China’s visa tactics
The National Audit Office’s 2023 Central Government Final Accounts Audit listed 171 countries that grant Taiwanese visa-free entry, a new record.
However, at the end of April, that number had dropped to 166 countries.
In the past few years, following China’s increased pressure on Taiwan, some countries’ visa policies are being readjusted to Taiwan’s detriment. Botswana has canceled its e-visa system’s Taiwan option from its pull-down menu. It forces Taiwanese to choose “China,” leading to Taiwanese travelers being unable to truly enjoy the benefits of e-visa service and treatment.
Kazakhstan and Colombia have similar visa policies.
China is attempting to use foreign diplomatic pressure to isolate Taiwan. This not only affects travel convenience for Taiwanese, but also harms trade and human exchanges between Taiwan and other countries. This move by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cannot stop Taiwanese support for our own democratic freedoms, but instead deepens feelings of antipathy and resentment toward China. China’s actions halt the development of peace in the Taiwan Strait.
The CCP should stop trying to suppress Taiwan’s national status. Doing so would create a foundation for mutual respect and understanding, and the pursuit of peace and prosperity.
Chang Ya-jou
Taipei
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