Wed, Aug 21, 2024 page8

• The escalating ‘gray zone’ conflicts

  • By Chen Kuan-ting 陳冠廷
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  In the past few years, China has increasingly encroached upon Taiwan’s air and maritime domains. Whether through military aircraft crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait or official and civilian sea vessels intruding into Taiwan’s exclusive economic zone, China aims to gradually alter the “status quo” in the Strait. By normalizing the presence of its aircraft and vessels in strategic locations, China exerts further pressure on Taiwan, creating a strategic environment favorable to its interests.

  Although China’s actions have not reached the level of “war” or “armed conflict,” they have effectively pushed Chinese air and maritime forces significantly eastward beyond the median line of the Strait. That indicates that China’s intention to change the “status quo” in the Strait is no longer theoretical, but rather an ongoing process.

  China employs various means to carry out its “gray zone” operations, including the deployment of so-called maritime militia civilian ships, as well as vessels from its coast guard, navy, maritime surveillance operations and fishery law enforcement.

  Since the implementation of China’s “State Council Institutional Reform and Functional Transformation Plan” in 2013, the China Coast Guard has unified vessels from the areas of maritime surveillance, fishery law enforcement and customs anti-smuggling under its command. This consolidation of authority allows for more coordinated deployments under a unified policy framework.

  Following the successive enactment of the Coast Guard Law and the Maritime Traffic Safety Law in 2021, China has adopted a strategy centered on “lawfare.” By codifying policies, China aims to prepare for disputes with other countries in regions such as the East China Sea and the South China Sea.

  This approach not only solidifies China’s discursive power on issues in disputed waters, but also provides legal justification for its response during conflicts, enabling Beijing to claim it is acting within the law.

  While the China Coast Guard appears to be an armed maritime police force based on its actual missions, a closer analysis reveals that since legal amendments in 2018, it has been wholly incorporated under the command of the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force, which in turn reports directly to the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party.

  Although it bears the title of maritime “police,” the China Coast Guard is essentially a military force controlled by the commission. Its role should not be viewed merely as a domestic law enforcement agency, but rather as a military combat unit disguised as a police force.

  Its military nature is further demonstrated by the many China Coast Guard vessels that have been converted from missile frigates or landing ships, which inherently possess naval warship advantages.

  The China Coast Guard commands more than 500 vessels of various types, including 120 ships exceeding 1,000 tonnes. It also boasts the world’s largest coast guard vessel, the CCG 3901, with a full-load displacement of 12,000 tonnes, surpassing even the US’ Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and Taiwan’s Keelung-class destroyers. Not only that, but the 76mm gun mounted on the CCG 3901 gives it overwhelming firepower against other maritime law enforcement vessels in the region.

  Examining the organizational structure of the China Coast Guard’s North, East and South sea fleet commands reveals that each possess its own aviation brigade.

  The East Sea and South Sea fleet commands, which operate in waters adjacent to Taiwan, control the First and Second Aviation Brigades respectively. The units operate Xian MA60H and modified Y-12 maritime patrol aircraft, providing the coast guard with real-time surveillance capabilities against unspecified targets at any time.

  In contrast, Taiwan established the Coast Guard Administration (CGA) under the Executive Yuan in 2000. Following the creation of the Ocean Affairs Council in 2018, it was incorporated under its jurisdiction and renamed the Coast Guard Administration, Ocean Affairs Council. It essentially functions as a maritime police force.

  While it can be incorporated into the military command structure during wartime, as stipulated by Article 4, Paragraph 2 of the National Defense Act (國防法) and Article 24 of the Organization Act of the Coast Guard Administration (行政院海岸巡防署組織法), its vessels are not primarily designed for military combat operations.

  Although it is technically feasible to equip coast guard vessels with weapon systems for combat missions, the challenge lies in the mechanisms and procedures for transitioning from peacetime to wartime operations.

  The question remains whether coast guard vessels can effectively handle three distinctly different missions: peacetime operations, gray zone conflicts and wartime scenarios.

  That is particularly crucial during gray zone conflicts, which could potentially escalate into full-scale war.

  Given the blurred line between law enforcement and military operations, it is uncertain whether the current coast guard possesses sufficient situational awareness to assist in assessing and managing such complex scenarios.

  In terms of vessel quantity, despite the government’s recent significant investments in new ships, the coast guard only operates 16 vessels exceeding 1,000 tonnes.

  Comparatively, in the 2,000 to 3,000 tonne class, the China Coast Guard fleet is nearly 10 times larger, not to mention the other maritime vessels under Chinese control that are not part of their official system.

  Furthermore, the CGA lacks its own maritime patrol aircraft, further highlighting the scarcity of resources available for maritime law enforcement in comparison to its Chinese counterpart.

  Recent conflicts between the Taiwanese coast guard and Chinese vessels reveal that the CGA remains the first line of defense against China’s gray zone tactics.

  However, as Taiwan’s navy does not routinely share intelligence with the CGA during peacetime, it is questionable whether it can provide commanding officers with an aligned common operational picture of conflict areas.

  The alignment of data received from different patrolling bodies is crucial for decisionmakers to anticipate and gain a comprehensive overview of potential scenarios — an area, or rather a skill, where there might still be room for improvement.

  Taiwan’s 2020 National Ocean Policy White Paper states that the establishment of maritime domain awareness is a concrete measure for maintaining maritime security.

  The document explicitly states that the government should implement measures to “effectively monitor all maritime activities within its jurisdictional waters and their impacts on national security, other aspects of maritime safety, economy and environment.”

  To fully realize the policy, in addition to gradually upgrading the performance of coast guard vessels to better address high-tense situations, it is crucial to update coastal radar equipment systems.

  The coast guard should also establish systems for rapid deployment to target areas and long-term real-time monitoring of extensive maritime surfaces. That would effectively enhance the coast guard’s ability to track near, medium and long-range targets, thereby improving their promptness and capabilities in situation management.

  The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), comprised of Australia, India, Japan and the US, proposed the “Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness” initiative at its summit in Tokyo on May 23, 2022. The core of the initiative is to integrate and share data from the automatic identification system and radio frequency technology of Indo-Pacific partner countries, enabling them to have more real-time strategic situational awareness of their maritime domains.

  From a law enforcement perspective, while real-time imagery from crewed or uncrewed aerial systems might suffice for evidence collection, the accumulation of information from this technology would provide partner countries with enhanced long-term strategic and predictive efficiency.

  The initiative would significantly improve the surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities of the Quad countries in the Indo-Pacific region, reducing the cognitive gap in regional situations and shortening response times.

  Outside of enhancing navigational safety, the initiative would also improve the effectiveness of precision strikes from a military standpoint. Consequently, it would aid in deterring expansionist actions by certain countries in the region.

  An analysis of recent threats faced by countries in the East and South China seas reveals that future pressures in the region would not be limited to the Taiwan Strait. Methods to share or exchange intelligence with potential allies might be a relatively soft and feasible issue to address.

  The 2020 National Ocean Policy White Paper outlined Taiwan’s intent to build maritime domain awareness programs. From a timing perspective, that demonstrates a far-sighted strategic vision, even predating the Quad’s “Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness.”

  To realize this vision under asymmetric conditions, it is crucial to employ advanced technologies and leverage rapid, real-time and mobile systems for continuous monitoring of conflict areas.

  That would enable Taiwan to establish a controllable and visible line of demarcation in gray zone conflicts. Such measures would provide the CGA greater capacity to enforce the law, while simultaneously addressing increasingly frequent and sudden situations of contention, thereby ensuring national security.

  Such an endeavor deserves the government’s attention and long-term investment. By enhancing its maritime domain awareness, Taiwan can better navigate the complex environment in the region, protect its interests and contribute to regional stability. The implementation of such strategies would not only bolster Taiwan’s defensive capabilities, but also potentially increase its value as a partner in regional security initiatives.

  Chen Kuan-ting is a member of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee at the Legislative Yuan representing Chiayi County Constituency 2. He was formerly special assistant to the Democratic Progressive Party chairperson and former president Tsai Ing-wen, the CEO of Taiwan NextGen Foundation, a researcher at the National Security Council and an adjunct lecturer in Tamkang University’s Department of Diplomacy and International Relations.
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