Sat, Oct 19, 2024 page8

• An exploration of ‘ROC aesthetic’

  • By Cheng Mu-Chun 鄭睦群
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  The Double Ten National Day celebrations again brought up the question of the display of uniquely Taiwanese elements compared with the “Republic of China [ROC] aesthetic.”

  Any discussion on how we are to understand the ROC aesthetic requires clarification on several points. First of all, what exactly is the ROC? Second, from which point in time was the aesthetic linked to the ROC? Third, what were the factors behind constructing the “ROC aesthetic?” Finally, does a refined “ROC aesthetic” exist?

  One thing we can state with certainty is that the ROC is a constitutional state apparatus that in itself is neutral on the subject of beauty and bears no responsibility on defining aesthetics, so consequently, the ROC Constitution has nothing to say on the subject.

  Second, this state apparatus was founded in 1912, but for a long time after its founding the “orthodox ROC” of which the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) likes to talk was a political entity whose influence was limited to the south of China and whose existence relied on local warlords: It did not have influence over the whole of China.

  Even after the apparent unification of China with the success of Chiang Kai-shek’s (蔣介石) 1928 Northern Expedition (北伐), the government was quickly embroiled in the Central Plains War and then the war of resistance against the Japanese, before the Nationalist army was ultimately defeated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) forces and retreated to Taiwan in 1949.

  What we call the “ROC aesthetic” never really existed in China; it gradually formed only after the ROC forces relocated to Taiwan after World War II. As a result, we have to conclude that a “Republican era aesthetic” is not the same as the “ROC aesthetic,” as it was developed only after the relocation to Taiwan.

  Three factors contributed to the formation of the ROC aesthetic.

  The first of these was the post-war chaos and poverty that necessitated practical solutions over aesthetic aspirations, a dichotomy that was felt in the structural and administrative levels within the public sector.

  Second, one could say that post-war Taiwan was immediately plunged into a phase of mobilization, with militarized cultural values instilled into the daily lives of ordinary people, a phenomenon that was most explicitly seen on student campuses around the nation. Modes of dress and hairstyle restrictions were all expressions of the constraints placed upon the public by political authorities. The insistence at the time that “external beauty is not important, it is what is inside that counts” continued to hold back aesthetic development for more than two decades.

  That is not to say that the military approach to appearance, such as a uniform, was ignored or disregarded; in the Western world, many fashion trends were derived from military uniforms. Therefore, for the third factor, we need to look at the cultural roots of the military.

  The late Qing Dynasty/early Republican period military teaching institutions, such as the Yunnan Military Academy and the Baoding Military Academy (precursor to the Whampoa Military Academy that relocated to Taiwan with the KMT and which continues to exist in Kaohsiung under the name the ROC Military Academy) were recipients of state funding and retained many elements of the Chinese aristocratic classes from previous periods, so naturally these would have certain aesthetic requirements in terms of clothing and uniform.

  The Whampoa academy, with its direct connection to the ROC, was born from the conflict of the time in China, with the majority of its students being common people. The earliest graduates would be sent directly to the battlefield, and their successors would have been part of the period of mobilization in Taiwan. One can imagine that the “aesthetics” born of this military culture were essentially equated with “neatness.”

  In the beginning, practicality and utility took precedence over aesthetics, and this would subsequently evolve into a casual indifference and later to an indifference to the importance of specifics, so that all one had to do to express a sense of patriotic pride would be to slap on a national flag or national emblem. Aesthetic beauty was beside the point, the focus was the expression of an ideology, and for this reason we should probably not talk about the “ROC aesthetic,” but the “ROC ideological aesthetic.”

  Cheng Mu-Chun is the executive director of the Lee Teng-hui Foundation.

  Translated by Paul Cooper
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