Germany’s ruling coalition is still in power, but the three-party alliance exists in little more than name.
Behind the scenes in Berlin, talk of a breakup before scheduled elections in September next year has become more pronounced. Some high-ranking officials have mused that the only thing that can save the so-called “traffic light coalition” is the fear factor that would result from former US president Donald Trump winning a return to the White House, according to people close to the situation, who asked not to be identified because the discussions were private.
The extent of the frayed relationship was on full display yesterday, as German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and German Minister of Finance Christian Lindner of the pro-business Free Democratic Party (FDP) hosted parallel and partly competing meetings with industry officials to explore ways to revive the country’s stagnating economy. Neither invited the other, and both shut out German Minister of Economic Affairs Robert Habeck of the Greens, who last week surprised his Cabinet colleagues with a proposal for a “Germany fund” to bolster investment.
Scholz, Habeck and Lindner have been key over the past three years to brokering compromises within the coalition, but they have lost each other’s trust to some degree and shifted focus to winning over voters rather than trying to find common ground, the people said.
The strains are not a secret. During a visit to India at the weekend, a student asked Scholz how it is to lead the three-way alliance.
The Social Democrat laughed and said: “Well, I want to be very honest with you. The coalition government which I’m leading is not the easiest in the world.”
Tensions between the parties have been rising for months as budget constraints collide with a sputtering manufacturing sector that is struggling with an economic slowdown in China, and high energy and labor costs. Europe’s largest economy, which is scheduled to release GDP data today, has likely been in recession since April.
Anxiety over living standards has fueled anti-immigrant sentiment and caused all three parties to lose support in polls compared with the last election in 2021. The FDP’s support would put it at risk of failing to make it into the lower house of parliament.
With their fortunes fading, the ruling parties have been using their platform in the government to burnish campaign profiles. Scholz caught his partners wrong-footed about two weeks ago when he surprisingly announced an “industry pact” with business leaders helmed by himself.
Habeck and Lindner were unaware, although they had pushed Scholz in the past few months to take further steps to ease the burden on businesses.
Habeck reacted to Scholz’s proposal a few days later by floating the idea of subsidizing as much as 10 percent of company investment. Lindner, a fiscal hawk, dismissed the idea as a potential violation of EU restrictions on state aid.
The FDP leader then let his parliamentary caucus schedule a meeting with small and medium-sized companies and business associations not invited to the chancellor’s summit. That meeting took place just hours before Scholz hosted union and manufacturing representatives yesterday.
“There is no lack of proposals,” said Jurgen Goldinger, chief executive officer of German ventilation specialist Maico Holding and part of a business delegation that traveled to India last week with Habeck. “It seems difficult to reach a consensus across party lines and then find a pragmatic way to make decisions.”
The partial dysfunction creates a power vacuum in Germany that threatens to ripple across Europe as the region seeks to uphold support for Ukraine’s defense against Russia, but the stakes are high for any party that pulls out of the coalition.
Although Scholz’s government is deeply unpopular, Germans value stability and the political damage for pulling out of the coalition could be severe. The FDP is seen as the weakest link, but with support hovering below the 5 percent threshold to get into the Bundestag, losing the finance ministry as a platform for the party’s fiscally prudent policies could be costly.
Aside from political tactics, more trouble is brewing for the coalition. The budget for next year must be approved by lawmakers in the German parliament in about two weeks, but there is still a shortfall of as much as 10 billion euros (US$11 billion) to close. Keeping the country’s net borrowing limit enshrined in the constitution is Lindner’s top priority and conflicts with the economic incentives sought by Habeck.
“We are now in the middle of what I call the autumn of decisions,” Lindner said last week in Washington after announcing that there was no scope for further spending and that even more consolidation was needed.
Another stumbling block could once again come from Germany’s top court, which triggered a government crisis in November last year with a decision that special off-budget funds were unconstitutional. The judges of the federal court are expected to rule this year on a levy for high earners, the so-called solidarity charge, which could potentially spark a new financing crunch for the government.
Asked whether the coalition will still celebrate Christmas together, Scholz wryly responded during his India trip: “Christmas will always be celebrated.”
A return to power for former US president Donald Trump would pose grave risks to Taiwan’s security, autonomy and the broader stability of the Indo-Pacific region. The stakes have never been higher as China aggressively escalates its pressure on Taiwan, deploying economic, military and psychological tactics aimed at subjugating the nation under Beijing’s control. The US has long acted as Taiwan’s foremost security partner, a bulwark against Chinese expansionism in the region. However, a second Trump presidency could upend decades of US commitments, introducing unpredictability that could embolden Beijing and severely compromise Taiwan’s position. While president, Trump’s foreign policy reflected a transactional
There appears to be a growing view among leaders and leading thinkers in Taiwan that their words and actions have no influence over how China approaches cross-Strait relations. According to this logic, China’s actions toward Taiwan are guided by China’s unwavering ambition to assert control over Taiwan. Many also believe Beijing’s approach is influenced by China’s domestic politics. As the thinking goes, former President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) made a good faith effort to demonstrate her moderation on cross-Strait issues throughout her tenure. During her 2016 inaugural address, Tsai sent several constructive signals, including by acknowledging the historical fact of interactions and
HSBC Holdings successfully fought off a breakup campaign by disgruntled Asian investors in recent years. Now, it has announced a restructuring along almost the same east-west lines. The obvious question is why? It says it is designed to create a simpler, more efficient and dynamic company. However, it looks a lot like the bank is also facing up to the political reality of the growing schism between the US and China. A new structure would not dissolve HSBC’s geopolitical challenges, but it could give the bank better options to respond quickly if things worsen. HSBC spent 2022 battling to convince shareholders of
China’s “Joint Sword-2024B” military exercises around Taiwan last week have sparked concerns in Taipei and allied capitals that Beijing’s risk tolerance is increasing, and rather than prioritizing efforts toward “peaceful unification,” it is ramping up efforts to bring about unification by force, whether that be a military quarantine, blockade or full-scale invasion. Catherine Lila Chou (周怡齡) and Mark Harrison are right in their recent book Revolutionary Taiwan: Making Nationhood in a Changing World Order that the nature of Beijing’s one-party political system, in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is always right, means Taiwanese identity is explained away as being the
RSS