The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in a statement on Tuesday reiterated Taiwan’s claims over the islands and features in the South China Sea, and called for disputes to be resolved through dialogue.
The statement came in response to assertions by the Philippines and China of their own claims in the area, and ongoing skirmishes between the countries, which MOFA said were “escalating regional tensions and potentially jeopardizing regional peace and stability.”
Taiwan claims a large swath of the South China Sea inside of a U-shaped “eleven-dash line,” which includes the Paracel Islands (Xisha Islands, 西沙群島), the Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands, 南沙群島) and Pratas Island (Dongsha Island, 東沙群島), as well as several other disputed features. Those claims include the only two that are administered by Taiwan: Pratas Island and Itu Aba (Taiping Island, 太平島).
Taiwan is unlikely to rescind those claims, but pursuing those claims would be unrealistic and unproductive for a number of reasons, not least of which is that the eleven-dash line contradicts the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
UNCLOS stipulates that a coastal state can claim a territorial sea that extends up to 12 nautical miles from the baseline of its shore. Even if Taiwan were to enjoy sovereignty over every habitable feature in the South China Sea, the areas between those features would remain international waters. China is a signatory to UNCLOS, but flouts its terms, and has disregarded The Hague’s 2016 arbitral tribunal’s adjudication of the Philippines’ case against it on sovereignty in the area.
Taiwan, despite not being a member state, follows UN conventions including UNCLOS, because it hopes to be seen as a contributing member of the global community that adheres to international order. It follows that Taiwan has more to gain by not pressing its neighbors on claims in the area. While Taiwan should continue to assert its sovereignty over Pratas Island and Itu Aba, but it could work with the Philippines and other regional partners in countering Chinese aggression.
China has frequently obstructed Philippine vessels, including those supplying sailors stationed at Second Thomas Shoal (Renai Shoal, 仁愛暗沙), and fishers operating in waters near disputed features.
Taiwanese assistance to Philippine fishers would not necessarily equate to recognizing the Philippines’ claims, but it would demonstrate Taiwan’s commitment to resolving territorial disputes through dialogue. Conversely, if China is allowed to bully others with impunity, it would embolden Beijing to seize more features and drive out other claimants, effectively handing over control of the region to China. Such a scenario would be disastrous for global shipping, much of which passes through the South China Sea. It would also afford China an uncontested projection of power, making it a greater threat to the US and its allies in the region.
While China is unlikely to come to the table for talks on resolving territorial disputes — since it views its own claims as uncontestable — Taiwan and the US could at least demonstrate good faith by offering to host such talks. A regional alliance led by Taiwan, the US and Japan, and including other South China Sea claimants, could potentially keep the China Coast Guard at bay through regular joint patrols.
The Republic of China is the progenitor of the current state of territorial disputes in the South China Sea, which began when Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) published an official map featuring the eleven-dash line in 1947. The Chinese Communist Party revised those claims into a “nine-dash line” to avoid conflict with Vietnam, but it continues to make many of the same claims that Chiang laid out. This is one reason why Taiwan could play an important role in mediating tensions today.
Taiwan must work with the US and other regional partners to mitigate conflict in the South China Sea, cooperate on protecting freedom of navigation through its waters and seek dialogue on resolving territorial disputes.
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