The return of US president-elect Donald Trump to the White House has injected a new wave of anxiety across the Taiwan Strait.
For Taiwan, an island whose very survival depends on the delicate and strategic support from the US, Trump’s election victory raises a cascade of questions and fears about what lies ahead. His approach to international relations — grounded in transactional and unpredictable policies — poses unique risks to Taiwan’s stability, economic prosperity and geopolitical standing.
Trump’s first term left a complicated legacy in the region. On the one hand, his administration ramped up arms sales to Taiwan and sanctioned several Chinese officials over human rights abuses.
However, Trump has also framed US military support as a business transaction rather than a commitment rooted in shared democratic values. He repeatedly likened the US’ defense of Taiwan to insurance, demanding that Taiwan pay “protection money” and even suggested that Taiwan quadruple its defense spending to 10 percent of GDP. Such rhetoric and demands have left many Taiwanese officials scrambling to brace for a future where US support could come with heavy financial strings attached.
Taiwan’s economic landscape could also face significant upheaval. During his first term, Trump’s trade dispute with China severely disrupted global markets, and he is poised to escalate those tensions once more. This time, he has pledged to impose even steeper tariffs — up to 60 percent — on all Chinese imports, a move that could force Taiwanese companies to accelerate their exit from China, which could potentially strain Taiwan’s own economic growth.
Taiwanese semiconductor companies such as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) have already felt pressure to shift production to the US, but questions loom about whether this strategy is sustainable or whether it would compromise Taiwan’s competitive edge in the semiconductor industry.
Beijing’s reaction to Trump’s victory has been cautious, but opportunistic. Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) was quick to reach out, signaling a willingness to engage and possibly strike a “grand bargain” that might sideline Taiwan’s interests.
While experts argue that China’s plans for Taiwan do not hinge on who sits in the Oval Office, Beijing might perceive Trump’s disdain for multilateral defense commitments as an opening to escalate military and economic coercion against Taiwan.
The past few years have seen regular Chinese air and sea incursions around Taiwan, and any indication that the US’ commitment is wavering could embolden further aggression from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.
Internally Taiwan is facing a complex calculus. While President William Lai (賴清德) has projected confidence in US-Taiwan relations, emphasizing shared democratic values, behind closed doors, Taiwanese officials are bracing for a bumpy road.
The fear of abandonment looms large, especially since Trump’s former national security adviser John Bolton ominously remarked that Taiwan could be “toast” under Trump if US support becomes contingent on financial gains rather than strategic alignment.
The challenges for Taiwan are not confined to military and economic realms. There is a psychological warfare component, with Beijing expected to ramp up hacking attacks and information warfare to exploit any perceived fractures in the Taiwan-US alliance.
Taiwan’s leaders understand that demonstrating unwavering commitment to their own defense is essential to maintaining the US’ support, but doing so could require not only increasing military spending, but also deepening alliances with other regional powers, such as Japan and South Korea, as a hedge against US unpredictability.
As Taiwan navigates this uncertain future, one thing is clear: The stakes have never been higher.
A second Trump presidency brings the risk of diminished US commitment to Taiwan, further escalation with China and an economic fallout that could disrupt global supply chains.
In this rapidly shifting landscape, Taiwan must work urgently to fortify its defenses, diversify its international partnerships and prepare for the unpredictable whims of a US president who views global alliances as financial transactions rather than strategic imperatives.
Y. Tony Yang is an endowed professor and associate dean at George Washington University. He earned his law degree from National Taiwan University and his doctoral degree from Harvard University.
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