The formation of Taiwanese democracy is the result of resisting martial law under the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). However, the consolidation of democracy is still unfinished because of a lack of self-criticism and a half-formed national subjectivity.
It would seem as if the problem rests solely with those who came and dominated us, placing responsibility for this domination solely at the feet of the KMT.
However, rule by a minority was allowed to form, and colonial syndrome enabled them to carry out oppression to their heart’s content. Despite Taiwan’s history, we should ask ourselves: Does every single Taiwanese — especially those living with post-colonial syndrome — not have any responsibility or agency in this?
South Korea, which was also colonized by Japan, after gaining independence after World War II, and despite the division of the Korean Peninsula into North and South Korea after the Korean War, has a continuous history of criticism and self-rectification. In South Korean culture, people continue to reckon with their history and examine themselves.
After Taiwan cast off the yoke of Japanese colonialism, it faced a new but similar colonial rule of the so-called Chinese “motherland.” Plenty of Taiwanese were willing to help the KMT during the 228 Massacre. The hushed metaphor that the “dogs [Japanese] have left and the pigs [Chinese] have arrived” allows Taiwan’s criticism of foreign rule to overlook some of Imperial-era Japan’s treatment and point to China. Taiwan’s unresolved history is accumulating in the shadow of time.
From Japanese colonialism to the Republic of China’s post-World War II quasi-colonialism to a democratized Republic of China on Taiwan, the buildup of historic silt and grime exists in the gaps of these transitions of power, where these historic remains are stuck and left uncleaned.
Taiwanese poet Chin Lien (錦連) expressed in his poem Him (他) the kind of fickle and untrustworthy fortune-chasing person who altered course at the slightest change in the political winds, who teamed up with dark-hearted powers that came to Taiwan.
“He is sensitive to history / he flies the flag of whoever is in the ascendance.
“He will take the awe-inspiring banners of those in power / and those whose flags are most striking.
“Whichever slogans and cheers are the loudest and most piercing, he will cheer them too.
“Forgive him, I would advise you / my voice full of dismay and sorrow,
“I advise you, forgive him / just as I would forgive you.”
The themes of this poem are resistance, and even more so, self-criticism. Chin Lien was a Taiwanese poet who wrote his works in Japanese and Chinese. During his youth, he lived through the 228 Incident and the massacres that ensued — events whose political stains and shadows cannot be erased.
After World War II, Taiwanese, mired in confusion and bewilderment, did not get to choose an independent and sovereign national direction. The beginning of the nation’s tragedy has only extended our nation’s road of hardships, and to this day, we are entangled in the mirage of the Chinese Communist Party, spawned from a KMT political Gordian Knot.
Taiwan’s road to democracy has not been a smooth one. Materialism is sometimes viewed more favorably than our national spirit. Economic accomplishment is emphasized over cultural development, creating a shining spotlight on production and consumerism, yet our national conditions are not sufficient and there is internal strife. This reflects the social pathology of colonial syndrome or postcolonial syndrome.
The Kaohsiung Incident in 1979 shone a light on the power of Taiwanese resistance — a point of honor and pride for the nation’s democracy, and yet, the democracy movement lacks a spirit of self-criticism.
There exists in Taiwan a force that blocks nation-building: A few political opportunists and trendsetters block Taiwan’s road to normal national development through grandstanding and by fishing in troubled waters.
One by one, the “him” in Chin Lien’s poem forms new dirt on the unresolved history.
Besides resistance, Taiwanese must also be able to self-criticize, as our experience is also one of participating in dominating structures under colonialism and quasi-colonialism, reaping undue benefits.
In post-democratization Taiwanese, the power to rebuild or destroy comes from within.
Lee Min-yung is a poet.
Translated by Tim Smith
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