As the global economy changes, economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region is becoming more important. Taiwan officially applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) on Sept. 22, 2021.
It has been nearly four years. On Nov. 27 and 28, the CPTPP Executive Committee is to be held in Canada to discuss applications from seven countries including, Taiwan, China and Ecuador.
After Taiwan formally submitted its application, China used diplomacy, lobbying and other means to try to pressure and prevent Taiwan from joining. Some Southeast Asian countries, which have close economic ties with China, are facing political pressure to take a stance.
According to the CPTPP’s agreed “Auckland Principles,” one of the review principles for membership applications is to obtain a “consensus decision” from all members. This means every member must agree. If any country is coerced into a reserved attitude under China’s pressure, it could delay Taiwan’s entry.
Canada, this year’s rotatating chair, is relatively supportive of Taiwan’s international participation. Australia and Vietnam, which would hold the rotating chairmanship next year and the year after, have a more reserved attitude toward Taiwan. This might make it harder for Taiwan to join. Therefore, public opinion mostly regards this year as a crucial year for Taiwan’s membership.
The CPTPP is a high-quality and high-standard free-trade agreement. Its members include countries such as Japan, Canada and Australia. The purpose of the agreement is to promote economic and trade exchanges within the Asia-Pacific region and establish a system of economic cooperation.
The combined economic strength of its member countries is equivalent to 15 percent of global GDP, a significant proportion of global trade. For Taiwan, the economic size of CPTPP member countries accounts for about a quarter of Taiwan’s total trade. Among them, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam are among the country’s top 10 trading partners.
If Taiwan could join the CPTPP, it would help consolidate economic and trade ties with member countries and enhance Taiwan’s competitiveness.
Joining the CPTPP would not only promote Taiwan’s economic growth, but also improve the nation’s ability to mitigate risks in the global market and enhance economic resilience. Taiwan would benefit from lower tariffs and high trade standards, reducing trade barriers, increasing export advantages and attracting more foreign investment.
In addition, the CPTPP has stricter regulations on labor conditions, intellectual property rights and environmental protection, which would promote Taiwan’s overall industrial transformation, international cooperation and the development of more complete regulations to align with international standards.
In recent years, international democratic partners have been increasing their support for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations. As stated in Sun Zi’s (孫子) The Art of War: “It is the sudden push that enables rushing torrents to move stones.”
Taiwan should take advantage of the trend and combine the recognition and support of the international community to expand Taiwan’s influence. Through various channels such as chambers of commerce, industry, academia and non-governmental organizations, Taiwan should create a more favorable atmosphere and strive for Taiwan to join the CPTPP.
Taiwan needs the CPTPP, and the CPTPP needs Taiwan. Taiwan should demonstrate its ability and willingness to make more contributions within the CPTPP and persuade member countries to support the nation’s membership.
With Taiwan’s advantages in semiconductors, information and communications technology, artificial intelligence, biomedicine and other industries, it could not only enhance the economic and trade resilience of CPTPP member countries and reduce global risks, but also promote industrial progress, economic growth and sustainable development in the Asia-Pacific region, and jointly create more resilient international supply chains.
Su Wei-cheng is a lecturer and a former secretary of the president of the Legislative Yuan.
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