Following the BRICS summit held in Kazan, Russia, last month, media outlets circulated familiar narratives about Russia and China’s plans to dethrone the US dollar and build a BRICS-led global order. Each summit brings renewed buzz about a BRICS cross-border payment system designed to replace the SWIFT payment system, allowing members to trade without using US dollars. Articles often highlight the appeal of this concept to BRICS members — bypassing sanctions, reducing US dollar dependence and escaping US influence.
They say that, if widely adopted, the US dollar could lose its global currency status. However, none of these articles provide concrete evidence of an actual system or any indication that de-dollarization is underway.
Most pro-BRICS Pay — the BRICS-backed payment system — articles appear in Chinese and Russian state media or “sponsored” media outlets focused on cryptocurrency and gold, often pushing sensational claims about the US dollar’s impending collapse. Some Western mainstream media also run attention-grabbing headlines about “the end of the dollar,” but the content remains speculative. For example, NASDAQ reported that “should the BRICS nations establish a new reserve currency, it would likely impact the US dollar, potentially leading to de-dollarization.” While true in theory, this statement does not confirm any concrete development toward a BRICS currency or cross-border payment system.
This year, as usual, media outlets — particularly in China and Russia — have promoted BRICS’ supposed progress in reducing US dollar reliance, yet no substantial plan exists. Frequently, articles mention “Russia proposed the creation of a BRICS Cross-Border Payment Initiative,” but this remains an idea without timelines, agreements or mechanisms to manage diverse, often non-convertible currencies. For example, what practical value would Russia find in South Africa’s rand, Brazil’s real or Ethiopia’s birr?
Buzzwords like “blockchain” and “open ledger” are thrown around as solutions, but they do not address the core issue: Value still needs to be traded for value. Most BRICS currencies hold limited global appeal, with only Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) possessing fully convertible, US dollar-pegged currencies backed by significant US dollar reserves — giving them little reason to abandon the US.
A BRICS cryptocurrency would still need backing from non-convertible currencies, making it impractical for the global market. Most BRICS currencies, including China’s partially convertible yuan, lack the liquidity and acceptance needed for cross-border payments, and countries such as Ethiopia and South Africa lack the resources to engage significantly in such transactions.
Unlike the EU, BRICS has no supranational institutions, central bank, mutual defense agreements or visa preferences allowing cross-border freedom of movement. It lacks a parliament, courts and binding policies that members are required to follow. Apart from a development bank that mostly operates in US dollars, BRICS is not an organization in any formal sense.
Originally, “BRIC” was simply an acronym coined in 2001 by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill to highlight the world’s fastest-growing economies at the time: Brazil, Russia, India and China. South Africa joined in 2010. While the term gained popularity, it was never intended to signify an actual alliance.
Today, economic realities diverge sharply. China’s growth has slowed below its 5 percent target, Russia is isolated by sanctions, and countries such as Ethiopia remain developing.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and the UAE — although they engage in oil sales with China — are more closely aligned with the US for security and hold significant reserves in US dollars. They both show little interest in integrating fully into BRICS or replacing the US with China or Russia as security guarantors.
The two countries that stand to gain the most from BRICS are Russia and China. Heavily sanctioned with a weakened currency, Russia seeks any alternative to bypass the US dollar for international trade. China often promotes large-scale initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS — all anti-Western in nature — hoping these would create investment opportunities, secure access to cheap commodities and enable lending at interest rates favorable for Beijing.
This also ties into China’s ambitions regarding Taiwan. For Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) to realize his goal of taking Taiwan, he must expand the Chinese People’s Liberation Army to match the combined forces of the US and Taiwan, with the potential involvement of allies like Japan, Australia, the UK, South Korea and possibly NATO. Xi needs to ensure China’s economic stability.
Prolonged conflict would likely lead to sanctions, embargoes and perhaps a naval blockade.
To mitigate these risks, China is focused on securing its energy and financial stability. Xi hopes that establishing a non-US dollar, non-SWIFT trade network within BRICS would allow China to sustain its economy during a conflict, and expanding BRICS would theoretically increase China’s trade options in such a scenario.
Xi views BRICS as a tool to prepare China for potential conflict over Taiwan, aiming to establish an alternative to the US dollar and mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. However, the development of a BRICS-based financial system is still just a vague aspiration, lacking concrete plans or timelines.
Assuming unanimous support from BRICS members in a conflict scenario is unrealistic. Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva maintains a balanced approach, engaging with both China and the US. India has ongoing territorial disputes with China and aspires to lead the Global South, making its support uncertain. The UAE and Saudi Arabia, with strong ties to the US, would likely avoid jeopardizing those relationships.
This leaves an economic coalition involving Russia, South Africa and Ethiopia, which offers limited protection against sanctions.
While BRICS provides a platform for China to explore alternatives to Western-dominated financial systems, its current structure and the diverse interests of its members limit its effectiveness as a unified front in the event of a conflict over Taiwan.
Antonio Graceffo, a China economic analyst who holds a China MBA from Shanghai Jiao Tong University, studies national defense at the American Military University.
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