By urging the US to adopt a no-first-use nuclear policy and abandon its nuclear protection guarantees for allies in Asia and Europe, Beijing is trying to position itself as the reasonable voice on anti-nuclear proliferation. Official Chinese government documents acknowledge there is no victor in a nuclear war, emphasizing the inevitable destruction it would cause. Additionally, the China Daily has labeled China’s nuclear nonproliferation stance a “significant peace move.”
However, China’s actions are inconsistent with its calls for a reduction in nuclear weapons, as Beijing is currently engaged in a massive buildup of its nuclear arsenal. China already possesses 410 nuclear warheads and plans to expand that number to 1,000 by 2030. Many of these missiles are capable of carrying multiple warheads and can reach the US. Additionally, there are suspicions that Beijing has not complied with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, with possible tests detected in the Lop Nur Desert. Furthermore, Beijing’s suspension of arms control talks with Washington, in protest of US military support for Taiwan, signals that it has no genuine interest in arms reduction.
The primary role of the US nuclear arsenal is deterrence. While Beijing argues that US compliance with China’s demands for nonproliferation and the end of the US nuclear umbrella protecting its allies would make the world safer, the reality is that such actions would remove the deterrence, leaving the US and its allies vulnerable to attacks. The US does not adhere to a no-first-use doctrine. Instead, the US’ nuclear strategy, as outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review, affirms that the US reserves the right to use nuclear weapons to defend itself or its allies not only against a nuclear attack of any scale, but also against conventional attacks of significant scale. The exact threshold for deploying nuclear weapons remains deliberately vague, much like the strategic ambiguity surrounding the US defense of Taiwan. This ambiguity creates uncertainty for Beijing and complicates its strategic planning.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) claims to have a no-first-use policy, consistent with its National Defense Policy, which states that China would not use nuclear weapons in response to a non-nuclear attack. However, in China, CCP policy or edicts by Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) supersede any other laws or policies. There is no reason to believe that Beijing’s decision to deploy nuclear weapons would not be driven by expediency, given the realities of the situation, or that Xi would not bypass established policy to deploy nuclear weapons as he sees fit.
A further complication in nonproliferation and no-first-use discussions with China is that neither North Korea nor Russia would be bound by these agreements. Russia, the world’s largest nuclear power, possesses 6,375 warheads, while North Korea has about 50 nuclear bombs. Under the “no-limits” partnership with Russia and the Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, either country could act as a proxy for China by launching attacks on the US, effectively bypassing any constraints China might agree to.
Of particular concern for Taiwan is that in CCP statements on nuclear proliferation, Beijing emphasizes the need for each nation to respect the other’s sovereignty and interests — phraseology that typically refers to Taiwan. This suggests Beijing might feel justified using nuclear weapons in a Taiwan conflict.
Overall, China’s push for the US to adopt a no-first-use nuclear policy, drop its nuclear umbrella, and enter nonproliferation agreements is a strategic move aimed at weakening US influence globally. Agreeing to these demands would undermine the deterrence that has kept US allies secure and embolden adversaries like Russia and North Korea. It would destabilize regions like East Asia, potentially leading to an arms race as allies might seek their own nuclear capabilities. While some US voices advocate for adopting a no-first-use policy and reducing the nuclear arsenal, the historical logic of nuclear deterrence is likely to prevail. The US has long provided military protection, including the nuclear umbrella, as a key element of its diplomatic power, making it unlikely to abandon its allies and comply with Beijing’s demands.
Moving forward, the US is more likely to expand its nuclear arsenal than reduce it. Abandoning strategic ambiguity in the US nuclear policy would limit flexibility and expose vulnerabilities. The US must recognize that China’s motivations are more about limiting US power than ensuring global stability. Even with robust verification, independent inspections and audits, any agreement still risks leaving the US and its allies vulnerable.
Maintaining US leadership and the integrity of its alliance system is crucial for global security. Compromising on these fronts could allow China — or a China-Russia-North Korea alliance — to displace the US as the leader of the international order, resulting in a less free and more authoritarian world.
Antonio Graceffo, a China economic analyst who holds a China MBA from Shanghai Jiao Tong University, studies national defense at American Military University in West Virginia.
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