As the war in Burma stretches into its 76th year, China continues to play both sides. Beijing backs the junta, which seized power in the 2021 coup, while also funding some of the resistance groups fighting the regime.
Some suggest that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) is hedging his bets, positioning China to side with the victors regardless of the outcome.
However, a more accurate explanation is that China is acting pragmatically to safeguard its investments and ensure the steady flow of natural resources and energy for its economy.
China’s primary interest is stability and supporting the junta initially seemed like the best way to achieve that. However, as ethnic resistance armies grow stronger, reclaiming more territory from the junta, China has shifted to expediently supporting rebels in areas rich in the resources it needs. While China is not heavily invested in seeing one side win, its actions are driven by immediate needs and the pursuit of long-term stability.
China is Myanmar’s top investment and trade partner, playing an increasingly vital role in the junta’s survival as Western sanctions take effect. One of China’s key investments in Burma is the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a crucial component of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aimed at boosting trade and infrastructure development across the region. The CMEC connects China’s Yunnan Province to the Chinese-built Kyaukphyu port in Myanmar’s Rakhine State on the Bay of Bengal. This corridor is central to China’s strategy for overcoming the “Malacca dilemma,” providing a direct route for energy imports that bypasses the US-controlled Strait of Malacca.
The completion of the CMEC would position China for a more secure energy supply, potentially emboldening Beijing to take risks, such as seizing Taiwan or even going to war with the US.
However, the CMEC has faced several setbacks. Local residents protested as the Burmese army, the Tatmadaw, forcibly displaced or killed those living in the project’s path. Resistance groups responded with sporadic attacks on the Tatmadaw and Chinese engineers, as well as acts of sabotage targeting the project. Work nearly came to a standstill during the COVID-19 pandemic and after the 2021 coup, intensified fighting across the country further hindered the CMEC’s progress.
In response, China has forged security agreements with various actors in Myanmar’s civil war, not only supporting the junta, but also backing select ethnic armed organizations that are either in a ceasefire with the junta or fighting against it. Its involvement in the conflict has led to Chinese-made weapons being used on both sides.
Junta forces receive Chinese-supplied jets and helicopters, while resistance groups use small arms obtained from the United Wa State Army, an ethnic force backed by China that has a ceasefire with the junta.
Immediately after the February 2021 coup, China’s support for the junta’s army was relatively covert. That changed last year, when ethnic armies launched Operation 1027 and began capturing significant territory. In response, China increased its backing for the junta.
However, as the junta struggled to reclaim rebel-held areas, Beijing shifted its focus to engaging with ethnic armed groups along the border to manage the conflict and protect its economic interests. Simultaneously, China began negotiating ceasefires and peace agreements to resolve the conflict in a way that secures its strategic goals.
Notably, Beijing has excluded the National League for Democracy (NLD), the country’s democratically elected government ousted in 2021, and the National Unity Government (NUG), an exiled coalition of NLD members and representatives from ethnic armed factions.
China has consistently involved ethnic armed groups aligned with its interests in ceasefire agreements and has supported the junta’s proposed 2025 election. However, this election has already been widely criticized as a sham for excluding opposition groups under the Political Party Registration Law. The NLD and the NUG are barred from participating, making the election a likely contest between China-aligned parties backed by the military junta.
Given China’s BRI investment history, it is evident that it has no vested interest in promoting democracy. Autocracies are easier for Beijing to negotiate with, as decisionmaking authority rests with a single leader who can be more easily corrupted and tends to prioritize short-term gains over the long-term impact of Chinese investments and debt. Thus, China’s support for elections in Myanmar is unlikely to be driven by any ideological commitment to democracy. Instead, its primary concern is stability, as it increases the likelihood of successfully completing investments and maintaining a steady flow of resources.
Xi appears to believe that backing a sham election is the fastest way to achieve stability in the country. Until the situation in Myanmar stabilizes, the completion of the CMEC will likely remain delayed, slowing China’s path to energy security and its preparedness for a potential Taiwan invasion.
There are essentially four paths to stability in Myanmar. The first is for the Tatmadaw to defeat the rebels, seize control of the country and disarm them. China initially backed this outcome, but it now appears increasingly unlikely to materialize.
The second option is for China to support democratic elections, hoping this could end the civil war, increase stability and allow the CMEC to proceed. However, as elections are already being criticized as illegitimate for excluding the opposition, it is doubtful they will bring lasting peace.
A third is that the resistance forces could eventually win, although this could take years as long as China continues to support the junta.
A final, albeit unlikely, scenario is that the US or other Western forces intervene, quell the violence and support fair elections. In this case, China would face a Western-aligned democratic government on its border, an undesirable outcome for Beijing.
Until China finds a solution to the Myanmar conflict, its efforts to overcome the “Malacca dilemma” remain hindered, potentially delaying any military action against Taiwan.
Antonio Graceffo, a China economic analyst who holds a China MBA from Shanghai Jiao Tong University, studies national defense at the American Military University.
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