Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s visit to China from Friday last week to Sunday accomplished multiple objectives, including establishing cooperation agreements. A contentious deal in Indonesia was the “Joint Statement Between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Indonesia on Advancing the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and the China-Indonesia Community with a Shared Future.” Item 9 of the agreement particularly stuck out: “The two sides will jointly create more bright spots in maritime cooperation.”
That item ignited controversy in Indonesia, as it appeared that Prabowo has acknowledged China’s claims in the South China Sea, which contradicts the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and international law.
International maritime law experts in Indonesia criticized Prabowo for signing the statement, asking whether he genuinely acknowledged China’s “10-dash line” claim, particularly given that under former Indonesian president Joko Widodo’s administration, Jakarta unequivocally opposed recognizing China’s claims in the South China Sea.
The situation poses significant risks to the geopolitical dynamics in the region, particularly in Southeast Asia, as nations that staunchly oppose China’s assertions, such as Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei Darussalam, might scrutinize Indonesia’s stance. That could undermine the cohesion among ASEAN member states, which have collectively rejected China’s claims in the South China Sea.
Prabowo’s actions sharply contradict his inaugural address on Oct. 20, when he said that Indonesia would not lag behind contending superpowers. According to the joint statement, Indonesia is trailing China.
The primary beneficiary of this statement is China, as Indonesia acknowledges Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea. Indonesia must assess if the statement is advantageous or damaging to its interests, and explain its objectives to its strategic partners. Undoubtedly, nations such as the US and Japan would be disheartened by Indonesia’s stance, as it would affect the freedom of international shipping.
The joint statement is fundamentally at odds with Article 8 of Indonesia’s 2008 Law No. 43 on the territory of the state, which does not acknowledge maritime boundaries with China as asserted in the joint statement. Furthermore, Article 10 stipulates that negotiations with other nations concerning the delineation of state territorial boundaries must adhere to legal provisions and international law.
A more profound examination reveals Indonesia’s contravention of UNCLOS regulations in formulating the joint statement.
The concern is that China might use Indonesia — the largest country in Southeast Asia — as a conduit to persuade other nations to acknowledge its claims in the South China Sea. Prabowo must address the issue upon his return, as some believe he was meticulously deliberate and calculating in endorsing the joint statement.
M. Syaprin Zahidi is a senior lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of Muhammadiyah Malang and is a doctoral student at Ghazali Shafie Graduate School of Government at the Universiti Utara Malaysia.
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