In response to the escalation of the Second Thomas Shoal (Renai Shoal, 仁愛暗沙) incident in the South China Sea in recent months, Japan and the Philippines signed a defense pact on July 8.
The defense treaty, known as the Reciprocal Access Agreement which allows for the deployment of Japanese forces to the Philippines for joint military exercises, and Philippine forces would be able to enter Japan for joint combat training.
It began in April with a trilateral meeting between the US, Japan and the Philippines to strengthen strategic alignment and emphasize military and economic security in collaboration. The three nations believe that China is being increasingly aggressive in the South China Sea. To maintain peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region, the three countries must strengthen their security partnership.
For the Philippines, bolstering its alliances with the US and Japan would boost its confidence in defending the West Philippine Sea, particularly in conflict with China. Furthermore, the Philippines has agreed to open four military bases to the US under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, strengthening bilateral security alliance. For some analysts, this move is also viewed as a strategic measure to counter China’s influence in the South China Sea.
The three countries also agreed to the collaborative initiative “Luzon Economic Corridor” as part of a broader strategy to promote sustainable development and economic resilience in the Indo-Pacific region. The initiative focuses on infrastructure projects, semiconductor supply chains, agribusiness and economic growth.
Many academics have written about the US’ support for the Philippines, but what are Japan’s interests in reaching a defense pact with the Philippines?
The Philippines is Japan’s strategic cooperation partner in Southeast Asia. Both countries want to strengthen strategic ties related to regional concerns. Then-Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida agreed with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr to start negotiations that would allow troops to enter each other’s territory for joint military exercises and strengthen defense cooperation. The move is part of efforts to boost their alliance in the face of what they regard as China’s growing assertiveness in the region.
According to Alexander Vuving, a professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii, from the Philippines’ perspective, Japan is Manila’s second-most significant partner in the region, second only to the US, given Japan’s strong commitment to preserving the region free of Chinese dominance.
There are at least three reasons that Japan supports the Philippines in the South China Sea dispute and has signed a defense pact.
First, Japan has a similar case with the Philippines in the southern region of Japan, namely the dispute over the Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台), known to Japan as the Senkaku Islands. This disagreement over delimitation lies at the root of Sino-Japanese maritime tensions.
China and Japan claim the islands, as well as Taiwan. China claims that the islands were named and used by China during the Ming Dynasty, whereas Japan argues that the islands were terra nullius when it occupied them in 1895. China has similar motives in its territorial claims when it argues that the South China Sea and East China Sea have been part of Chinese territory since ancient times.
Second, the South China Sea is an important trading route for Japan. Ninety percent of Japan’s energy and trade flow through the region. These waterways are strategically important for shipping, fishing, and potential oil and gas reserves. In the 1930s, European colonial powers in Asia and the US raised tariff barriers to protect their industries, so Japan had difficulties in finding outlets for its products. Japan penetrated Southeast Asian markets and procures its material requirements mainly from Southeast Asian countries.
Japan involved itself deeply in the development of shipping lanes in Southeast Asia. International maritime routes across Southeast Asia are vital to the economic and political well-being of billions of people around the world. The important Sea Line of Communication (SLOC) in the region is the Strait of Malacca, which connects the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.
The South China Sea is the largest SLOC. It covers 3,330km from Sumatra, Indonesia, to Taiwan, with four main island groups and three major petroleum development zones. The sea is a key global trade route. Japan relies on importing crude oil from Middle Eastern countries. The sea became the most important SLOC for Japan because of trade, energy supplies and strategic security. Japan also conducted a number of hydrographic surveying activities in the sea.
Third, geopolitical interest. Japan has a vested interest in maintaining stability and support for freedom of navigation in the South China Sea; hence, the Philippines is Japan’s geopolitical security partner in Southeast Asia.
In the South China Sea, Japan has consistently assisted the Philippines in improving its maritime capacities through naval and coast guard capacity building. Japan is transferring non-military patrol vessels and providing training to maritime law enforcement personnel.
Japan’s geopolitical interest in the South China Sea is motivated by several key factors, including not only economic security, but also regional stability.
According to Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs press releases: “Japan opposes any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force, as well as any actions that increase tensions in the South China Sea.”
Japan’s foreign policy aims to promote peace, stability and prosperity in the region through freedom of navigation.
Ismah Rustam is a doctoral student in the International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies at National Chengchi University and a lecturer at the University of Mataram.
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