Russian President Vladimir Putin has drawn a “red line” for the US and its allies by signaling that Moscow would consider responding with nuclear weapons if they allow Ukraine to strike deep inside Russia with long-range Western missiles.
Some in the West are asking: Does he actually mean it?
The question is critical to the course of the war. If Putin is bluffing, as Ukraine and some of its supporters believe, then the West might feel ready to deepen its military support for Kyiv regardless of Moscow’s threats.
If he is serious, there is a risk — repeatedly stated by Moscow and acknowledged by Washington — that the conflict could turn into World War III.
In the latest in a long series of warning signals, Putin on Wednesday extended the list of scenarios that could lead to Russia using nuclear weapons.
It could do this in response to a major cross-border conventional attack involving aircraft, missiles or drones, he said. A rival nuclear power that supported a country attacking Russia would be considered a party to that attack.
Those criteria apply directly to the situation that would arise if the West allows Ukraine to strike deep inside Russian territory with Western long-range missiles such as US Army Tactical Missile System and British Storm Shadows, something Putin has said would need Western satellite and targeting support.
“It was a very clear message: ‘Don’t make a mistake — all these kind of things may mean nuclear war,’” former Soviet and Russian diplomat Nikolai Sokov said.
Henry Jackson Society nuclear analyst Bahram Ghiassee linked the timing of Putin’s remarks to Ukraine’s lobbying of the West for long-range missiles and the fact that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy is making his case to US President Joe Biden this week.
“Putin is saying: Just stop it right there,” Ghiassee said.
Reaction from Kyiv was swift, with Zelenskiy’s chief of staff accusing Putin of “nuclear blackmail.”
“In my opinion, this is yet another bluff and demonstration of Putin’s weakness. He will not dare to use nuclear weapons, because that will make him a complete outcast,” former Ukrainian internal affairs minister adviser Anton Gerashchenko said on X.
Putin’s warning was irresponsible and poorly timed, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said, adding that it was not the first time he had been “rattling the nuclear saber.”
Swedish Institute of International Affairs analyst Andreas Umland accused Putin of playing mind games.
“This is a psychological PR operation, by the Kremlin, without much substance. It is designed to scare leaders and voters of countries supporting Ukraine,” he wrote.
Doctoral research fellow and defense expert Fabian Hoffmann said he did not believe Putin’s comments could be ignored, but that it was important not to overreact.
“Russian nuclear use is not imminent,” he said on X. “Concern is warranted only when Russia signals actual preparations.”
The next steps could be removing warheads from storage and pairing them with delivery vehicles for a tactical strike, before ratcheting up preparations for large-scale nuclear use by readying silos and putting bombers on alert — all of which US intelligence agencies would detect, Hoffmann said.
“Talk is easy and has political impact, but evidence of actual willingness to use nuclear weapons is both absent and something we can detect if it ever happens,” Russia security expert Mark Galeotti wrote.
Nevertheless, Putin was more specific than in the past about the circumstances that could prompt nuclear use.
His spokesman said on Thursday that his comments were meant as a signal to Western countries that there would be serious consequences if they participated in attacks on Russia.
At the same time, the announced changes fell short of what some hawkish commentators have been calling for. The best-known of them, Russian political scientist Sergei Karaganov, has said a limited nuclear strike in Europe that would “sober up” Russia’s enemies and make them take its nuclear deterrent seriously.
In practical terms, the changes extend Russia’s nuclear umbrella to cover neighboring Belarus, a close ally. They lower the threshold for nuclear use by stating, for example, that it could happen in response to a conventional strike that posed a “critical threat to our sovereignty.”
Previously, the nuclear doctrine talked about a threat to “the very existence of the state.”
Putin made the announcement in a four-minute video in which he was seen addressing the nine members of a security council that meets twice-yearly to discuss nuclear deterrence.
Nuclear use was an extreme measure and Russia had always approached the issue responsibly, he said. Ministers and intelligence chiefs listened intently, occasionally fidgeting or shuffling papers. One participant — Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corp head Alexei Likhachev — took detailed notes.
However, the real addressees of Putin’s message were in Kyiv, Washington and London.
The thrust of the revised doctrine was a blunt message to Ukraine and the West not to escalate the war further into Russia, Russian political consultant Yevgeny Minchenko said.
“If you try to kill us with your proxy’s hands, we will kill both your proxy and you,” was the message, he said.
The changes opened the door to Russia using tactical nuclear battlefield weapons in certain scenarios, namely against Ukraine, former Kremlin adviser Sergei Markov said.
“The threshold for the use of nuclear weapons has been lowered. Now it will be easier for Russia to use nuclear weapons,” Markov said on his official blog. “The reason for changing the nuclear doctrine was the threat of a full escalation by the West. The West is sure that Russia will not use tactical nuclear weapons first. Russia is now saying it is ready to do so.”
Russia could use tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine, or air bases in Romania or Poland if Ukrainian warplanes flew sorties from there and if Kyiv — backed by US or British satellite support — used jets to strike Moscow itself or parts of central Russia, Markov said.
The changes were necessary, because the West had ignored a slew of previous warning signals against further escalation, including Russian exercises in the summer rehearsing the use of tactical nuclear arms, military analyst Igor Korotchenko said, who often appears on Russian state TV.
“We see that Western adversaries no longer respect any ‘red lines,’ believing that any acts to arm Ukraine and Western-assisted strikes against facilities deep inside Russian territory will not be met with nuclear escalation,” Korotchenko told the daily Izvestia newspaper.
Announcing the changes to the doctrine had allowed Moscow to get ahead of any Western decision on missiles for Ukraine, said Vladimir Avatkov, who sits on an official body that offers advice to Putin on international relations.
“Let them think now,” he said on Telegram. “This is an attempt to not just warn them, but to give them back the fear that they have completely lost. And perhaps even some strategic thinking.”
The changes were strongly welcomed by Russian nationalists and war bloggers, some of whom have long advocated Moscow use nuclear weapons to force a Ukrainian capitulation, and led to a discussion about what could trigger a nuclear response.
Putin’s words should give Ukraine and the West pause for thought, Security Council of Russia deputy chairman and former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev said.
“The very change in the regulatory conditions for our country’s use of nuclear components may cool the fervor of those opponents who have not yet lost their sense of self-preservation,” Medvedev said.
There was a palpable sense of frustration in Moscow that the West appeared deaf to its many nuclear warnings, Sokov said.
When Russia staged three rounds of exercises this year to simulate preparations for the launch of tactical nuclear missiles, there were complaints in the media and among experts that Western countries were not paying attention, he said.
“So now they decided to strengthen the signal,” Sokov said. “Putin decided the West is like small kids, and you have to explain every small thing, because they just don’t get it.”
Sokov said he was concerned about “loose talk” among politicians and commentators who argue that the West has crossed a series of Russian red lines with impunity — by supplying Ukraine with tanks and F-16 jets, for example — and that Moscow’s warnings can therefore be ignored.
In fact, the West had yet to breach two red lines that Russia had spelt out clearly: sending NATO troops to fight in Ukraine, and letting Ukraine fire Western long-range missiles into Russia, he said.
“How can we say how [Putin] is going to react, if so far we have not actually crossed any Russian red lines?” Sokov said in a phone interview, adding that such an approach was based on guesswork, not data.
“I’m really concerned about all the loose talk, precisely because we run head-on into a situation which is completely unfamiliar to us ... If you do not factor in the risks, you are likely to have a very unpleasant surprise,” he said.
Reporting by Mark Trevelyan and Andrew Osborn.
Editing by David Clarke.
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