The US election result will significantly impact its foreign policy with global implications. As tensions escalate in the Taiwan Strait and conflicts elsewhere draw attention away from the western Pacific, Taiwan was closely monitoring the election, as many believe that whoever won would confront an increasingly assertive China, especially with speculation over a potential escalation in or around 2027.
A second Donald Trump presidency naturally raises questions concerning the future of US policy toward China and Taiwan, with Trump displaying mixed signals as to his position on the cross-strait conflict. US foreign policy would also depend on Trump’s Cabinet and advisers, as well as broader Republican Party dynamics. While there is a bipartisan consensus on China as a primary threat, opinions among Republicans are divided, particularly between the China hawks and the prioritizers.
The hawk school could be divided into two subschools: the “old guard hawks” (unreformed neo-conservatives) and the “new guard hawks” (reformed neo-conservatives). The hawks see China as a major threat to the US and the liberal order in general, and for this reason seek to counter China on the domestic and international fronts. They support a wide variety of economic warfare measures, diplomatic and political countermeasures, and support for anti-Chinese Communist Party groups and regimes. Hawks of both stripes see the world order diverging into a bipolar one in which the US and allies stand against a revisionist China-led “axis of evil.” They see the conflicts in Ukraine, Israel and potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait as fundamentally interconnected. Thus, they enthusiastically support military aid to “like-minded democracies,” and economic sanctions against the “axis” regimes.
The old and new guard hawks agree on this, but new guard hawks would perhaps prioritize the competition with China over conflicts elsewhere. Due to Taiwan’s liberal democratic system and opposition to Beijing, the hawks see Taiwan as a natural ally. Hawks are the most overtly supportive of Taiwan, but hawk support for Taiwan is nuanced, generally favoring the Democratic Progressive Party and at times even leaning into independence sentiments, while remaining wary of the supposedly “pro-China” Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and others in the pan-blue coalition.
The hawk position is by far the most prominent among Republicans, though the rise of MAGA has created a schism with old guard hawks opposing Trump, and new guard hawks mostly supporting him. The hawks have a major presence both in government and in foreign policy think tank circles. US Senator Tom Cotton and former Trump administration officials like former US secretary of state Mike Pompeo could be considered new guard hawks, while one could look to figures like former US representative Liz Cheney for examples of old guard hawks. A separate group, which is just as or perhaps more hawkish on China, but totally rejects neoliberalism and maintains a close relationship with the MAGA grassroots could be called the MAGA hawks and is represented by figures like Steve Bannon.
The prioritizers and hawks share the belief that China poses the greatest geopolitical challenge to the US and that the US is not doing enough to address this issue. However, they differ in their assessments of the regional balance of power, how to address the China challenge and the nature of US interests.
Hawks support stopping China’s rise while the US is ahead, while prioritizers believe that the US is already behind, with the regional balance of power shifting in China’s favor. In line with this logic, prioritizers argue against providing military aid to Ukraine and Israel, instead prioritizing all military aid to Taiwan. They are critical of Taiwan’s current state of military readiness, arguing that it is insufficient to meet the challenges posed by China. They emphasize hard military power over economic warfare measures like sanctions, believing them to be harmful to US interests and unable to meet strategic goals vis-a-vis China.
Prioritizers are realists in their logic, and less likely to subscribe to the “axis of evil” narrative often echoed by hawks, leading them to support anti-China balancing with Russia. This group also adopts a more “historical” perspective, acknowledging China’s long-standing regional influence and thus advocating for a balance of power rather than outright US hegemony over the western Pacific. The prioritizers also sometimes support detente with China, at least until the US could reorient her defense posture in the western Pacific such that the balance of power is more in its favor.
The prioritizer school is smaller, but includes notable figures like Elbridge Colby and resonates with younger Republican leaders like US Senator J.D. Vance. A subset of prioritizers, termed “diversifiers,” believe that the US should defend Taiwan only as long as it is dependent on Taiwan for semiconductor supplies, with the ultimate goal of securing a diversified supply chain and thereby reducing necessary defense commitments.
Despite characterizations as a “China hawk” by some, Trump’s China policy incorporates aspects of both hawk and prioritizer schools, augmented by his own quirks. Trump’s trade war with China is mainly driven not by his perception that economic warfare is necessary to contain China, but more so due to his emphasis on the idea of reciprocity in business transactions. Trump considers China’s trade relationship with the US to be asymmetric in its current state, and so he wishes to recalibrate it such that the US comes out with a “better deal.” At the same time, he does seem to consider China a major threat in the Western Pacific, given his interest in multilateral coalition building and his willingness to target China specifically.
Trump’s position on Taiwan is decidedly in the prioritizer camp, albeit augmented by his characteristic transactionalism and emphasis on reciprocity. He has drawn heat from commentators for his apparently anti-Taiwan rhetoric, namely his accusation that Taiwan “stole” the US chip business. This, too, is a misconception. In discussing the chip issue, Trump directs his criticism toward the US political establishment for allowing Taiwan to “steal” the majority of US semiconductor business, not at Taiwan itself. He even complimented Taiwanese for their hard working nature and business savvy.
The next Trump administration’s policy on China and Taiwan would largely depend on his Cabinet selections. It is expected that Trump would prioritize personal loyalty and ideological alignment when choosing appointees, especially after experiencing resistance from the foreign policy establishment during his first term. He has acknowledged that his previous Cabinet choices were a mistake, indicating that future selections would be more carefully vetted for loyalty and alignment with his views.
Trump’s aversion to neo-conservatives might steer him towards the prioritizer camp, especially given the influence of J.D. Vance. However, many prominent Republicans align with the hawks, so it would be challenging for Trump to completely sideline that school. Ultimately, the direction of US policy on Taiwan and China would hinge on which faction he empowers within his administration, though his personal traits of transactionalism and reciprocity are likely to influence his approach regardless.
Jackson Burns is a graduate student at National Chengchi University.
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