The newly appointed Taiwanese representative to Japan, Lee Yi-yang (李逸洋), has taken office, launching the “Lai era” of Taiwan-Japan relations under President William Lai (賴清德).
While the Taiwan-US relationship is based on security guarantees that Taiwan relies on for survival, Taiwan-Japan relations are based on broad economic, cultural and personnel exchanges. The two nations keep pace with one another and rely on mutual engagement.
The relationship is the best it has been since Japan severed formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China in 1972. Taiwan’s response the 2011 earthquake and tsunami that led to the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant disaster helped establish a relationship of necessity, exemplified by the saying, “a friend in need is a friend indeed.”
During the COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwan stood out proudly among its peers due to its masterful handling of the situation, which was not lost on Japan. Moreover, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co leads as the world’s most advanced chip manufacturer — something Japan cannot ignore.
Eight years ago, Taiwan’s greatest friend in Japan, the late former prime minister Shinzo Abe, described Taiwan-Japan relations under former president Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) as a “golden age.” Abe made several policy proposals that enhanced Taiwan-Japan ties. In an environment of good faith upheld by the US and Japan, Taipei’s relationship with Tokyo blossomed.
Gazing far into the Lai era, these ties could be extended further.
Primarily, the bilateral relations are political. Legislative foreign exchanges, or paradiplomacy, are still the swivel upon which the unofficial ties turn.
It was a pleasure to see a succession of Japanese lawmakers visit Taiwan recently, highlighting the high regard that Japan’s political sphere places on Taiwan. Minister of Economic Affairs J.W. Kuo (郭智輝) and Minister of Culture Li Yuan (李遠) also visited Japan, fostering a new means of holding direct talks between high-level officials.
Despite Japan regrettably defining the bilateral relationship under a framework of “unofficial exchanges of practicality between civilians,” there is plenty to discuss and space remains for further development.
During his time in office, former representative to Japan Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) did much to boost local exchanges. His achievements were remarkable and more proof of the success of this diplomatic development.
A few years ago, I raised the concept of integrating the Taiwanese-Japanese economy in an article published in the Chinese-language Liberty Times (the Taipei Times’ sister paper). I wrote that Taiwan’s most ideal scenario should be to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.
As it stands, Taiwan has just as little hope of directly joining the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Perhaps Taiwan is to face many repeated instances of rejection. However, if it follows the US-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade model, the nation could continue to accelerate signing free-trade agreements with other countries. That is a considerable goal the government should strive for.
To add to Taiwanese semiconductor firms’ accolade-worthy success, Lai declared that he would help turn Taiwan into an “artificial intelligence (AI) island.” There is ample room for Taiwan and Japan to team up on AI, next-generation telecommunications and other fields.
Security dialogues and cooperation between Taiwan and Japan are the areas with the most formidable challenges. The government in 2018 established the Institute for National Defense and Security Research think tank, building the primary platform for dialogue with Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies. The Taiwanese think tank has taken great strides toward institutionalization.
Since 2022, the phrase “a Taiwan contingency is a contingency for Japan” has encapsulated the debate on regional security. Despite Tokyo’s official descriptions of ties with Taipei, the reality is that Taiwan has long been an important facet of Japan’s new security strategies. Within the confines of diplomatic relations, Taiwan-Japan security cooperation should, under US guidance, form a nonofficial Taiwan-Japan-US security pact.
Simultaneously, advancing multinational peacekeeping frameworks with the Philippines, Australia, South Korea and other countries should be another area of focus.
The government should reference former president Lee Teng-hui’s (李登輝) Asia Open Forum and establish “Track II” diplomatic mechanisms that bring together the brightest minds of Taiwanese and Japanese industries, government and academia to regularly provide policy recommendations. This could further advance ties between Taiwan and Japan.
From the accomplishments of former representatives to Japan, it is not difficult to see Lai’s ambitious mindset in personally leading Taiwan’s ties with Japan. Following the acceptance of his diplomatic credentials, Lee Yi-yang is expected to raise Taiwan-Japan relations to greater heights during the Lai era.
John Lim is a project researcher at the University of Tokyo’s Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia.
Translated by Tim Smith
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