administration should rescind all climate policies from its foreign aid programs (specifically the Agency for International Development’s USAID Climate Strategy 2022-2030); shut down the agency’s offices, programs, and directives designed to advance the Paris Climate Agreement; and narrowly limit funding to traditional climate mitigation efforts.”
Apart from the proposed cuts to USAID, disdainful statements Trump has made about the Green Climate Fund, another crucial source of climate finance for the Pacific Islands, indicates further retrenchment. Over the past few years, the fund has given the Marshall Islands US$58.5 million, Palau US$12.4 million and Tuvalu US$45.5 million.
While totaling US$116.4 million, this is insufficient to compensate for the damages Pacific Island nations have already incurred and expect to incur from the effects of climate change. Trump’s bad faith arguments against the US’ participation in such climate financing efforts could leave the Pacific scrambling to fill a void in funding — one that can be filled by China.
In preparation for a reduction of US support for international climate finance, Taiwan could turn to regional partners such as Australia and Japan — both of which have consistently outshone the US in climate financing — to secure its alliances. Still, Taiwan is not without its own tools to help its Pacific Island allies.
In 2022, then-minister of the environmental protection administration Chang Tzi-chin (張子敬) was invited to join the Our Ocean Conference — an international conference launched by US Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry — to share its knowledge of marine preservation.
In addition to attending dialogues that are not affiliated with larger international organizations, Taiwan has also hosted dialogues of its own. On July 19 last year, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held the inaugural Pacific Climate Change Forum, which brought leaders from Pacific Island nations to Taipei to exchange knowledge about climate adaptation.
During the forum, Taiwan announced its plans to commission a just transition fund with the Marshall Islands, Palau, Tuvalu and Nauru (which has since switched its diplomatic recognition to Beijing) to “strengthen cooperation on climate adaptation with island nations.”
On a different note, as geostrategic competition comes to the fore, the people-centered nature of providing aid is often lost. Nation’s disingenuous attempts at assistance, pursued for their potential strategic benefits, are easy to see through and have been decried by Pacific Island leaders in the past.
China is not exempt from such criticism, with its showy donations to the Solomon Islands for last year’s Pacific Games attracting scrutiny over its seemingly misplaced priorities for international aid.
Simply put, sincerity and a willingness to listen are important qualities in a reliable partner — ones that allies are quick to notice. Therefore, Taiwan should aim to center these qualities in its approach to aiding its partners in the Pacific. Indeed, Palau has expressed gratitude toward Taiwan in the past for its willingness to deliver aid rapidly and without conditions.
Taiwan should continue down this path, ensuring that its aid continues to reach its partners swiftly and thoughtfully and not as a calculated play in a long game.
Trinity Tai is a junior at Pomona College studying Politics and Asian Studies. She was a former Virtual Student Federal Service Intern with the US Department of State.
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