Both the Philippines and Taiwan are surrounded by water, with the Pacific Ocean on their east and the South China Sea on their west. Due to their strategic locations, their surrounding waters have become natural passageways for intra-Asia and trans-Pacific submarine cables.
The growing demand for telecom and Internet service, including in Southeast Asia, has boosted the construction of new cable capacity. Heavy dependence on these critical infrastructure requires securing them from a myriad of risks. The complexity and length of these digital backbones require more public-private partnerships and international cooperation.
The seabed of the Luzon Strait, separating Luzon and Taiwan, and the South China Sea have dense networks of undersea cables. Complex underwater geography, technology capacity and vast distances present challenges to securing such fiber-optic lifelines. The Philippines and Taiwan are in the Circum-Pacific Ring of Fire, a global epicenter for earthquake, volcanic and tectonic activity.
They are also vulnerable to typhoons and tsunamis, mostly coming from the Pacific, which have become more intense and unpredictable in recent years due to climate change. These present grave natural hazards. For instance, undersea earthquakes and landslides can impact multiple submarine cables.
The mapping of underwater topography to avoid active volcanoes, faultlines and areas prone to seismic movements in the seabed is crucial. This can also aid in exploring new routes to avoid already congested ones or sidestep marine biodiversity hotspots.
The international scientific community and the private sector can work together on this as this undertaking is usually beyond the limited capacity of many coastal states.
Furthermore, the Luzon Strait and South China Sea are also busy with maritime traffic, are rich fishing grounds for coastal states, and have become tense flashpoints in recent years. This raises the specter of accidents that can rupture submarine cables in these waters. Fishing and ship anchors are among the main causes of cable faults.
Being mindful of the livelihood of locals and the environmental impact of submarine cable-laying, including when selecting landing stations, is important to getting the buy-in of local communities. Offshore petroleum, wind and ocean wave energy projects and deepsea mining might also inadvertently cause the severing of cables. Measures should be taken to mitigate the potential risks to cables posed by such marine economic activities.
Regional flashpoints might also affect submarine cables. In Taiwan, there is concern that simmering cross-strait tensions might put cable links with its outlying islands of Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu at risk. Cable landing stations in eastern Taiwan facing the Pacific are being put up. For instance, Toucheng serves the Apricot and Pacific Light Cable Network (PLCN) and Dawu will serve the Taiwan-Philippines-US (TPU) cable system.
In the Philippines, the brewing South China Sea row has increased the importance of building alternative cable landing stations in the country’s north and east. Daet in Camarines Norte province is a landing site for the Asia-Submarine Cable Express and Jupiter. Baler in Aurora province will be a landing spot for Apricot and PLCN. Davao, in the country’s second-largest island of Mindanao, is also becoming a hub, serving the Southeast Asia-US cable system, Bifrost, and Apricot. Daet and Baler face the Pacific Ocean and Davao sits in a gulf that connects to the Pacific. In the northern Philippines, Claveria in Cagayan which faces the Luzon Strait would become a landing station for TPU.
These welcome developments would diversify the Philippines’ existing cable stations, which are mostly concentrated in the west, notably in Batangas, Cavite and La Union. With this, the country is also becoming an emerging hub for regional submarine cable connectivity.
Few industry players and the urgency to repair cuts to resume disrupted service demand more public-private sector partnership and international cooperation. Submarine cable-laying, operations and maintenance is a technology-intensive industry with high entry barriers. The forming of partnerships between multinational big tech and local telco companies can pool resources to underwrite the cost of such big-ticket projects.
Possible investment from governments through state-owned enterprises, policy banks and sovereign wealth funds can give states a stake in this important sector. Subsidies and tax incentives can also be extended to attract investors. Financiers and industry actors should factor in environmental, social, and governance principles as they go about their work.
Aside from industry self-policing, regulations should catch up. Undertaking cable installation, repairs and decommissioning should be done with the least harm to the marine environment, fisherfolk and coastal communities, and other sea-based economic activities.
The legal regime governing submarine cables, especially on the continental shelves of coastal states and the high seas, also has to evolve to clarify jurisdictions and responsibilities. This would be handy in the event of accidents, compensation for damages, and accountability in restoring damaged sections. The 2022 explosion of the Nord Stream gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea and last year’s cable cuts that interrupted internet service in Matsu gave rise to suspicions of sabotage or intentional impairment of vital undersea infrastructure.
However, the difficulty of undertaking deepwater investigations posed challenges in identifying the real culprits, let alone their motives. Such critical infrastructure should be spared from conflict or geopolitical tensions, and data that flows through subsea cables should be deemed inviolable. The rise of autonomous uncrewed underwater vehicles can be a double-edged sword in the security of submarine cables as they can be used by state or non-state actors for their agendas.
Given the importance of submarine cables, the international community needs to have some serious discussions about protecting them.
Lucio Blanco Pitlo III is president of the Philippine Association for Chinese Studies and a research fellow at the Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation. He was a former Ministry of Foreign Affairs Taiwan Fellow affiliated with the Department of Diplomacy and Center for Foreign Policy Studies at National Chengchi University.
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