National defense plans are generally focused on preparing to defend against the military aggression of an adversary. In the case of Taiwan, such plans center on China, which possesses a dramatically larger and more powerful military. However, a recent tabletop exercise conducted by the Taiwan Center for Security Studies and other institutions revealed several nonmilitary vulnerabilities in Taiwan, particularly in the areas of economics, cybersecurity and energy.
The exercise, set in 2032 and simulating crises such as cross-strait tensions and global conflicts, demonstrated that modern conflicts often extend beyond traditional military aggression, underscoring the need for new defense strategies and continuous reassessment.
The identification of nonmilitary vulnerabilities in Taiwan’s defense plans becomes even more crucial when considering that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is uniquely positioned to launch multifaceted attacks, leveraging its military-civil fusion strategy and whole-of-government approach.
The military-civil fusion enables China to integrate civilian industries, companies and infrastructure into its military and strategic objectives, giving it the ability to use nonmilitary assets, such as telecoms and energy providers, to support military goals.
The whole-of-government approach further enhances this by coordinating the efforts of different sectors — government, businesses and society — toward national security objectives.
Therefore, China can exploit Taiwan’s vulnerabilities through economic sabotage, cyberattacks on critical infrastructure and disruptions to energy supplies.
Taiwan’s dependence on imports and international connections leaves its energy, food, water, Internet and other essential infrastructure systems susceptible to disruptions from external sources. The PRC could use such attacks to coerce Taiwan into surrendering or to isolate and severely weaken the nation before invading.
One option for the PRC is to apply economic pressure or impose blockades to isolate Taiwan and cripple its economy.
A blockade by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could exploit Taiwan’s dependence on key shipping routes, effectively halting trade. Taiwan imports about 65 percent of its food and holds only a few months’ of reserves, indicating that it would struggle to survive a prolonged blockade.
Another option is the use of cyberattacks to disrupt Taiwan’s financial system. The nation faces up to 30 million cyberattacks daily, primarily attributed to the PRC, which target its government, economy and infrastructure. A well-coordinated cyberattack on Taiwan’s power grid or financial sector could cause widespread chaos, weaken public morale and diminish the country’s ability to respond to military threats.
The Kinmen and Matsu archipelagos are highly vulnerable due to their close proximity to China. While these islands are more than 200km from Taiwan, they lie just off the PRC’s coast. That geographical closeness makes them particularly susceptible to different forms of disruption from China, including the sabotaging of submarine cables connecting the islands to Taiwan proper. Such actions could lead to severe slowdowns in Internet access, mobile communications and financial systems, as well as broader economic consequences.
In February last year, PRC vessels severed both of Matsu’s submarine cables, resulting in a 50-day Internet outage across the entire archipelago. Kinmen faces a similar threat, with the added risk that Beijing could target cables linking the islands to China. That could result in either a complete communications blockade or, alternatively, China could take control of Kinmen’s Internet services, imposing censorship through a “Great Firewall”-style regime.
Beyond these vulnerable islands, it is believed that the PRC is also studying methods to disable Taiwan’s entire Internet, communication networks and economy, further threatening the nation’s stability.
Taiwan’s energy security is a significant vulnerability due to its limited domestic resources. The nation relies on imports of oil, natural gas and coal for 98 percent of its electricity generation, with key suppliers such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The PLA could easily shut down international shipping routes, cutting off these vital energy imports.
That risk is heightened by Taiwan’s phaseout of nuclear power, which previously supplied 11 to 12 percent of its electricity needs. Even nuclear energy is considered an energy import by the government, as materials come from Russia and Central Asia, and could easily be intercepted by the PRC.
In addition to a blockade, China could use cyberattacks or sabotage to target Taiwan’s energy infrastructure, including its liquefied natural gas terminals, oil refineries and power plants. For example, Taiwan’s largest liquefied natural gas terminal in Taichung could be vulnerable to military strikes or cyberattacks aimed at crippling energy supplies. While Taiwan maintains a strategic petroleum reserve, it only has about 145 days’ worth of oil and coal, which might not be enough in a prolonged conflict.
Taiwan must diversify its food and energy sources while improving its cybersecurity and safeguarding communications systems. It could improve its energy security by developing domestic renewable resources such as solar and wind power. Distributed solar power systems, although hard to disrupt, are costly and inefficient, while utility-scale solar power systems are vulnerable to cyberattacks and limited by land and weather conditions.
Onshore wind faces land use challenges competing with food production. Offshore wind shows great promise, with large-scale projects under way, but poses military concerns due to its radar profile and vulnerability to attacks on turbines and cables.
Four key measures could enhance Taiwan’s food security: increasing domestic production, boosting food inventories and reducing reliance on imports. However, limitations remain, including the higher cost of domestically produced food, an aging farming population and limited arable land. Additionally, even with increased domestic production, the agricultural sector remains dependent on imported fertilizers and chemicals.
Ultimately, the US and Taiwan must develop a comprehensive plan to counter Beijing’s nonmilitary actions and strengthen coordination with allies. That plan must be fully integrated into Taiwan’s overall defense strategy. Additionally, without adequate food and fuel, the population would suffer, and the country would be unable to sustain any fight. Addressing these nonmilitary vulnerabilities must be a top priority.
Antonio Graceffo, a China economic analyst who holds a China MBA from Shanghai Jiao Tong University, studies national defense at the American Military University in West Virginia.
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