Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar would have celebrated his death, were he alive to see it, and the world should do the same — if for very different reasons.
Israel confirmed the 62-year-old’s killing through DNA tests on Thursday, after he was shot, together with two other men, in an encounter with Israeli soldiers in southern Gaza. Sinwar had seen himself as a modern-day Saladin — the leader who united a fractious Arab world and recaptured Jerusalem from Christian crusaders in 1187 — as well as a willing “martyr” to the Palestinian cause.
Yet Saladin was everything Sinwar was not: A judicious military commander and chivalrous statesman, who was respectful of human life and religious difference. Far from a Saladin or any kind of savior, Sinwar brought catastrophe on his own people in a calculated act that used their mass suffering as a catalyst to spark a regional war against Israel. He was no martyr. He was a monster.
Sinwar’s passing could be turned into an opportunity for Palestinians. He spent years diverting vast sums of aid money to build tunnels, deep under Gaza’s overcrowded cities, in preparation for the war he precipitated with last October’s attack on Israel. Palestinian civilians were not invited to shelter in his tunnels from the bombardment he knew would follow. Their role was to die above ground.
His followers could now put an end to that insanity by releasing the remaining Israeli hostages they hold, negotiate what would amount to clemency in surrender, and exile. They shared a cause with Sinwar and followed him to the darkest of places. Yet this was, ultimately, his war. He was its architect and reportedly did not share details of its planning or timing with either Hamas’ then-political leadership in Qatar or his sponsors in Iran.
There would be a precedent for such a change of heart, should Hamas now sue for peace. While in an Israeli prison for killing alleged collaborators, Sinwar famously held out so long against a 2011 deal to free more than 1,000 Palestinians — including himself — for a single Israeli soldier, that the prison put him in solitary confinement to allow negotiations to conclude, which they did with less intransigent Hamas leaders. (Sinwar had wanted even those found guilty of the worst attacks on Israelis to be added to the swap.) Palestinians in Gaza would only thank Sinwar’s successors if they follow suit and get a ceasefire deal agreed now that he is gone.
Sinwar’s death is equally a huge win for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and one he should bank quickly. The risk of revenge killing against the remaining hostages that Hamas holds is high.
Israel should signal to Hamas and Gaza’s bruised ceasefire mediators that it sees Sinwar’s removal as a chance to end the fighting. Netanyahu could declare victory. He could then follow up by calling on Hezbollah to honor its claim that it would stop attacking Israel should a ceasefire be reached in Gaza. He could offer to withdraw Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, so long as Hezbollah does the same — as a UN resolution ordered this vast, unofficial armed militia to do back in 2006.
The net result would be that Netanyahu achieves his stated war aims on both fronts — returning the hostages from Gaza, creating conditions for evacuated Israelis to return home in the north and wreaking unprecedented damage to both groups.
Sadly, this is not the most likely outcome. It is impossible to know what the state of mind among Sinwar’s successors would be, but some would surely argue for slaughtering the hostages and fighting on. Meanwhile, Netanyahu could use Sinwar’s death as evidence that his bare-knuckled use of force to impose a new order on the region is working. The reality is that Israel would not be able to achieve the permanent security it craves until it has settled its Palestinian question one way or another — but it is by now clear that is not a limitation Netanyahu accepts.
Rather than de-escalate, he might choose to double down on Israel’s military efforts in Gaza, Lebanon and against Iran. None of these wars offer an easy exit, promising lengthy occupations and potentially severe loss of life and prosperity for Israel. Indeed, he would risk ultimately failing in all those war aims in the attempt to make them absolute.
If that is the path Netanyahu chooses, he would give Sinwar, in death, the war that he was unable to secure in life.
Marc Champion is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Europe, Russia and the Middle East. He was previously Istanbul bureau chief for the Wall Street Journal. This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
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