After a 15-day election campaign, Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has elected former Japanese minister of defense Shigeru Ishiba as its president. Since the ruling party holds a majority in the Japanese National Diet (parliament), Ishiba has become Japan’s new prime minister. For the 67-year-old Ishiba, long a leading rival of the late former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe, ascending to the post is the realization of a long-held dream. However, Ishiba’s political star is likely to soon fall — perhaps rapidly.
There are several reasons for this. For starters, Ishiba’s proposal of an “Asian NATO” is utterly unrealistic and would not withstand debate in the Diet. While Ishiba portrays himself as a security expert, he seems to lack some fundamental perspective. When this flaw becomes apparent, public support would melt away.
NATO’s defining feature is its guarantee of mutual defense: an attack on a member state is regarded as an attack on one’s own country. Collectivizing the right of self-defense maximizes deterrence. Japan, through Abe’s tireless efforts, achieved partial collectivization of self-defense back in 2015. However, reflecting strong domestic anti-military sentiment, the scope for collective self-defense was limited to situations where Japan’s survival was at stake.
An Asian NATO, by contrast, implies that Japan would have to be ready and able to assist if, say, the US were attacked in the Indian Ocean. Likewise, should Australia, a likely member state, clash with the Chinese navy, Japan would need to engage in collective self-defense.
Perhaps Ishiba’s main intention is to institutionalize US involvement in the Indo-Pacific more firmly. In that case, he would need to present compelling arguments for how an Asian NATO would be a net gain for the US. This seems highly implausible. An Asian NATO would change little from today’s arrangements, whereby Japan hosts the bulk of America’s forward-deployed combat power in Asia (particularly in Okinawa) — forces that continually carry out active joint exercises with Australia and India to remind China of the high cost of military adventurism.
That brings us to an even more serious problem with Ishiba’s proposal: Taiwan. Should Taiwan come under the control of China’s communist regime, Japan’s strategic sphere would be significantly constricted — psychologically, militarily and commercially. In other words, a collectivization of self-defense that cannot guarantee Taiwan’s security is worthless. The countries with a strong stake in Taiwan’s security are the US, Japan and the Philippines. Would other countries join an Asian NATO whose most worrying point of defense is Taiwan? The prospects for this seem bleak.
Then there is the question of India. When Abe brought India into the Quad, alongside the US, Japan and Australia, he did so in the knowledge that India, constantly in tension with neighboring China, wants to maintain its longstanding relationship with Russia. Even as it joins the Quad, India would likely refuse to join an Asian NATO rather than risk that relationship. Testing India in this regard should be avoided.
Ishiba’s political prospects are also burdened by his call for tax increases. In his view, there is room to raise both personal and corporate income taxes, and he has shown enthusiasm for taxing capital gains as well. Does he genuinely believe that he can win an election on a platform of tax hikes?
The LDP’s need to prevail in the coming elections is the main reason Ishiba was chosen. The Japanese House of Councilors (the upper house) renews half of its seats every three years, with the next election scheduled for July next year. The current term of the Japanese House of Representatives (the lower house) lasts until October next year.
Common sense suggests that an administration has the most political capital at its start, and Ishiba has used this opportunity to dissolve the lower house and call a general election to secure a majority and boost his administration.
Fortunately for him, Japan’s economy is not in bad shape. Nominal GDP is at an all-time high, as are tax revenues. However, private sector demand has not fully recovered, suggesting that this is no time for a tax hike; if anything, a tax cut is warranted. While Ishiba might be under the sway of the Japanese Ministry of Finance’s groupthink, which often treats the fiscal balance as an end in itself, few if any parties have ever won an election by running under the banner of tax hikes.
A third key reason to doubt Ishiba’s political longevity concerns the loyalty of those who form his government. When a Japanese administration is short-lived, its demise generally results from scandals involving cabinet ministers or defections within the prime minister’s entourage in the Kantei, or the Japanese Prime Minister’s Office. Essentially, the government falls when organizational management fails.
Ishiba previously served as minister of defense. I know many civilian officials at the ministry, and I am well-acquainted with the Japan Self-Defense Forces’ top brass. I have always been struck by the uniformity of their reaction when asked about Ishiba’s tenure. They offer no clear answers, but uniformly frown when responding.
The prime minister’s responsibilities are far more daunting than the minister of defense’s. About 99 percent of the job is dealing with setbacks. New initiatives materialize only when backed by budgetary and legislative support, which is too often rare.
Moreover, the Diet demands 7.4 times more of the prime minister’s time than the British Parliament does of its prime minister. To be bound to a small chair in the Diet, maintaining composure under relentless opposition attacks, is no easy task.
Japan can ill-afford a return to the era of short-lived premierships that preceded Abe’s tenure. Unfortunately, Ishiba’s policy positions and questionable management skills do not bode well. Let us hope that he can learn quickly and mature.
Taniguchi Tomohiko is a former special adviser to former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe’s Cabinet.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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