The Chinese-language United Daily News published an article by Kuan Chung (關中) titled: “Criticizing US hegemony — it has become a rogue nation.”
In response, I would argue that many academics affiliated with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) appear to deliberately overlook or dismiss the widely recognized hegemonic stability theory.
Hegemonic stability theory posits that the international system is more stable when a single, dominant and benevolent nation-state, or hegemon, provides essential global public goods, such as security and economic stability. This leadership helps maintain order and reduces the risk of large-scale conflicts.
When the hegemon’s power wanes, global instability often increases due to the absence of clear leadership and the rise of competing power centers. This dynamic was evident in the multipolar world leading up to World War I and World War II.
After 1945, the US emerged as the leading global power, initiating a new international order characterized by economic interdependence and strategic alliances — embodied in the Bretton Woods system. This era, known as Pax Americana, saw the US utilize its economic and military dominance to foster stability and prevent major conflicts.
The US also played a pivotal role in establishing international institutions such as the UN, promoting global cooperation and supporting economic recovery in war-torn regions. By providing security guarantees to its allies, the US helped deter aggression and stabilize key regions such as Europe and East Asia in the aftermath of World War II.
Critics of hegemonic stability theory argue that US hegemony was characterized by coercive measures, proxy wars and uneven benefits, both during and after the Cold War. Despite these criticisms, the overall impact of US dominance is frequently credited with fostering a generally peaceful and rules-based international order following World War II.
There is no scientific method to measure events that never occurred, meaning we can never precisely quantify how many military conflicts were prevented by Pax Americana. A useful analogy is how people often highlight police mistakes or abuses of power, but no one can calculate how many crimes police have successfully prevented.
While quantifying hypothetical scenarios is inherently challenging, it is reasonable to suggest that, without Pax Americana, western and northern Europe might have fallen under the control of the Soviet Union. Similarly, Taiwan would likely have been taken over by the Chinese Communist Party, subjecting its people to policies such as the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution and zero COVID-19.
The descendants of the KMT and their families might have faced “re-education camps” instead of enjoying the relatively free society they now inhabit and often criticize.
One certainty is that there has been no major war since 1945 — a 78-year period frequently attributed to Pax Americana. While some argue that nuclear weapons have played a significant role in deterring large-scale conflicts, the strategic and economic policies of US hegemony have also been crucial in fostering a relatively peaceful international order. This perspective is widely accepted in academic circles.
The alternative to the peace maintained by the current unipolar power is a scenario few would genuinely welcome. Be cautious what you wish for, Mr Kuan.
Simon Tang is an adjunct professor at California State University, Fullerton, lecturing on international relations.
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