A magazine editor in Taiwan told me that regardless of who wins the US presidential election on Tuesday next week, they would be checked by the US Congress and the courts, so Taiwan should not worry too much about a change in Washington’s stance on Taipei. In response, I pointed to a concept well-known in US political circles, but rare in Taiwan: the “imperial presidency.”
The term describes the modern US presidency’s virtually unlimited power in military and foreign affairs. It became popular in the 1960s and was the title of historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr’s 1973 book The Imperial Presidency. The book addresses two main concerns: that presidential power in military matters has become difficult to control and that it has surpassed constitutional limits.
The term “imperial presidency” denotes a threat to the US constitutional system, as it allows the president to create and expand executive privileges in national emergencies. This situation is based on two factors: the vague constitutional definition of the president’s war powers and executive privilege, which gives the president’s military powers immunity from the usual legislative and judicial checks.
In US democratic politics, checks on the president are mostly limited to domestic issues. In foreign and military affairs, the president holds imperial-like power. When US President Joe Biden said five times during official interviews that the US would defend Taiwan militarily, you could be confident that he both has the capability and the willingness to act on that pledge.
On the other hand, if former US president and Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump were re-elected president and, hypothetically, he considered abandoning Taiwan out of business calculations, he would not need Congress’ consent. In his first term, Trump was often restrained by experienced advisers and established institutions, but if re-elected, he might pursue more unilateral and unconventional policies. An internally polarized and externally isolationist US would only encourage authoritarian expansion, which would not benefit Taiwan in any way.
The last time the US Congress formally declared war was on June 5, 1942, against Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania for their involvement with Axis powers in World War II, after in December 1941 declaring war on Japan, and then Germany and Italy following the attack on Pearl Harbor. Since 1945, the US has engaged in numerous global military conflicts, interventions and actions, many of which were undertaken without congressional approval.
In short, the US president can, within minutes, decide to protect Taiwan militarily if China invades (acting first and informing the US Congress later), or could immediately decide to abandon Taiwan. Some academics in Taiwan have said that the US president needs congressional approval to deploy troops to protect Taiwan, which would delay a response. That argument, if not based on ignorance, must have other motivations, as it defies common sense.
The foreign policy approach of the administration of Biden and Democratic presidential candidate and US Vice President Kamala Harris is fundamentally correct and aligns with more than 70 years of US diplomatic tradition, pursuing a policy of “containment and deterrence of communist regimes.” That has for more than 70 years maintained global peace and prosperity for free trade (benefiting Taiwan and even, to a large extent, China). Therefore, who becomes the US president is of utmost importance, especially for Taiwan.
Simon Tang is an adjunct professor at California State University, Fullerton, lecturing on international relations.
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