On Thursday last week, the International Crisis Group (ICG) issued a well-researched report titled “The Widening Schism across the Taiwan Strait,” which focused on rising tensions between Taiwan and China, making a number of recommendations on how to avoid conflict.
While it is of course laudable that a respected international organization such as the ICG is willing to think through possible avenues toward a peaceful resolution, the report contains a couple of fundamental flaws in the way it approaches the issue.
First, it attempts to present a “balanced approach” by pushing back equally against Taiwan’s perceived transgressions as against Beijing’s military threats and intimidation, as well as political and economic pressure. In a sense, this perpetuates the old “dual deterrence” line from the 1950s and 1960s when the US had to prevent an invasion of Taiwan by Mao Zedong (毛澤東) as well as an attack on China by Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石).
This “balanced approach” does not do justice to the fact that Taiwan is now a vibrant democracy, where President William Lai (賴清德) must represent the views of Taiwanese, while China remains an authoritarian regime that uses its increasing political, economic and military might to push Taiwan into a corner. There is simply no moral equivalence there.
The ICG report should have come down much harder on the rather blatant and aggressive Chinese moves against Taiwan.
Instead it meekly states that “Beijing should reduce its military harassment of Taiwan” and seems to accept that “a heightened Chinese military presence around Taiwan will remain the norm.”
The other fundamental flaw is the report’s overemphasis of rather minute differences between the pronouncements of Lai and his predecessor, former president Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文). This is not helpful as it gives Beijing more ammunition to hit Lai over the head.
As an example, the report states that Tsai was more “selective” in her statement that “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other,” implying that the two sides are separate political entities. That statement is a fundamental part of the policies of the Democratic Progressive Party, so the precise number of times Tsai or Lai might have mentioned it should be of no consequence.
The other “proof” given by the report of Lai’s “assertiveness” was that he referred to the other side of the Strait as “China” rather than “the mainland” or “Beijing authorities.” Well, come on now: Everyone refers to China as “China” — as we should. The latter two terms are outdated holdovers from the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) regime, and should have been ditched long ago.
Finally, it is problematic that in its flow of arguments, the ICG report seems to imply that Lai’s “increased assertiveness” was the cause of Beijing’s military exercises in May. The report even proffers the rather naive notion that Beijing did not engage in major military exercises right after the January elections, which “arguably communicated a desire to lower the temperature over Taiwan.”
The report also implies that China signaled “patience” and offered a new formulation based on the concept that “both sides of the Strait belong to a Chinese nation,” chiding Lai for not picking up on this.
As the report itself states: Whatever Lai would have said in his inauguration speech, Beijing would have come down hard on him. Beijing’s escalating pressures have deepened the conviction in Taipei that more tact will not produce moderation on China’s part. It is essential for the international community, and for organizations such as the ICG, to understand this reality.
Gerrit van der Wees is a former Dutch diplomat who teaches Taiwan history and US relations with East Asia at George Mason University and previously taught at the George Washington University Elliott School for International Affairs in Washington.
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