A return to power for former US president Donald Trump would pose grave risks to Taiwan’s security, autonomy and the broader stability of the Indo-Pacific region. The stakes have never been higher as China aggressively escalates its pressure on Taiwan, deploying economic, military and psychological tactics aimed at subjugating the nation under Beijing’s control.
The US has long acted as Taiwan’s foremost security partner, a bulwark against Chinese expansionism in the region. However, a second Trump presidency could upend decades of US commitments, introducing unpredictability that could embolden Beijing and severely compromise Taiwan’s position.
While president, Trump’s foreign policy reflected a transactional approach, emphasizing costs, obligations and imbalances rather than strategic alliances. He often questioned the value of US partnerships, treating security commitments as contingent on financial returns or clear benefits to the US.
When it comes to Taiwan, such an approach is fraught with risk. Trump’s remarks that Taiwan should “pay for protection” reflect a troubling shift in US strategy. He has suggested that Taiwan should increase its defense spending drastically, to as much as 10 percent of GDP, a figure significantly higher than what even NATO allies are expected to pay.
For Taiwan, a nation facing an existential threat from China, such financial demands are not just burdensome — they are destabilizing, as they put US support on uncertain ground.
Moreover, Trump’s stance on US alliances signals a willingness to abandon traditional partners if they do not meet his demands, irrespective of the broader strategic implications. Such an isolationist approach undermines the spirit of the US foreign policy that has maintained global stability since World War II.
Allies such as Japan, South Korea and the Philippines have historically counted on US protection, and Taiwan, although not a formal ally, is even more reliant on US support due to its unique security challenges.
Trump’s transactional mindset could cause allies to question whether the US would truly stand by its commitments when challenged by a formidable adversary such as China. For Taiwan, that uncertainty could lead to further instability, weakening deterrence against Chinese aggression.
Strategic ambiguity, Washington’s longstanding policy of leaving Beijing uncertain about the extent of US intervention in Taiwan’s defense, has helped preserve peace in the Taiwan Strait for decades. However, Trump’s comments questioning Taiwan’s importance, or even suggesting that the US could potentially forsake the nation, chip away at this essential deterrence.
During his presidency, Trump made statements that diminished Taiwan’s value compared with larger US priorities in managing relations with China. Such unpredictable messaging undermines the strategic ambiguity that deters Chinese aggression, creating a dangerous environment in which Beijing might gamble on Washington’s hesitation to engage.
Beijing, under Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) increasingly assertive leadership, is watching closely. Xi has explicitly set unification with Taiwan as a national goal, and Trump’s rhetoric could inadvertently encourage China’s ambitions by suggesting that the US might not uphold its commitment to Taiwan’s security.
China could interpret Trump’s perceived indifference or transactional approach as an opportunity to press its claim on Taiwan more aggressively, whether through military intimidation, economic coercion or cyberwarfare.
That perception, coupled with Trump’s reluctance to intervene on behalf of US allies without direct benefit, would signal to Beijing that Washington’s willingness to protect Taiwan might be waning — a shift that could dangerously alter the calculus in the Taiwan Strait.
Trump’s policy inconsistencies are especially problematic for Taiwan’s economy, which plays a vital role in the global technology supply chain, particularly in semiconductor manufacturing. Taiwan’s advanced semiconductor industry is crucial for the US and global industries, from automotive to defense technology. Despite that, Trump has criticized Taiwan for “taking advantage” of US industries, especially in semiconductors, and suggested that Taiwan does not contribute enough economically to merit the US’ support.
His insistence on a bilateral trade balance could lead him to pressure Taiwan to reduce its trade surplus with the US, undermining Taiwan’s economy and shifting focus away from collaborative strategies that have bolstered the countries’ interests in technology and security. That economic friction would not only weaken Taiwan’s critical industry, but could also drive a wedge between the partners, damaging a relationship essential for Taiwan’s independence and the US’ technological edge.
In contrast to Trump’s isolationist tendencies, the administration of US President Joe Biden has taken a more comprehensive approach to Taiwan, bolstering security support, while deepening economic and diplomatic ties. For example, the Biden administration has expanded US support for Taiwan, facilitating access to military resources, bolstering trade relations and building an international coalition of support for Taiwan’s autonomy.
Biden has repeatedly emphasized the significance of alliances and, unlike Trump, has made clear public commitments to Taiwan’s defense. Trump’s return would likely mark a regression to an erratic, single-issue foreign policy approach that prioritizes economic grievances over strategic partnerships, jeopardizing the foundations of Taiwan’s security in the process.
A second Trump term would also set back the international support Taiwan has garnered as a democracy standing on the front lines of a broader ideological conflict between democratic and authoritarian powers. Taiwan’s struggle for self-determination resonates globally, symbolizing a defense of democratic values. Recent diplomatic efforts have elevated Taiwan’s stature on the international stage, portraying it as a key partner in upholding democratic ideals.
However, Trump’s skepticism of alliances based on values rather than monetary returns could dismantle these efforts. His rhetoric downplaying the ideological divide between democracies and autocracies would weaken Taiwan’s position as a symbol of democratic resilience, emboldening authoritarian states and undermining global solidarity for Taiwan.
Given these challenges, a Trump presidency could lead Taiwan to intensify its defense spending or seek alliances elsewhere, potentially driving it closer to regional powers such as Japan. However, no other nation can replace the role that the US plays in Taiwan’s security, and a realignment away from Washington would ultimately weaken Taiwan’s defense.
The ripple effects of a US withdrawal from Taiwan’s security would extend beyond the nation, unsettling regional allies and sending a signal that the US might abandon other commitments in Asia. China, sensing such fractures in US-led alliances, could increase its assertiveness in the region, threatening peace not only in the Taiwan Strait, but across the Indo-Pacific region.
Ultimately, Trump’s approach to foreign policy — marked by isolationism, inconsistency and a narrow focus on transactional gains — stands in stark contrast to the strategic and values-driven policies that have supported Taiwan’s autonomy. His willingness to view Taiwan through a lens of financial cost, rather than as a key partner in a region critical to US interests, risks eroding Taiwan’s security and the US’ credibility. At a time when Taiwan’s defense requires unwavering support and a clear strategy, Trump’s approach could spell disaster, endangering Taiwan and destabilizing the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region.
Y. Tony Yang is an endowed professor and associate dean at George Washington University. He earned his law degree from National Taiwan University and his doctoral degree from Harvard University.
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