The Japanese general election on Sunday resulted in a catastrophic defeat for Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which failed to retain its majority for the first time in 15 years.
Even with the support of its longtime coalition partner, Komeito, it still did not reach its target.
The results of this historic election shifted the political landscape of one large and several small parties that has characterized the LDP and its opposition since former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe’s victory in December 2012.
If the era of Japan’s LDP-led one-party dominant system enters a new age of decline, the start would undoubtedly be traced back to last week’s immensely significant election.
Following the LDP’s defeat at the polls, the bewildering political makeup of Tokyo’s Nagatacho, home to the National Diet, has attracted much attention. It appears that whether Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s administration is able to survive would depend on three important observational factors.
First is whether the administration can withstand internal fissures. The primary reason for the LDP’s loss is the public’s long-standing disdain for its mixture of politics and money. Although the Ishiba-led LDP must broadly bear responsibility for the election outcome, it was not his fault alone.
Ishiba has never been a part of the party’s mainstream faction, and whether the only remaining bloc — that of former Japanese prime minister Taro Aso — and the forces supporting former Japanese defense minister Sanae Takaichi force Ishiba to step down merits careful attention.
Second is how Ishiba will fare in the prime ministerial nomination election to be held during an extraordinary Diet session on Thursday next week.
Negotiations with the opposition are crucial to either form a coalition government or establish a successful, issue-based policy negotiation mechanism.
The LDP, which holds 191 seats, has already extended an olive branch to the Democratic Party for the People (DPP), which with 28 seats is considered the pivotal minority party.
However, DPP leader Yichiro Tamaki has yet to respond, only exhibiting a posture that indicates he is open for negotiation with parties. The remaining trump card for the LDP would likely be to relinquish the prime minister’s position.
Last, the LDP is not the only party with the vision of establishing a coalition government. The largest winner on Sunday and the LDP’s largest opposition, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), with 148 seats, is also eager to take action.
In addition to its affiliate, the DPP, the CDPJ has also invited the third-largest party, the Japan Innovation Party, which has 38 seats, and other small opposition parties to form a coalition government to overthrow the LDP-Komeito alliance. They hope to reproduce the events of 1993, when eight opposition parties worked together to challenge and defeat the LDP.
With the prime ministerial election just a week away, it is unlikely that the Aso faction and other forces within the LDP looking to oust Ishida would unite. Thus, the main stage of forming a coalition would become a tug of war between the LDP and the CDPJ.
In the coming week and beyond, Nagatacho would be filled with a chaotic atmosphere; it will surely be something to see.
John Lim is a project researcher at the University of Tokyo’s Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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